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ABSTRACT 
 




The Japanese military administration of Southeast Asia during the Second World War 
was meant to rebuild the prewar colonial system in the region under strong, centralized control. 
Different Japanese administrators disagreed over tactics, but their shared goal was to transform 
the inhabitants of the region into productive members of a new imperial formation, the Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Shōnan, the wartime name for Singapore, was meant to be the 
center of this Co-Prosperity Sphere in Southeast Asia. It was the strategic fulcrum of the region, 
one of its most important ports, and a center of culture and learning for the wartime Japanese. 
Home to thousands of Japanese administrators during the war and a linguistically, ethnically, and 
religiously diverse local population, Shōnan was a site of active debates over the future of the 
Sphere. Three assumptions undergirded these discussions: that of Japanese preeminence within 
the Sphere, the suitability of “rule by minzoku (race)” for Southeast Asians, and the importance 
of maintaining colonial social hierarchies even as Japanese administrators attempted to put the 
region on a total war footing. These goals were at odds with each other, and Japanese rule only 
upended social hierarchies and exacerbated racial tensions. The unintended legacy of the 
wartime empire lay, not only in the new opportunities that Japanese rule afforded to Southeast 
Asian revolutionaries, but in the end of the politics of accommodation with imperial power 
practiced by prewar Asian elites. The result of Japanese rule under the Co-Prosperity Sphere was 
the emergence of a new, confrontational form of politics that made it impossible to return to 
prewar colonial practice. Even in Singapore, the bastion of British power in Southeast Asia, 
Japanese rule undermined the Asian foundation that Western imperialism had been built on.  
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Note on Romanization, Names, and Abbreviations 
 
English was widely used throughout the Japanese occupation of Singapore. As a result, the 
Japanese military administration was forced to translate Japanese concepts into English, along 
with Malay and Chinese, and romanize Japanese names daily. Translations were often poor and 
sometimes bizarre, while romanization was inconsistent: the administration generally relied on 
Kunrei-shiki romanization but would occasionally use Hepburn romanization, such as in the 
name of the primary English propaganda newspaper during the occupation, which was variously 
called the Syonan Times, the Syonan Sinbun, and the Syonan Shimbun. 
 
For the convenience of English-language readers, I have opted to use the modified Hepburn 
romanization found in Kenkyusha’s New Japanese-English Dictionary throughout this 
dissertation. I have used this romanization for the wartime name of Singapore as well, writing 
Shōnan except when referencing specific publications (such as the Syonan Times) or in direct 
quotations from English-language sources. While much of the previous work on this subject has 
used Kunrei-shiki romanization for the name Shōnan, from my experience this has led to 
confusion among English speakers over its pronunciation. 
 
While wartime sources often misspelled the names of Japanese figures, this was particularly true 
of one of the most important administrators in Shōnan: Mayor Ōdachi Shigeo (). Malay 
and English publications regularly mis-transliterated the mayor’s name as Odate. They were not 
alone in this mistake: Japanese speakers regularly mispronounced his name as “Ōdate” as well, 
which was a source of great personal frustration for the civil servant.1 As a result, while some 
scholars may be more familiar with referring to this figure as Ōdate, I will refer to him as Ōdachi 
Shigeo. 
 
In this dissertation, I romanized Chinese words using Hanyu Pinyin. However, when it comes to 
Chinese names, I used the romanization that each individual mentioned in the text used for 
themselves. In the rare circumstances when I was unable to track down an individual’s preferred 




NIDS: National Institute of Defense Studies, Japan 
OHC: Oral History Centre, National Archives of Singapore 
                                               
1 Ōdachi Shigeo Denki Kankōkai, ed. 	
, Ōdachi Shigeo 	
 (Tokyo: Ōdachi Shigeo 
Denki Kankōkai 	
, 1956), 437. 
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Introduction – Shōnan and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
 
 Singapore sits of the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula in Southeast Asia. Situated at 
the eastern end of the Malacca Strait, it straddles the sea lanes that run between the Indian Ocean 
and the South China Sea. For much of its modern history, Singapore was part of the British 
Empire, the largest city in a patchwork of colonial territories and protectorates collectively 
known as British Malaya. It was the administrative center of the Straits Settlements Crown 
Colony (which also included Penang and Malacca), whose governor also served as the British 
High Commissioner for the Federated Malay States. From the establishment of the first British 
settlement on the island in 1819, Singapore served as a bastion of British military power in East 
Asia. In the 1920s and the 1930s, after the construction of new battlements and a state-of-the-art 
naval base along its northern coast, the island city was referred to as Britain’s ‘impregnable 
fortress’ in the Far East. It had also developed into one of the largest ports in Southeast Asia. 
More than three-quarters of the population was Chinese, while the local Malay and Indian 
communities constituted approximately ten percent of the population.1 It was also home to the 
diasporic communities of the Indian Ocean, including Hadhrami Arabs, Armenians, Jews, and 
Parsis, as well as a substantial Eurasian (mixed-race) population. Singapore flourished as the 
strategic, political, and economic heart of the British Empire in Southeast Asia. By the 1940s, 
Singapore’s preeminence had also made it a prime military target. 
                                               
1 Statistics Department, S.S. & F.M.S, Malayan Year Book, 1939 (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1939), 36–
37. 
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 Japanese soldiers landed on 
the northern coast of the Malay 
Peninsula early in the morning 
of December 8, 1941. They 
were members of the 25th Army, 
under the command of 
Lieutenant General Yamashita 
Tomoyuki (ì?Èĺ), and 
would spend the next two 
months marching down the 
peninsula through British Malaya toward their ultimate goal, which was to capture the 
‘impregnable fortress’ at Singapore (See Figure 1). Along the way, they fought British, 
Australian, and Indian troops, as well as volunteers recruited from the local Chinese, Malay, and 
Eurasian populations. These men were some of the best-trained forces of a globe-spanning 
imperial power, but the Japanese had been planning their invasion for months. The Japanese 
Imperial Army had battle-hardened veterans from the war in China, which had begun in 1937, 
technological superiority, and, after the sinking of the H.M.S. Prince of Wales and Repulse on 
December 10, control of the seas and skies. Yet the world was stunned when, on February 15, 
1942, the British surrendered Singapore to Yamashita’s army. In his memoirs, Winston Churchill 
described the fall of Singapore as “the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British History.”2 
                                               
2 Winston Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, vol. 4 of The Second World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), 
92. 
Figure 1: Map of Singapore in early 1940s. Note the built-up area along the 
southern coast. The developed area just north of the island is the capital of the 
state of Johor, Johor Bahru. From Lionel Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, Vol. 4 of 
Australia in the War of 1939–1945 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957). 
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In Japan, it was the occasion for mass celebrations that rivaled those held after the successful 
raid on Pearl Harbor two months earlier. 
 Many histories of the Second World War in Singapore, particularly those written in the 
decades after the war, stop here, with the much evoked “Fall of Singapore.” But for the people 
who lived there, the two-month Malayan Campaign was prelude to a three-and-a-half-year 
occupation by the Japanese military. Before the invasion, Singapore had been the center of 
British imperial power in East Asia. Under Japanese occupation, it became, in the words of its 
first Japanese Mayor Ōdachi Shigeo (ÃɆȉɤ), “the nerve center of the Southern Regions 
(Nanpō ľ).”3 The city was renamed Shōnan (Ņ), the “Light of the South,” connecting it in 
name to Hirohito, the Shōwa (Ņ¢) Emperor. By mid-1942 the Allies had been driven from 
Southeast Asia, and Shōnan, centrally located in the new Japanese occupied territories in 
                                               
3 Shingapōru Shiseikai 2Q-CRMĢśy, Shōnan Tokubetsushi shi—Senjichū no Shingapōru ůµǀĢÁよ
ŏŰ\2Q-CRM (Tokyo: Nihon Shingapōru Kyōkai ŨŽ2Q-CRM´y, 1986), 217. 
Figure 2: Occupation Zones in Wartime Southeast Asia circa July 1942. Shōnan is starred. Map made by author in Google My 
Maps. Map data ©2018 GBRMPA, Google, SK telecom, ZENRIN. 
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Southeast Asia and geographically distant from Allied forces in India, Australia, and the Pacific, 
became the center of operations from which the Japanese military administered the region and 
sought to extract its natural resources to fuel the imperial war machine. For much of the war it 
served as the headquarters of the Southern Expeditionary Army, which oversaw Japanese army 
operations in Southeast Asia and the military administrations of Malaya, Burma, Sumatra, Java, 
North Borneo, and the Philippines. It sat at the center of the Japanese army’s zone of control in 
the western half of Southeast Asia (See Figure 2) and, while the Japanese navy was given an 
occupation zone in the east that included Sulawesi, South Borneo, New Guinea, Guam, and the 
Bismarck, Maluku, and Lesser Sunda Islands, a large proportion of the imperial fleet was 
stationed at the British-built naval base on the northern coast of Shōnan.4 Its port had always 
been a center of shipping for the region, but as the headquarters for Japan’s Southern Areas Air 
Transportation Department (Nanpō Kōkū Yusōbu ľȄǏȻȿɏ) it became the wartime hub 
for regional air travel as well.5 Flight paths radiated from Shōnan to all corners of Southeast 
Asia, bringing generals, scientists, cultural figures, and pro-Japanese leaders such as Subhas 
Chandra Bose of India and Sukarno of the occupied Dutch East Indies through the city on their 
way around the region and to and from Japan. Prominent Japanese figures like writers Hayashi 
Fumiko (ŞȆǲÍ) and Ibuse Masuji (IUɱH), film director Ozu Yasujirō (èƃÑHɍ), 
political economist Itagaki Yoichi (ŝ»ȁ;), and biologist Kooriba Kan (Ɏ¿à) all spent 
                                               
4 This division of the region was decided in a joint agreement between the army and navy on November 21, 1941. 
Hata Ikuhiko ǭɲķ, Nanpō gunsei no kikō/kanbu gunseikan ichiran µŤɝśƓƏ9ĪɴɝśāSȹ (Tokyo: 
Nanpō Gunseishi Kenkyū Fōramu µŤɝśÁǟǱA,RKE, 1998), 2. 
5 This organization was formed out of the 13th and 15th Special Air Transportation Corps on September 15, 1942 
and was under the control of the Southern Expeditionary Army. Most of its staff was made up of air and ground 
crew from Imperial Japanese Airways (Dai Nippon Kōkū ñŨŽțǲ) and other Japanese-controlled airlines. 
Flights to the Japanese mainland were controlled by Imperial Japanese Airways and often flew via Saigon and 
Taipei, but the Air Transportation Department flew as far away as Ambon and had a crew training center in Java. 
Hata, 17. 
 5 
some time in Shōnan.6 The city was meant to be the strategic, political, economic, cultural, and 
scientific capital of the southern portion of a new Japanese imperial formation in Asia, the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Daitōa Kyōeiken ÃŚJvŢ²). 
 
The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in Wartime Southeast Asia 
 For decades after the Second World War, historians dismissed the Co-Prosperity Sphere 
as a sham perpetuated by Japanese propagandists to justify the exploitation of other Asians 
during the war. This is surely what the Co-Prosperity Sphere meant to many of the local 
population dragooned to serve as forced laborers or ‘comfort women’ in the system of military-
supervised brothels in Japanese-controlled Asia. Recently, however, historians such as Nakano 
Satoshi and Jeremy Yellen have begun to reexamine the place of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in the 
wartime Japanese empire. Nakano has argued that, because of the constantly shifting strategic 
situation during the war, it is difficult to judge the Sphere on its merits because the Japanese 
were never able to fully implement it.7 Instead, he focuses on the way the experience of wartime 
occupation transformed the thinking of Japanese participants about such concepts as “co-
prosperity” and “independence,” ultimately leading some of them to reject Japanese imperial 
practice and embrace the anticolonial ideology of the Southeast Asians they lived beside.8 
Jeremy Yellen describes the Sphere as a “process or contest of beliefs” that different individuals 
                                               
6 Matsuoka Masakazu ƂĘūÐ, “’Shōnantō’ ni okeru ‘bunkajin’: Kodomo muke shinbun kara no kōsatsu ůµ
ě#Š®mˀÉţȎ!ȌĊˀ” in Shokuminchi kyōikushi kenkyū nenpō ƋƠãŞ
ȔǟǱĩ, No. 14 (2011), 143. 
7 Nakano Satoshi \ɷȏ, Tōnan ajia senryō to Nihonjin: Teikoku-Nihon no kaitai Ɓµ'3'·ʑŨŽmˁĥ
Ý9ŨŽ、} (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten ęƪųĮ, 2012), 25–26. 
8 Nakano, Tōnan ajia, 25–26. Nakano Satoshi \ɷȏ, “Shokuminchi tōchi to Nanpō gunsei: Teikoku-Nihon no 
kaitai to Tōnan Ajia ƋƠãȅƨµŤɝś−ĥÝ9ŨŽ、}Ɓµ'3',” in Kurasawa Aiko Ʀŉü et 
al., Shihai to bōryoku řɶŲ¥, vol. 7 of Iwanami Kōza: Ajia-Taiheiyō Sensō ęƪɐıʬ'3'9óĨƬŏd 
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten ęƪųĮ, 2006), 23–25. 
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or groups could try to work to their advantage.9 He argues that Japanese Foreign Minister 
Matsuoka Yōsuke (ŜíƂ) coined the term “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” after 
the German conquest of Western Europe in 1940 in order to warn Germany off from claiming 
Dutch and French possessions in Southeast Asia.10 As Japan’s military position declined in 1943, 
Japanese diplomats recast the Co-Prosperity Sphere as a “new deal for Asia,” in order to win 
both occupied peoples and neutral nations to Japan’s side, at the same time allowing new 
opportunities for some of Japan’s collaborators to claim a greater degree of autonomy.11 The 
significance of the Co-Prosperity Sphere lay in the ways that it shaped the behavior of both 
occupiers and the occupied in wartime Southeast Asia. 
 The Sphere may have come out of an immediate strategic concern about the extension of 
Nazi power into Asia in 1940, but it was also part of a decade-long effort to reconcile the 
expansion of Japanese power in Asia with the mobilization demanded by total war. By the 
beginning of the 1930s, Japanese strategic thinkers were preoccupied with the difficulties that the 
Japanese Empire, with its limited access to natural resources, would have in a battle against 
superpowers like the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in the new age of 
total war (sōryokusen ǩĨ). A growing number of officers, and particularly members of the 
“Control Faction” (tōseiha Ǧ}ƅ) of the Japanese Army, believed that Japan required a 
“national mobilization state” based on a planned national economy that would allow it to weather 
protracted conflicts with world powers.12 The Japanese would need greater access to strategic 
                                               
9 Jeremy Yellen, “The Two Pacific Wars: Visions of Order and Independence in Japan, Burma, and the Philippines, 
1940–1945,” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2012), 5. 
10 Yellen, 65. 
11 Yellen, 212–213, 263–264. 
12 Edward J. Drea. Japan’s Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853–1945. (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 
2009), 177. 
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resources, which had been one of the reasons that the Japanese Guandong Army (Kwantung 
Army, Kantō-gun ɝŚȷ), stationed in in China’s Liaodong Peninsula, engineered the takeover 
of Manchuria in 1931 to create an economic “lifeline” (seimeisen ƪ¡ǫ) for Japan.13 But the 
growing preoccupation with mobilization and the controlled economy ran into a problem in this 
new colonial possession. As Prasenjit Duara has argued, a schism occurred between nationalism 
and imperialism in the early twentieth century. While these ideologies had reinforced each other 
during the rapid expansion of Western imperial power in the late nineteenth century, by the 
1930s the world’s empires had been forced to confront the conflict between imperial domination 
and the growing global salience of “antiimperialist nationalism.”14 In order to blunt international 
criticism for their imperial project of Manchuria, the Japanese sought to claim that their actions 
were not imperialist at all. To square the circle, the Guandong Army created the puppet-state of 
Manchukuo, an institution that was totally beholden to it but ostensibly represented an 
“authentic” expression of East Asian political traditions of moral governance and inter-ethnic 
harmony. Duara argues that this imperialism that refused its name prefigured the “regional 
economic blocs” of the Cold War, when the United States and Soviet Union “controlled many 
formally independent nations.”15 Japanese in Manchuria also saw this new imperial rhetoric as 
necessary to win the support of the people, with whom Japanese advisors in the Manchukuo state 
and soldiers in the Guandong Army sought to create a direct, productive relationship.16 The 
                                               
13 The term “lifeline” was also coined by Matsuoka Yōsuke during a Diet speech in 1931. Louise Young, Japan’s 
Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 
88. 
14 Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 16–17. 
15 Duara, 14. 
16 The Concordia Association (Kyōwakai ´Ðy) is a particularly illustrative case of Japanese mass mobilization in 
Manchuria, though control over the organization was contested between Japanese civilian idealists, bureaucrats in 
the Manchukuo puppet-state, and officers in the Guandong Army. See Young, 286–291. Duara, 73–39. Janis 
Mimura, Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State (Ithaca: Cornell University 
 8 
imperial strategies that the Japanese developed in Manchuria provide a model for Japan’s 
haphazard wartime occupation of China after 1937 and its more deliberate and planned takeover 
of Southeast Asia after 1941. 
 
Shōnan at the Center of the Southern Co-Prosperity Sphere 
As the center of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in Southeast Asia, Shōnan was home to the 
Southern Expeditionary Army’s military administration directorate, the military administration 
headquarters for Malaya (and, until April 1943, Sumatra), and its own municipal government.17 
Despite the fact that the Japanese military had formal control over occupied Southeast Asia, the 
layers of Japanese administration based in 
the city were run by civilian bureaucrats, 
chiefly recruited from offices in the home 
islands. These civil servants vastly 
outnumbered military servicemen in the 
administration. Indeed, the Shōnan 
Special Municipality (Shōnan Tokubetsu-
shi Ņƙ{ö), which administered the 
city formerly known as Singapore, was 
entirely civilian-run by the end of 1942.18 
                                               
Press, 2011), 80–84. Ōdachi Shigeo Denki Kankōkai, ed. ñɬȟʈzɀȱyȉの, Ōdachi Shigeo ñɬȟʈ 
(Tokyo: Ōdachi Shigeo Denki Kankōkai ñɬȟʈzɀȱy, 1956), 112–136. 
17 For more information on these different layers of administration, see Appendix A. 
18 I refer to these civil servants as “civilians,” even though the current Japanese term for “civilian” (bunmin ŠƠ), 
as in “civilian control [of the military]” (bunmin tōsei ŠƠȅ¡), is a neologism from the postwar Japanese 
constitution. John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton & 




































































Military 69 72 71 77 49 52 55 54
Bureaucrat or
Equivalent 263 320 433 501 562 727 12632454
Civilian Employee 102 126 134 186 175 305 412 459
Breakdown of Malayan Military 
Administration Staff
March 1942 to January 1943
Figure 3: Data from Kurasawa Aiko ed., Hiroku: Senji Geppō/Gunsei 
Geppō, Vols. 1–3 (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha, 2000).  
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Civilians also played prominent roles within the regional military administrations of Java, 
Burma, Borneo, and the Philippines, but Shōnan became home to thousands of these civilian 
administrators. The concentration of Japanese soldiers and civilians in the city made Shōnan a 
prominent site of contestation between different visions of the wartime administration of 
Southeast Asia. Civilian and military administrators of Shōnan shared a common language of 
occupation, as they struggled to achieve the “three great objectives” (san daiganmoku =ÃƻƸ) 
laid out in plans drawn up before the war—restoring order, acquiring strategic resources, and 
achieving operational self-sufficiency—and to “construct” (kensetsu suru ĆȢ) the new 
Co-Prosperity Sphere. But the administrators disagreed sharply about how best to achieve these 
goals. Some, like Malayan military administration chief Colonel Watanabe Wataru (ƊɉƊ), felt 
that the people of Southeast Asia could only become productive members of the Co-Prosperity 
Sphere through force and “spiritual cleansing” (misogi Ǉ).19 Others, like the civil servant Mayor 
Ōdachi, felt that coercion would drive Southeast Asians to rebel against the Japanese and argued 
that public order could only be maintained if the administration secured the livelihood of the 
local population. The conflict between these two administrators was a microcosm of the debates 
that raged across the Japanese wartime empire, most of which focused on the central problem of 
                                               
Japanese subjects (kokumin ÝƠ). They had received their appointments either from the emperor or the 
government on his behalf and were given ranks equivalent to their counterparts in the military. Under the Meiji 
constitution, both military officers (bukan Ɯā) and civil service officers (bunkan Šā) were not considered 
servants of the people of Japan but of the emperor himself. See B.C. Koh, Japan’s Administrative Elite (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1989), 16. I use the term “civilian” anachronistically to make the English-language 
distinction between the combatant (army soldiers and officers) and noncombatant (referred to in Japanese as 
gunzoku ɝĖ, meaning “civilian attached to the military”) staff of the administration. 
19 Here I rely on the translation of historian Akashi Yōji. Akashi Yoji, “Colonel Watanabe Wataru: The Architect of 
the Malayan Military Administration, December 1941–March 1943,” in New Perspectives on the Japanese 
Occupation in Malaya and Singapore, 1941–1945, eds. Akashi Yoji and Yoshimura Mako (Singapore: NUS Press, 
2008), 34. 
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the Co-Prosperity Sphere: the mobilization of the human and natural resources of the diverse 
territories under Japanese control in order to win a total war against the Allied powers. 
 The conflict in Shōnan between military hardliners like Watanabe and paternalistic 
civilian figures like Ōdachi became even more acrimonious and, from an outside perspective, 
pettier as Japan’s military fortunes declined in 1943. Yet their personal enmity obscured the 
logic of Japanese rule in the Co-Prosperity Sphere that they shared with administrators across 
Southeast Asia. This internal logic of the wartime empire framed the Japanese approach to local 
society in Shōnan and elsewhere and set the conditions for the political changes that the 
occupation catalyzed in the region in the years during and after the war. The first assumption of 
the wartime rulers of Southeast Asia was the preeminent role of the Japanese within the Co-
Prosperity Sphere. Only a very few Japanese in positions of power in the administration of 
Southeast Asia believed in the professed mission of “Asian liberation,” or at least any 
“liberation” that would have been recognizable to anticolonial nationalists in the region. Most 
Japanese who went to Southeast Asia were convinced that they needed to liberate its peoples 
from Western imperial rule, but they were equally convinced that its inhabitants would need 
Japanese guidance (shidō ıç) and management (keiei Ǥª) after the Westerners were 
expelled, assuming that they alone could usher in a new, harmonious regional order under the 
auspices of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Members of the Sphere that the Japanese deemed to have a 
higher “civilizational standard” (mindo Źă), such as the Burmese and the Filipinos, would be 
“granted independence under the strong guidance and control of the empire” (teikoku no 
kyōryoku naru shidō haaku no shita ni dokuritsu seshimu ÷°ČıçĮĳ?Ơ
ǐ), similar to the conditional independence that the Japanese had introduced in the 
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puppet-state of Manchukuo a decade earlier.20 By 1943, as Japan began losing the war, its 
leaders were willing to allow more autonomy to the “independent” members of the Sphere.21 But 
Japan’s preeminence within Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere went unquestioned until 
defeat dissolved it in 1945. This preeminence was reinforced by Japanese control of the city at 
the strategic center of the Southern Co-Prosperity Sphere, Shōnan, which was meant to remain 
Japanese imperial territory in perpetuity. 
 The assumption of Japanese preeminence fit into a larger Japanese conception of the 
natural social divisions of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. During the Second World War, the principal 
concept that the Japanese used to explain social difference both within their empire and without 
was minzoku (ŹŁ), or race. While the term is best translated as “ethnicity” today, in the mid-
twentieth century the concept of minzoku was tied to an assumption of shared descent, and in its 
extreme forms to an unbroken, primordial bloodline.22 Analogous to the British Empire’s 
                                               
20 The term mindo is more commonly translated as “cultural standard” today, but it implies a level of developed 
achieved by an entire people. Daihon’ei Rikugunbu ñŽÖなɝɴ, “Nanpō senryōchi kaku chiiki betsu tōchi yōkō 
µŤ·ʑãÄãèȅƨȶȇ,” in Nanpō no gunsei µŤɝś, ed. Bōeichō Bōei Kenkyūjo Senshibu てȲĬて
ȲǟǱŒŏÁɴȉ (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha źʌţȎǣ, 1985), 110. Even independent Thailand was flatly 
informed in late 1942 that “independence had taken on a new meaning” in Greater East Asia and that Manchukuo 
“should serve as the proper model for independent Asian states.” E. Bruce Reynolds, "Anomaly or Model? 
Independent Thailand's Role in Japan's Asian Strategy, 1941–1943," in The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945, 
ed. by Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 260. 
21 Thailand, always a reluctant ally of the Japanese and eager to disassociate itself with Japan once the Allies began 
their advance into Southeast Asia, was at least secure in its independence from this year forward. Reynolds, 267–
273. 
22 This term is translated as “ethnicity” today but in its current usage the term ethnicity does not capture the 
meaning of minzoku in the mid-twentieth century. More than any other scholar, anthropologist Fredrik Barth has 
helped to decouple our modern understanding of ethnicity as a basis for group identification from an assumption 
of biological descent. He argued that the study of ethnic groups as ideal types defined by shared descent and 
culture prevented anthropologists from “understanding the phenomenon of ethnic groups and their place in 
human society and culture.” This treatment saw ethnicities in relative isolation from each other, and “produced a 
world of separate peoples, each with their culture and each organized in a society which can be legitimately 
isolated for description as an island to itself.” In his seminal introduction to Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, he 
called for anthropologists to shift the focus of their studies away from describing these ideal types to the 
boundaries of ethnic groups, and how they are created and maintained. Fredrik Barth, “Introduction,” in Ethnic 
Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), 
11. Our current understanding of the basis of ethnicity in a combination of cultural markers, of which shared 
ancestry may but not must be one, has been far more analytically useful to modern scholars of human society. The 
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conception of “race” or Nazi usage of Volk, by the early 1940s the term minzoku was also used 
hierarchically to identify the different peoples of the Japanese empire based on their level of 
social development. As with the other racist ideologies of the mid-twentieth century, Japanese 
imperial ideology posited that the Japanese people had a predestined role in world history: they 
were members of the Yamato minzoku (Ã¢ŹŁ), the only minzoku in Asia that had 
successfully modernized, placing them above colonized nations like the Koreans (chōsen 
minzoku ŐɰŹŁ) and Chinese (kan minzoku ƎŹŁ). Not only had the Yamato minzoku 
achieved a high “civilizational standard” (mindo Źă), they had also managed to maintain their 
essential “spirit” (seishin ǜǅ) while other Asian peoples had been corrupted by the West.23 
This position gave the Yamato minzoku a moral imperative to uplift and develop the minzoku of 
Asia while, especially after the 1930s, protecting them from such socially destructive Western 
ideologies as individualism, liberalism, and communism.24 Kyoto University philosopher 
                                               
assumption of a shared bloodline, however, is built into the etymology of the word minzoku and was essential to 
the Japanese understanding of the term in the twentieth century. Its translations in Chinese (minzu) and Malay 
(bangsa) also denote a shared lineage in a way that our modern understanding of ethnicity does not. “Race” in 
human beings is also a social construct, but one that is predicated on shared ancestry. In North American English, 
due to the legacies of slavery and the system of white supremacy that it produced, “race” is often taken to mean 
skin color. Its closest translation in Japanese is jinrui (mʕ). The rest of the English-speaking world, including 
present-day Singapore, suffer from their own legacies of white supremacy, but the insistence of British imperialists 
on obsessively categorizing the peoples of their empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has 
meant that the term “race” is also understood to signify smaller social groups that North Americans would call 
ethnicities today. Because of its contemporary usage in Singapore, and its specific reference to shared ancestry, in 
this dissertation I will translate minzoku as “race.” 
23 Nakano, Tōnan ajia, 99–101. Not all imperial ideologues considered the Japanese seishin to be pure of Western 
corruption but considered themselves to be purer than their counterparts in East Asia. 
24 Kevin Doak and Frank Dikötter have both written extensively on the development of the concept of minzoku in 
Japan. Dikötter has also engaged with Chinese uses of the word minzu, which remains the official descriptor for the 
different ethnicities of the People’s Republic of China. Gregory Clancy offers a useful introduction to the term 
minzoku in the context of occupied Southeast Asia in his introduction to Southeast Asian Minorities in the Wartime 
Japanese Empire, ed. Paul Kratoska (Oxford: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 7–20. A representative and influential 
discussion of the concept of minzoku in wartime Japan can be found in the series of roundtable discussions 
(zadankai ıɌy) between Kōsaka Masa’aki (むäƛʔ), Nishitani Keiji (ȵɖÔƨ), Kōyama Iwao (むėęǋ), and 
Suzuki Shigetaka (そżŎむ), all of whom were associated with Kyoto University. These discussions were published 
under the title The World Historical Stance and Japan (ZǎÁǔǳëŨŽ) by Chuō Kōron in 1943. 
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Nishitani Keiji (șȬ§ſ) connected the racialized ideology of the wartime empire to Nazi 
thought when he declared that the Japanese were a “ruling minzoku” (chishateki minzoku ſǵƳ
ŹŁ) or Herrenvolk (.5689,!#5), the Nazi term for “master race.”25 
 Japanese imperial ideology demanded that its practitioners identify the “various local 
minzoku” (genchi shominzoku ƨ¶ȧŹŁ) of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in order to uplift them 
and, in doing so, win their allegiance to the Japanese wartime project.26 This could prove 
difficult in Southeast Asia, and particularly in a diverse port city like Shōnan, where local 
residents possessed multiple overlapping identities based on religion, language, and place of 
origin. While it was Japanese policy to respect native religions and customs, the administration 
practiced “rule by minzoku,” requiring that local residents identify themselves to the occupation 
state by their race. Minzoku became the primary identifier for understanding and organizing the 
peoples of Southeast Asia, and as occupation policy was implemented along minzoku lines local 
peoples were forced to employ these racial identities on a daily basis. Even organizations that 
supposedly transcended minzoku boundaries, such as the Shōnan Sports Association and the 
local neighborhood association system, still presumed that these were natural categories that 
required transcending and often continued to segregate their members by their perceived 
minzoku. While ethnic tension in Southeast Asia long predated the Japanese occupation, and the 
rulers of the Co-Prosperity Sphere often cribbed their minzoku categories from the work of 
prewar Western anthropologists, rule by minzoku brought the racial differences of Southeast Asia 
into even starker relief. 
                                               
25 Kōsaka Masaaki むäƛŬ et al, Sekaishiteki tachiba to Nihon ZǎÁǔǳëŨŽ (Tokyo: Churō Kōron \õ
ɍ, 1943), 263. 
26 This common formulation can be found in Kurasawa Aiko, ed. Ʀŉü、ʒ, Hiroku: Senji Geppō/Gunsei Geppō 
ǬたRŏŰŷê9ɝśŷê, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha やƳųȚ, 2000), 371–372. 
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 In addition to the assumptions of Japanese preeminence and rule by minzoku in the Co-
Prosperity Sphere, the military administrations of Southeast Asia also sought to maintain the 
colonial status quo in the region. Much to the frustration of radicals in the military, occupation 
guidelines instructed Japanese administrators to maintain the social and political hierarchies of 
the colonial period. They were to discourage nationalist movements (minzoku undō ŹŁɃ), 
work through preexisting (i.e. colonial) administrative structures and reaffirm prewar social 
hierarchies by working through Malay sultans and other native rulers, wealthy overseas Chinese, 
and even white colonialists. Japanese war planners justified this policy by claiming that, to 
achieve victories against powers like the United States and Britain, the military had to devote 
itself first and foremost to acquiring strategic resources. Any radical change in the Co-Prosperity 
Sphere would disrupt this process, and so the earliest plans for the occupation called on Japanese 
administrators to work with those “influential natives” (yūryoku domin ō³Ź) who were 
invested in the existing hierarchies of colonial Southeast Asia. Nakano Satoshi argues that these 
policies were rooted in “realism” (genjitsushugi ƨ×BǴ) and “appeasement” (yūwashugi Ú¢
BǴ) but, on the ground, they meant that the wartime administration of Southeast Asia aimed to 
maintain the prewar colonial system under Japanese control.27 Although the Japanese army 
worked with a few groups of anticolonial nationalists, who had been allies of convenience at the 
time of the invasion, within the first year of the occupation many of these groups had been 
disbanded and some of their leaders were imprisoned. As a result, the closest collaborators with 
the Japanese were members of the prewar Asian colonial elite. 
 These occupation policies revealed the conservative streak that ran through Japanese 
imperial practice. By the mid-twentieth century, as communist and socialist ideas circulated in 
                                               
27 Nakano, “Shokuminchi tōchi,”, 7–14. 
 15 
Eurasia and began to threaten the imperial state on which their elite positions in society 
depended, the leaders of the Japanese military and civil service, much like their counterparts in 
the West, grew more committed to defending the “established social and economic interests, 
elites, and hierarchies” that had served them so well.28 Although generations of Japanese 
radicals, stymied at home by the mounting authoritarianism of the Japanese state in the late 
nineteenth century, set out for Japan’s formal colonies or the informal empire in China to try to 
bring about social revolution that they could then import back to the home islands, it was 
conservatives who held the power to shape imperial policy. In the colonies, too, maintaining and 
controlling existing social hierarchies became a key strategy for extending the authority of the 
colonial state into local society. In Korea, Taiwan, and Micronesia (Nan’yō Guntō Ƃǳï), 
Japanese colonialists forged relationships with existing social elites and incorporated them into 
the structures of the colonial state. Japanese police played an especially critical role in this 
process, serving as representatives of state power in local communities and working with local 
elites to maintain public order.29 Although Japan’s conservative imperial policy had its critics, 
and faced a particularly robust challenge from the “reform bureaucrats” (kakushin kanryō ɨĽ
Õk) at home and in Manchuria in the 1930s, it remained the basis for the status quo-oriented 
occupation policies that the empire adopted in the Co-Prosperity Sphere. 
As a result, the varied approaches that Japanese military administrators took to different 
parts of the Co-Prosperity Sphere were based more on the political conditions that they inherited 
                                               
28 Martin Blinkhorn, “Introduction: Allies, Rivals, or Antagonists? Fascists and Conservatives in Modern Europe,” in 
Fascists and Conservatives: The Radical Right and the Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe, ed. Martin 
Blinkhorn (London: Routledge, 1990), 3. 
29 Hui-yu Caroline Ts’ai Taiwan in Japan’s Empire Building: An Institutional Approach to Colonial Engineering 
(London: Routledge, 2009), 67–68, 84–87, 137–140. Mark R. Peattie, Nan’yō: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in 
Micronesia, 1885–1945 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1988), 73–77. Chulwoo Lee, “Modernity, Legality, 
and Power in Korea Under Japanese Rule,” in Colonial Modernity in Korea, ed. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Edson 
Robinson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), 36–42. 
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from Western colonizers than on disagreements over administrative policy among the Japanese 
themselves. Burma and the Philippines, which had been granted limited autonomy by Britain and 
the United States before the war, were granted ‘guided independence’ and led, not by radical 
allies from the invasion of Southeast Asia, but by such established prewar politicians as Ba Maw 
in Burma and José P. Laurel in the Philippines.30 The local aristocracy in Malaya and East 
Sumatra, meanwhile, were given ceremonial status but ruled under the guidance of Japanese 
advisors, much as they had under the British and the Dutch.31 In Aceh, after an initial flirtation 
with reformist Islamic leaders the Japanese opted to worked with the Dutch-allied ruling class, 
the ulèëbalang, while in Java they adopted wholesale the native bureaucracy of local aristocrats, 
known as the pangreh praja, that the Dutch had constructed over the previous century.32 Shōnan 
and the rest of the Straits Settlements, which had not been granted even ceremonial autonomy 
before the war, were placed under the direct control of the Japanese army as an economic and 
military “base for imperial rule in the South.”33 These decisions were justified based on the 
                                               
30 According to Nakano Satoshi, in the Philippines the Japanese were generally most interested in courting the 
“Pro-American elite” (shinbei erīto Ⱥǻ+LR9). Nakano, “Shokuminchi tōchi,” 10. 
31 Col. Watanabe and a few allies in the Malayan administration did attempt to remove the Sultans from power, 
but they were prevented from doing so by policymakers in Tokyo. Paul H. Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation of 
Malaya, 1941–1945 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997), 67–70. Anthony Reid, The Blood of the People: 
Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule in North Sumatra, 2nd ed. (Singapore: NUS Press, 2014), 101–105. Frank 
Dhont has written about the similar approach of the Japanese administration in Java toward native principalities 
there. Here native rules were given comparatively more freedom but were still very much the preferred partners 
of the Japanese administration. Frank Dhont, “Outlasting Colonialism: Socio-political Change in the Javanese 
Principalities under the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia during World War II,” (PhD diss., Yale University, 2012), 
80–83. 
32 Reid, 102. Kurasawa Aiko Ʀŉü, Nihon senryōka no Jawa nōson no henyō ŨŽ·ʑX3GOɟſîĈ 
(Tokyo: Sōshisha Ƞłǣ, 1992), 423–428. Ethan Mark, “Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture, and the Problems of 
Imperial Modernity in Japanese-occupied Java,” (Phd. Diss., Columbia University, 2003), 220–244. By the end of 
1943 there was an attempt by the Japanese, particularly in Java but also in Malaya, to empower Islamic officials 
and teachers as propagandists for the war effort. This effort provided village-level religious leaders far greater 
visibility in Javanese public life, but daily administration continued to rely on the pangreh praja. See Harry J. Benda, 
The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945 (The Hague: W. van 
Hoeve Ltd., 1958), 132–168. 
33 Nanpōgun Sōshireibu µŤɝȈÃrɴ, Nanpōgun gunsei shikō keikaku (an) µŤɝɝśŦȱȽǍʡƉʢ, 
C14060706000, November 3, 1941, NIDS, 69. 
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assumed “civilization standard” of the minzoku who lived in these territories but, as Nakano 
Satoshi has pointed out, the Japanese ironically based their assumptions about the level of 
development of different Southeast Asian societies on the degree to which they had Westernized 
or been granted autonomy by their colonial rulers.34 As a result, Japanese policy toward the Co-
Prosperity Sphere followed the contours of prewar colonial policy, even in ‘independent’ Burma 
and the Philippines. Only during the desperate final year of the war did the Japanese break with 
prewar precedent, declaring that the East Indies (Higashi Indo Śă) would be granted 
independence (at an undetermined date) in September 1944 and overthrowing the Vichy regime 
in Indochina in March 1945. 
But this conservative occupation policy was not completely averse to change. Martin 
Blinkhorn describes conservatives in twentieth-century Europe as committed to the “pursuit of 
modernizing, developmental policies within a ‘system of order’ in which their own control could 
be guaranteed and perpetuated.”35 In wartime Southeast Asia, Japanese administrative policy 
sought to safeguard traditional hierarchies, but was still committed to placing the entire region on 
a total war footing. Japanese administrators agreed that, to fully mobilize the region’s natural and 
human resources, they needed to establish strong, centralized control over every aspect of social, 
political, and economic life in Southeast Asia. To establish this control while maintaining the 
social status quo in places like Shōnan, they brought Chinese businessmen, Malay aristocrats, 
Arab religious leaders, and Western-educated professionals—social elites who had been closely 
associated with colonial power and who had wielded influence in their communities through a 
variety of social organizations—into a tight, hierarchical relationship with the occupation state as 
                                               
34 Nakano, Tōnan Ajia, 99–100. 
35 Blinkhorn, 3. 
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the face of its mobilization policies. At the same time, the state assumed a far greater role in local 
society than it ever had before the war, particularly in Malaya. It was now tasked with providing 
for refugees, mobilizing local laborers, organizing the shipment of strategic resources to Japan, 
and, toward the end of the war, feeding local people as the regional economy broke down. In 
desperation, the Japanese began turning to their onetime allies of convenience from the initial 
invasion, the anticolonial nationalists, in late 1943, but while these figures spread Japanese 
propaganda and took command of volunteer armies, the Japanese administration continued to 
rely heavily on prewar social elites for daily governance. 
 
Postwar Transformation 
 The administration of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was characterized by 
the assumption of Japanese preeminence, rule by minzoku, and an attempt to achieve total 
mobilization while maintaining existing social hierarchies. But by 1945, these occupation 
policies had wrought changes in Southeast Asia that the Japanese had neither anticipated nor 
intended. Their ‘rule by minzoku’ had exacerbated racial tensions to the extent that there was 
widespread violence between Malay and Chinese guerrilla forces, inflicted chiefly on Malay and 
Chinese villagers and townspeople, in Johor, the Malay state that bordered Shōnan. Tensions 
simmered in Shōnan itself, and there were reports of reprisal killings in the interregnum between 
the Japanese surrender in August 1945 and the British return in September. In contrast to events 
in Java, Sumatra, and Indochina, anticolonial forces in Shōnan and the rest of Malaya did not 
seize on the power vacuum to resist the return of Western imperialism, but this was only because 
the Malay and Indian nationalist movements were in disarray after Malay leader Ibrahim Yaacob 
fled to Java and Indian leader Subhas Chandra Bose perished in a plane crash, while Lai Teck, 
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the head of the Chinese-dominated Malayan Communist Party (MCP) who had long been a 
double agent for the British, resisted calls for revolution from his followers. Lai fled in 1947 and 
the communists began a decades-long guerrilla war one year later, but Malaya did not gain 
independence for another twelve years, and the reborn Singapore remained a British territory 
until 1963. But the Japanese occupation had shifted the political environment of the colony as 
fundamentally as it had in its more revolutionary neighbors. The attempt by the Japanese to 
resuscitate the colonial system under strict centralized control, combined with their belief in their 
own leading role in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, had forced the prewar Asian 
colonial elite into an impossible position. Politics in prewar Singapore, as in the rest of Malaya, 
was based on accommodation with Western imperial power. While the prewar British convinced 
themselves that the stability of their colony depended on their racial prestige, in reality the 
colonial system depended on Asian elites who supported it, not because they were in thrall of 
white supremacy, but because they accrued social and economic benefits from it. Before the war, 
they had been able to present themselves as autonomous liaisons between their communities and 
the colonial state, and their social prestige had been based on their proximity to, but perceived 
independence from, the British. By coopting these same elites in the occupation state, the 
Japanese administration had attempted to continue this politics of accommodation. But the 
Japanese obsession with their role as a “guiding minzoku” (shidō minzoku ıçŹŁ) precluded 
them from giving their elite partners even the appearance of influence over occupation 
policymaking. Their insistence on centralization and control over all aspects of everyday life in 
the face of total war, however, meant that these local partners were forced to become de facto 
agents of the state, as leaders of semi-official social organizations that were charged with 
implementing occupation policy. By the end of the war at best they were seen as puppets, at 
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worst, traitors. While anticolonial nationalists were able to take advantage of the increased 
latitude that the Japanese allowed them from late 1943, Southeast Asia’s accommodationist elite 
had been locked in their positions of servitude since the first months of the occupation. The 
confusion of revolutionary forces in Malaya in the weeks after the Japanese surrender meant that 
most social elites avoided the fates of the ulèëbalang and Malay aristocrats in Aceh and East 
Sumatra, who were massacred.36 But the politics of accommodation that they embodied was 
pushed aside by postwar Singaporeans, who instead embraced new political figures who were 
willing to represent their grievances directly to the returning British administration. 
These grievances had grown during the occupation. The breakdown in regional trade 
during the war and the Japanese administration’s attempt to impose a controlled economy in the 
region had led to the growth of black markets and shortages of food and daily necessities 
throughout Southeast Asia. But Japanese attempts to put the region on a total war footing had 
also extended the state into everyday life on an unprecedented scale. In prewar Singapore, public 
welfare had been left to private charity. In Shōnan, in contrast, the Japanese administration 
became intimately involved in refugee relief, labor mobilization, food distribution, and even 
local sports tournaments. And, the more the occupation state asked of local residents, the more 
the residents began to expect in return. The British had considered the people of Malaya 
politically quiescent before the war, although in reality they had been only dimly aware of the 
intricacies of communal politics, which played out in ostensibly apolitical social organizations. 
When the British returned to Singapore in 1945, intent on introducing sweeping administrative 
reforms without the input of local residents, they were shocked to find that this perceived 
political apathy had vanished. The next year saw the foundation of new political parties, mass 
                                               
36 Reid, 220–227, 243–254. 
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social protests, and crippling strikes carried out by an aggressive labor movement. Although they 
had stumbled in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese surrender, the nationalist and 
communist movements, which had struggled find members before the war, were now flush with 
popular support. The war did not lead to revolution in Malaya and Singapore, but it did result in 
the same revolutionary change in local politics as the rest of Southeast Asia. 
In the following pages, I chart the history of the Japanese wartime occupation of 
Southeast Asia and its aftermath as it unfolded in the center of the Southern Co-Prosperity 
Sphere, Shōnan, the Light of the South. The Japanese administrative apparatus in Shōnan never 
had the level of control over the occupation of the surrounding region that central planners had 
hoped, but the concentration of administrative manpower on the island made it the center of 
debates over how the Japanese should rule Southeast Asia. I examine the assumptions that 
underlay Japanese wartime rule in Shōnan, the process through which the Japanese sought to 
expand the power of the occupation state under the shadow of total war, and the ways they 
coopted Asian colonial elites in order to do so. This is a story of the wartime attempt by an 
imperial power to use social elites to establish its authority in a new territorial possession and, as 
a result, the following chapters will focus on the relationship between the Japanese 
administrators of Shōnan and the figures they identified as their ideal partners in governing the 
city. Anticolonial nationalism and anti-Japanese resistance has dominated the study of wartime 
Southeast Asia, and I will address both of these issues at various points going forward. But the 
focus of my dissertation is on Japanese occupation policy, the men who implemented it, and the 
effect that it had on the accommodationist elites of Shōnan. 
I draw on the surviving documentary record of the Japanese administration, memoirs and 
diaries written by Japanese and non-Japanese figures who lived through the occupation in 
 22 
Shōnan, oral history interviews conducted over the past three decades by the Oral History Center 
of the National Archives of Singapore, and propaganda newspapers published in Shōnan during 
the war, including the English-language Syonan Times (which was renamed the Syonan Sinbun 
in December 1942 then the Syonan Shimbun in December 1943) and the Chinese-language 
Syonan Jitpoh (Ņł¾).37 All of these sources provide incomplete and biased accounts of the 
occupation, but they all contain useful information and I strive to use them in conjunction with 
each other to create as complete a picture as possible of Japanese Shōnan. 
After a brief prologue on the politics of accommodation in prewar Singapore, Chapter 1 
details the formation of the limited and conservative occupation plans that Japanese 
administrators took with them to Southeast Asia, with an emphasis on the importance of existing 
social elites, and the overseas Chinese in particular, to these plans. Chapters 2 and 3 describe the 
process through which local social elites, starting with the overseas Chinese, were compelled to 
serve the Japanese administration in Shōnan, the importance of minzoku to Japanese 
understandings of local society, and the important but limited role that anticolonial nationalists 
played in this process. Chapter 4 takes a closer look at Colonel Watanabe Wataru and civilian 
Mayor Ōdachi Shigeo, describing their conflict over administrative policy and shared belief in 
Japanese preeminence within the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Chapter 5 describes how Japanese 
occupation policy was implemented on the ground, following the work of Shōnan Special 
Municipality staffer Shinozaki Mamoru and his local allies as they attempted to provide refugee 
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relief, recruit laborers, and construct agricultural settlements for urban residents over the course 
of the occupation. Chapter 6 describes the Japanese surrender, the British return, and the new, 
confrontational politics in Shōnan that made a return to the prewar colonial status-quo 
impossible. 
 
The Japanese military administration of Southeast Asia was meant to resuscitate the 
colonial system in the region under strong, centralized control. Different Japanese administrators 
disagreed over tactics, but their shared goal was to transform the inhabitants of the region into 
productive members of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. These goals were at odds 
with each other, and Japanese attempts to make use of existing social hierarchies in the occupied 
territories to fight a total war only upended those hierarchies and exacerbated racial tensions. The 
unintended legacy of the wartime empire lay, not only in the new opportunities that Japanese rule 
afforded to Southeast Asian revolutionaries, but in the end of the accommodationist politics 
practiced by prewar Asian colonial elites. Even in Singapore, the bastion of British power in 
Southeast Asia, Japanese rule fatally undermined the Asian foundation that Western imperialism 




Prologue – The Politics of Accommodation in Prewar Colonial Singapore 
 
The Asian Foundation of British Rule in Singapore 
 Singapore is part of a cluster of islands at the mouth of the Malacca Strait, which 
connects the Indian Ocean to the Java and South China Seas. An independent country today, 
Singapore is only ten miles north from Batam Island in the Riau Islands Province of Indonesia, 
and a mere three thousand feet south of the Malaysian state of Johor. The site of the Malay 
kingdom and trading port of Singapura in the fourteenth century, for much of its early modern 
history the island would be part of the Johor Sultanate, which had its capital on nearby Bintan 
Island. In 1819 an agent of the British East India Company (EIC), Stamford Raffles, exploited a 
succession dispute within the sultanate and set up a rival branch of the royal family on the island 
of Singapore in exchange for permission to set up a company trading post there. Five years later, 
the British assumed total control of Singapore from their erstwhile Malay allies and signed a 
treaty with the Dutch demarcating their spheres of influence in the region. The EIC allowed 
unfettered immigration and trade in Singapore and the settlement quickly grew into a central 
entrepôt for the western half of the Malay Archipelago. By the 1870s the Malay aristocrats who 
remained in Singapore had been stripped of all political power while the island, along with 
Malacca and Penang, had been combined into the Straits Settlements Crown Colony. Throughout 
the first century of its existence, Singapore served as a base from which British imperial power 
and colonial capitalism would spread into the Malay Peninsula and throughout the surrounding 
area. 
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 The British, French, Dutch, and (by the end of the century) Americans had divided 
Southeast Asia into discrete colonies in the last decades of the nineteenth century, but even as 
colonial borders purported to divide the peoples of the region from each other, Western rule 
fostered the growth of a colonial system that connected rural economic hinterlands to the 
capitalist global economy through a network of sprawling, cosmopolitan port cities. Singapore 
was both an economic lynchpin and key beneficiary of this system. Before the war British 
Malaya and Dutch Sumatra provided the world with tin, rubber, and petroleum, much of which 
was processed in and exported from Singapore. This, along with a vibrant regional trade in 
tropical products and foodstuffs controlled by Chinese merchants, allowed the city to grow into 
the seventh largest port in the world by the 1910s.38 The perceived economic opportunities of 
colonial Southeast Asia drew millions of Indian and Chinese laborers to the region, providing a 
labor surplus that further benefited Singapore’s upper classes, European and Asian alike.39 Home 
to thousands of impoverished and opium-addicted laborers while also boasting one of the highest 
rates of private car ownership in the world, Singaporean society on the eve of the Second World 
War was both prosperous and deeply inequitable. It was also exceedingly diverse, with a Chinese 
majority and sizeable Indians and Malay minorities divided into multiple racial, linguistic, and 
religious communities. 
Prewar Singapore was a deeply racist city that saw Asians and mixed-race Eurasians 
excluded from the upper levels of the civil administration and certain prestigious social spaces. 
Historians have rightly scrutinized the obsession of Western colonialists in Southeast Asia with 
preserving white racial prestige, which they perceived to be a cornerstone of the entire colonial 
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39 Huff, 172–175. 
 26 
system. As tiny minorities in the societies they ruled over, European and American communities 
were unstable and colonial administrations developed an overbearing interest in maintaining the 
boundaries of whiteness in Southeast Asia.40 White colonialists told themselves that the colonial 
system in Southeast Asia rested on their racial prestige and obsessed over maintaining the color 
barrier in exclusive clubs and other colonial institutions. Yet throughout colonial Southeast Asia 
Western rule relied on the cooperation of a large population of Asian elites: autonomous actors 
who supported the colonial system because they accrued economic and social benefits from it. 
The colonial economy depended on the regional and inter-regional networks that these wealthy 
non-Europeans maintained, connecting the markets of Singapore to the world in ways that the 
British authorities only dimly perceived.41 As Tim Harper puts it, in the early twentieth century 
“the British dilemma lay in imposing order on native disorder, without extinguishing the native 
enterprise that had made British Malaya a working proposition in the first place.”42 In between 
the First and Second World Wars, the British policed diverse cities like Singapore but 
consciously limited the role of the state in everyday life, relying instead on Chinese businessmen, 
Arab landowners, remaining Malay aristocrats, religious leaders, and growing class of English-
educated Asian professionals to keep the peace through a variety of communal institutions. 
The colonial state in Singapore maintained numerous formal and informal connections 
with these elite figures. For instance, the Governor of the Straits Settlements often nominated 
leaders of local communal bodies to the colony’s Legislative Council and Singapore’s municipal 
commission. This practice intensified after 1913, when the government abolished Singapore’s 
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municipal elections and all members of the commission became government appointees. Though 
the European public decried the loss of direct elections, the Chinese leadership did not, and the 
governor often made appointments to these advisory bodies based on the recommendations of 
the communal institutions that they led.43 Governor Sir Laurence Guillemard formalized this 
process in 1921 by delegating the responsibility for nominating a little under half of the board 
members to certain associations: “the Straits Settlements (Singapore) Association (three seats), 
the Singapore Chamber of Commerce (two seats), the Chinese Chamber of Commerce (two 
seats), the Straits Chinese British Association (one seat), the Eurasian Association (one seat), the 
Mohammedan Advisory Board (one seat), and the Hindu Advisory Board (one seat).”44 In the 
years before the Second World War, the political life of Singapore was contained within these 
and other communal bodies and was “disregarded or invisible to British officials.”45 
European merchants dominated the Straits Settlements Association and the Singapore 
Chamber of Commerce, and the strength of these organizations came from their close 
connections, not with the colonial administration, but the government in London. The Muslim 
and Hindu Advisory Boards were themselves made from appointees who advised the 
government on matters related to the Hindu (predominantly Tamil) and Muslim (Malay, Arab, 
and South Asian) communities.46 The colonial state appointed both clergy and wealthy laypeople 
to these boards, focusing on those who had already risen up through the different religious 
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hierarchies of the island city.47 The Eurasian Association, meanwhile, was a self-constituted 
body that spoke for mixed-race Singaporeans, the majority of whom were Catholics descended 
from the Portuguese communities of Goa and Malacca. The Singapore Chinese British 
Association spoke for locally born English-educated Chinese. Most of its members were proud 
British subjects who contributed what they could to the civic life of the central, British-
dominated sections of the city despite the discrimination they faced from Europeans.48 But by far 
the most influential communal body was the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce (SCCC, 
Ľ¸AȋǮ¥Ō), which was founded at the behest of the Qing government in 1906. "Besides 
promoting trade with the motherland,” as Stephen Leong notes, Chinese Chambers of Commerce 
in Southeast Asia “performed such functions as welcoming official visitors from China and 
officially electing overseas Chinese representatives to government bodies in China.”49 The Board 
of Directors of the SCCC was itself made up of representatives from different dialect groups, 
nominated by the regional or clan associations (huiguan Ōɬ) that shared that dialect.50 
These bodies were beholden to very different racial and religious constituencies and there 
was little uniformity across the city in how communal institutions were organized and run. 
Crucially, British bureaucrats relied on Singaporean residents to organize themselves into these 
different institutions and then drew appointees to colonial advisory bodies from what they 
perceived to be the most influential organizations. This allowed people to organize along the 
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lines they perceived most important, producing an array of social institutions that spoke for 
several overlapping constituencies. This does not mean that these communal associations 
operated autonomously from the colonial state: the British empowered those elites who they 
appointed to positions in the administration as representatives of the different communities and 
invariably favored conservative men, wealthy businessmen or educated professionals, with a 
stake in the colonial economy. British policy also influenced the framework of communal 
politics in prewar Singapore. For instance, it was only in 1913, in the Malay Reservations 
Enactment, that the British set a formal definition for the term “Malay” as a member of the 
“Malayan race” who was Muslim and spoke Malay or a “Malayan language.”51 Noting that this 
definition was interpreted differently in the different Malay states, however, Shamsul A.B. 
argues that this act “created and confirmed” the legal existence of this category but made it the 
object of contestation as well.52 In Singapore, it helped to create a rift between the traditional 
leadership of the Muslim community, typically wealthy Arabs or South Asians, and a group of 
Malay activists who grew increasingly uncomfortable with the dominance of these “non-
indigenous” over the Malay majority within that community.53 The leader of this group was a 
journalist Mohammad Eunos Abdullah. Eunos had expressed concern that Malays were “being 
driven away from their own states by other races” years before 1913.54 It was after the creation 
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of a legal definition of Malays, though, that Eunos began lobbying for explicitly Malay, rather 
than Muslim, representation on colonial advisory councils, winning a seat on the Singapore 
municipal commission in 1922 and the Straits Settlements Legislative Council in 1924. Two 
years later, his supporters created the first Malay political organization in the history of the 
colony, the Kesatuan Melayu Singapura (Singapore Malay Union, KMS).55 
At the time this conflict was articulated as one between Malays and Arabs, but it was 
exacerbated by class divisions. A handful of Hadhrami Arab families, including the Alsagoffs 
(al-Saqqāf) and Aljunieds (al-Junayd), partly owed their preeminence within the Singaporean 
Muslim community to the fact that many of them were Sāda (direct descendants of the Prophet 
Muhammad). But they were also enormously wealthy: before the war they comprised less than 
one percent of the population but owned approximately half of all land in Singapore, including 
the land under storied colonial institutions like the Raffles Hotel.56 Nurfadzilah Yahaya has 
argued that this economic prominence of the Arab community enabled its members to cultivate 
close social and political ties to the British. It also led to mounting resentment of Arab-controlled 
Muslim organizations, which was condemned as “a sort of rich man’s club” that payed little 
attention “to the kind of practical social welfare needed by the economically depressed” 
Malays.57 In the 1920s Eunos and his followers lobbied for greater Malay representation within 
the administration, but also dedicated themselves to serving poorer Muslims and supporting 
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education for young Malay men.58 What might have been articulated as class conflict within the 
Muslim community was instead refracted through the lens of racial difference. And the KMS 
was no revolutionary organization either. Its members would come to include members of the 
defunct Singaporean royal family, village headmen, local imams, and English-educated 
professionals. The organization also pointedly avoided criticizing the British regime, holding tea 
parties for colonial official and participating in celebrations of the monarchy.59 Its leaders 
accommodated themselves with the colonial administration in the hopes of receiving recognition 
for themselves and their colleagues within its advisory bodies.  
Cooperation between the colonial state and this accommodationist elite extended beyond 
their representation in colonial councils, however. Religious bodies, communal organizations 
like the KMS, and the constituent huiguan of the SCCC offered prewar Singapore’s closest 
equivalent to public welfare. Certain bureaucrats in the colonial state dreamed of public housing, 
robust public works, and greater support for the poorest of Singapore’s laborers. But these 
developmentalist bureaucrats were constantly stymied by the administration’s unwillingness and, 
more important, financial inability to put their plans into action.60 Instead, before the Second 
World War poor laborers relied on the support of clan huiguan, district associations, or religious 
bodies from their place of origin for support when they first arrived or when they fell on hard 
times. These organizations supported the massive influx of laborers who came to Singapore 
before the war, enabling them to work for very little pay. Cheap labor was the lifeblood of the 
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colonial economy, and these elite-led organizations helped to ensure that it was in plentiful 
supply. 
Both the colonial state and communal bodies worked to keep radical movements that 
might have posed a threat to the colonial system from gaining a foothold in Singapore. The 
colonial state did this directly through the police: while the main police force was chronically 
underfunded and understaffed an elite Special Branch focused exclusively on threats to the 
colonial system.61 These included the embryonic Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and the 
Chinese nationalist Guomindang, both of which were banned in Malaya by 1925.62 It also 
included agents of hostile foreign powers, such as the Germans and the Japanese. Though they 
may have been less proactive than the colonial police, communal associations also helped to 
keep radical ideas in check. The commercial bent of the SCCC, for instance, made it difficult for 
members of the MCP to infiltrate the organization. Its structure, which required that board 
members secure the support of multiple huiguan within one dialect group, meant that aspiring 
Chinese leaders were likely to identify as Hokkien, Teochew, Cantonese, or Hakka and Chinese 
second.63 And, despite their sympathies with the Chinese nationalist movement (Sun Yatsen, Hu 
Hanmin, and Wang Jingwei had found early and enthusiastic supporters in Singapore), Chinese 
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leaders in Singapore consciously limited their ties to the Guomindang in the late 1920s out of 
deference to British concerns over the threat it presented to their interests in China.64 
Nationalism and Communism were an even less significant political force in the non-
Chinese communities of Singapore. Though the first communist leader in Malaya had been a 
Sumatran named Tan Malaka, the movement absorbed large numbers of political refugees from 
the 1927 purge of the Chinese Communist Party by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek ȎPƾ) and it 
was predominantly Chinese from that point forward.65 Though Ho Chi Minh himself travelled to 
Malaya as a representative of the Comintern in 1930 to formally organize the MCP and force it 
to become a more racially inclusive organization, by the time that war came to Southeast Asia 
the MCP’s efforts to forge a “United Front” with Malays and Indians were, in the words of the 
movement’s leading historian, Cheah Boon Kheng, a “complete failure.”66 Anticolonial 
nationalism, meanwhile held little appeal to the Indian community in Malaya. Despite the 
importance of coolie labor disputes in Malaya to the Indian National Congress’ politics back 
home, Indian nationalism had an extremely shallow presence in Malaya before the Second World 
War. The Tamil majority did not identify on a fundamental level with the northern-dominated 
INC, while South Asian Muslims identified more closely with Arabs and Malays in the city. The 
visit of INC president Jawaharlal Nehru to Malaya in 1937 caused a brief flurry of nationalist 
activity, stoking interest in the Central Indian Association of Malaya (CIAM) founded one year 
earlier. But this organization had been created to lobby the colonial administration to include 
“Indians” on colonial councils instead of Ceylon Tamils, who the government had relied on to 
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represent “Hindu” interests.67 Although the members of the CIAM were sympathetic to the 
independence movement in India, they were still predominantly non-Tamil, English-educated 
professionals who were firmly a part of the Anglophone Asian elite and operated within instead 
of against the colonial system in Malaya. 
Anti-colonialism did not find fertile ground in the prewar Malay community either. In 
1938, a small group of Malay teachers and intellectuals, inspired by the nationalist movement in 
Indonesia, founded the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (Young Malays Union, KMM) with the explicit 
goal of liberating both British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, uniting them under an 
independent “Indonesia Raya” (Greater Indonesia). But, in 1941, KMM president Ibrahim bin 
Haji Yaacob aired his frustrations at fellow Malays for being too caught up in their regional 
identities or loyalties to individual Sultans for a broad-based Malay nationalism to take root in 
the country.68 Yaacob and the KMM would become key collaborators with the Japanese during 
the occupation and, as a result, have left a deep impression on the historiography of the period. 
Before the Japanese invasion, however, the anticolonial movement had only just begun to find 
adherents among the Malay community. 
Finally, as European racism reached its peak in the interwar years many in Singapore’s 
mixed-race Eurasian community claimed for themselves a privileged position in the city’s racial 
hierarchy: if not European at least above the city’s Asians. Unable to join the whites-only 
Singapore Cricket Club in downtown Singapore they founded their own Singapore Recreation 
Club across from it and barred Asians from joining. They also often enjoyed privileged positions 
as head clerks in the colonial administration, as did English-educated, locally born Chinese. 
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Veteran Singaporean historian C.M. Turnbull, in her overview of the island’s history, wrote that 
the “divisions in Singapore’s mixed population were so deep that the authorities had no need to 
employ any conscious “divide and rule” policy.”69 Though others have gone back as far as the 
original Singaporean town plan made by Stamford Raffles in 1822 to attempt to explain the 
British origins of Singapore’s communal divisions, these arguments allow the British far too 
much power over local society. Colonial bureaucrats regularly came up against resistance to their 
policies from local Asians and masked their inability to impose their will directly on local 
society in snarky reports back to London explaining that they were graciously making 
concessions “in deference to [Asian] sentiment.”70 In fact, the colonial state depended on local 
elites to grapple with the bewildering diversity of the city and to keep the social peace. The 
actual, limited social influence that the British state had was to favor certain leaders with official 
appointments, but they did not interfere with the operations of local communal bodies unless 
they posed a threat to the colonial status quo. This system relied on the autonomy of communal 
bodies, which allowed their leaders to present themselves as independent liaisons between their 
constituent and the colonial state. This sense of independence was a pillar of the politics 
accommodation that prevailed in prewar Singapore, in which British colonial officials and Asian 
elites together worked to maintain stability within the colonial system. 
 
War is Elsewhere: Singapore and the War in China and Europe 
 The years immediately before the Japanese occupation saw the development of the 
largest political movement in Malayan history. The National Salvation Movement (NSM), 
centered on Singapore, mobilized the Chinese community of Malaya in support of Republic of 
                                               
69 Turnbull, 73. 
70 Yeoh, 314. 
 36 
China’s war of resistance against the Japanese. While some see this movement as a rupture 
within the political history of Malaya, it operated entirely within the politics of accommodation 
that buttressed the colonial system: the leaders of NSM were the same businessmen and 
professionals who dominated Chinese communal life in Malaya and they took concrete steps to 
avoid antagonizing the British authorities, who in turn limited their interference in the 
movement. While the Malayan Communist Party and agents of the Guomindang would attempt 
to establish control over the NSM, their influence never approached that of the 
accommodationist elite of the Chinese community that founded it.  
When Republican Chinese and Imperial Japanese troops clashed outside of Beiping on 
July 7, 1937, the response in Singapore was muted, even among local Chinese.71 Since the 
signing of the Tanggu Truce in 1933 there had been repeated confrontations between the 
Imperial Japanese Army, the Nanjing-based Republic, and their respective allies in North China. 
Many assumed that the conflict would end quickly and that Jiang Jieshi, leader of the Republic 
and the nationalist Guomindang party, would offer concessions to the Japanese. This had been 
the pattern of Sino-Japanese conflict in the North China for the previous four years, as the 
Japanese Army worked to eliminate republican influence in the area and replace it with a 
patchwork of “autonomous” governments beholden to Japanese interests. This new conflict 
would break the cycle, however, as Jiang refused to back down, tensions escalated, and Japan 
embarked on a full-scale invasion of not only North China but the Guomindang power base in 
the Yangtze Delta as well. Despite applying what they assumed to be overwhelming military 
force on Jiang, the invasion did not go as the Japanese high command expected. Shanghai was 
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only captured after months of brutal fighting. Resistance in the rest of the Yangtze Delta was less 
effective but still significant. The Japanese Central China Area Army only captured the 
Republic’s capital at Nanjing in December. Despite the civilian massacre that followed, and the 
loss of many of their best troops in defending Shanghai, Chinese nationalist forces refused to 
accede to Japanese demands. In October that next year, the renamed Central China 
Expeditionary Army was able to capture the new republican capital at Wuhan, but the campaign 
costs the lives of up to 100,000 Japanese soldiers and a far greater number of Chinese soldiers 
and civilians. Despite a continuous string of Japanese victories, Jiang and his conventional forces 
refused to surrender, establishing themselves further up the Yangtze at Chongqing. Communist 
guerrillas harassed Japanese troops in areas that they occupied, while Western powers grew 
impatient with continuing Japanese aggression. After the Battle of Wuhan the fighting in China, 
which the Japanese refused to label a war for fear of losing strategic imports from the West, 
settled into a bloody stalemate. 
 The Singaporean Chinese community observed events in China with mounting alarm. A 
month into the fighting, on August 15, Hokkien leader Tan Kah Kee (ɟ¬ā) called an 
emergency meeting of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce during which the board 
decided to form the Singapore China Relief Fund (Xinjiapo Chouzhenhui Ľ¸ǙȰŌ).72  In 
late July, the colonial government had expressly forbidden local residents from collecting funds 
to aid the military efforts of either antagonist in the conflict, and so the China Relief Fund 
dedicated itself to alleviating civilian suffering in those parts of China affected by the fighting.73 
This was not a new concept: Tan Kah Kee had headed a similar institution created in 1928 in the 
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aftermath of the Jinan Incident.74 Yet the China Relief Fund went much further than any of its 
predecessors and would eventually become the first true mass movement in Singapore’s history. 
 In August 1937, the Chinese community began an unofficial (in fact, illegal) boycott of 
Japanese goods and businesses that would continue for years. The Chinese-dominated MCP 
leadership was happy to secretly mobilize young Chinese men to enforce the boycotts. In the 
most extreme cases, Chinese merchants dealing in Japanese goods would have an ear cut off.75 In 
1938, as the war expanded, it engulfed the homelands of different Southeast Asian overseas 
Chinese groups. In May, the Japanese Army captured Xiamen (Amoy) in Fujian Province, a 
coastal trading city and the most important urban center in the Hokkien dialect region. In 
October they captured Guangzhou (Canton), center of the Cantonese dialect region. In response, 
Southeast Asian Chinese leaders redoubled their efforts to send aid to China. At the suggestion 
of the Executive Yuan of the Republican government, Tan Kah Kee presided over an 
unprecedented meeting of Chinese leaders from across Southeast Asia (and Hong Kong) at the 
Nanyang Overseas Chinese High School in Singapore on October 10, 1938, the twenty-seventh 
anniversary of the Chinese Revolution.76 Out of this meeting came the Federation of Nanyang 
China Relief Funds (Nanyang Huaqiao Chouzhen Zuguo Nanmin Zonghui ƂȋjǙȰǄ±
ɥŹǮŌ or Nanqiao Chouzhen Zonghui jǙȰǮŌ). Headquartered in Singapore and lead 
by Tan, this was the first regional organization of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. The Relief 
Fund Associations that proliferated across the region worked closely with local Chinese 
Chambers of Commerce and huiguan to raise millions of dollars for humanitarian relief. To 
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prevent this massive influx of aid from being “mismanaged”, the British and Chinese 
governments signed an agreement stipulating that all funds raised by the federation would go 
directly to the Executive Yuan.77 At the same time, overseas individual remittances to China 
peaked during the first years of the war.78 Whether all of these funds were used for civilian 
purposes or not, it was clear to all observers at the time that the billions of yuan coming in from 
overseas Chinese communities helped Jiang’s regime avoid bankruptcy and continue to resist the 
invaders. The Japanese military was furious. 
 The National Salvation Movement was the first experience most Chinese Singaporeans 
had of a mass movement. People marched in the street, teachers taught patriotic lessons at 
Chinese schools, and funds were collected in increasingly sophisticated and comprehensive 
ways. During this time the local Guomindang and the MCP made further inroads into local 
Chinese society than ever before. Still, there were tensions between the brand of nationalism 
encouraged by these Leninist parties and the old dialect allegiances that characterized Chinese 
politics in Singapore before 1937. The high point for the fundraising drive came between 
November 1938 and October 1939. After the outbreak of the war in Europe, though, several 
Anglophone Chinese began contributing instead to the Malayan Patriotic Fund for Britain.79 
Meanwhile, Tan Kah Kee led a delegation to China in 1940 that ended in a disastrous breakdown 
in relations between him and Jiang’s government. It is well known that Tan was taken aback by 
the opulence of official life in Chongqing and pleased with the more Spartan lifestyle he found 
among the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in Yan’an. Yet according to Stephen 
Leong, whose dissertation on the National Salvation Movement in Malaya remains the most 
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comprehensive study on the subject, the breakdown in relations seems to have come when Tan 
visited his home province of Fujian and witnessed the effects of the corrupt rule of republican 
governor Chen Yi (ɟl).80 After Tan returned to Malaya in December 1940, the Hokkien 
community curtailed their participation in the National Salvation Movement, demonstrating the 
importance that dialect group identity continued to play even at this stage. 
Over the course of 1941, the Malayan branch of the Guomindang stepped up its efforts to 
bypass Tan and appeal directly to Southeast Asian Chinese. Yet they could only do so through a 
strategic alliance with Hakka businessman Aw Boon Haw (ǻĺȓ), the “Tiger Balm King,” a 
perennial rival of Tan in overseas Chinese communal politics.81 And, even with Aw’s support, 
fundraising never recovered to its 1938 and 1939 levels. Akashi Yōji’s influential work on the 
National Salvation Movement has led scholars to emphasize the Guomindang role within the 
movement, but Leong argues that the nationalist party had little ability to affect the movement on 
the ground in Singapore and Malaya.82 The Malayan Communist Party, meanwhile, followed its 
counterpart in mainland China by forming a United Front with the local branch of the 
Guomindang in 1937, but this strategic alliance had broken down within a year.83 The 
communists did what they could to use the boycott movement to expand their influence in the 
Chinese community. The accommodationist leaders of the NSM never officially endorsed the 
boycott, because it went against British colonial law, and the MCP was forced to operate 
clandestinely.84 Party members continued to have trouble penetrating the capitalist-dominated 
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China Relief Fund and were relentlessly pursued by the Special Branch of the British colonial 
police. Despite the efforts of the Guomindang and the MCP, it was elite leaders like Tan Kah 
Kee and Aw Boon Haw who continued to predominate in Chinese communal politics during the 
National Salvation Movement to the extent that, when the Japanese invaded Malaya in December 
1941, the British administration turned to Tan to organize an Overseas Chinese Mobilization 
Council (Huaqiao Zongdongyuan Hui ȋjǮ£Ō) to supply volunteers and otherwise 
support the defense of the city.85 
 
On the eve of the Second World War, the politics of accommodation held sway in 
Singapore. It provided lasting stability that had allowed the British to rule the city for more than 
a century with a relatively small colonial budget. Asian and Western businessmen alike bought 
into the colonial system because they were able to become fabulously wealthy off the labor of 
the Chinese and Indian coolies who were the basis of the colonial economy. The British would 
occasionally treat the Asian colonial elites in Singapore with racist condescension, but they 
would also treat the wealthiest among them with respect in public ceremonies and appoint them, 
as representatives of the communal bodies they dominated, to advisory councils. The British 
stood at the top of the colonial hierarchy in Singapore, but the Asian accommodationist elite 
provided its foundation. And they gained prestige from their proximity but perceived autonomy 
from the British. It was this class of local notables that the Japanese hoped to use to rule the city 
of Shōnan during the war. 
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Chapter 1 – Fighting for the Status Quo: 
Japanese War Plans for Southeast Asia 
 
The Japanese army landed in Malaya before dawn on December 8, 1941. That night, 
bombs fell on Singapore. Rudy William Mosbergen, a child at the time, remembers that the 
British air raid sirens went off only after the raid was over. His father Bertie, a leader of the local 
Eurasian (mixed-race) community, was convinced that the Japanese would make little headway 
against the British. Rudy remembers walking to Malacca St, where the bombs had fallen, and 
collecting shrapnel.86 Singapore had not been the target of a military attack since the British 
established themselves on the island in 1819 and, despite the bombing on December 8, the war 
seemed unreal and far away. 
Two months later, the world had been turned on its head. The Japanese army had moved 
faster than anyone had thought possible, capturing the entire Malay Peninsula by the end of 
January.87 From his perch in the Sultan of Johor’s palace at the extreme southern end of the 
peninsula at Johor Bahru, Lieutenant General Yamashita Tomoyuki’s (ì?Èĺ) spent the first 
week of February eyeing the only part of British Malaya that still lay in British hands: the 
“impregnable fortress” of Singapore. The city was swollen with refugees and British, Australian, 
and Indian soldiers who had retreated from the peninsula in various states of discipline. The 
British had lost control of the seas and the skies. Japanese artillery and bombers hammered the 
city, leaving parts of the town in ruins, while Westerners, Eurasians, and wealthy Chinese 
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scrambled to board ships bound for India and Australia. Many of these ships were sunk by the 
Japanese navy. Then, on February 8, the Japanese army landed on Singapore Island itself. A 
week of brutal fighting across the rural areas and jungle-covered hills on the eastern, northern, 
and western sections of the island followed, until Yamashita’s 25th Army encircled the city at its 
southern tip.  
The British commander, Lieutenant General Arthur Percival, surrendered to Yamashita 
on Chinese New Year, February 15, 1942. As silence descended over the city, so did a sense of 
deep unease among its residents. Anglophiles like Bertie Mosbergen took in the news of the 
British surrender with a mix of stunned disbelief and denial.88 Surely, the British Empire would 
quickly rally and sweep away the upstart Japanese. Other, less Anglophilic residents were not so 
sanguine about a British return, but there was no uniformity of opinion about what the Japanese 
takeover might mean for Singapore. Members of the Malay and Indian communities wondered if 
there was any substance to the Japanese claim that the army had come to Southeast Asia to 
liberate its peoples from colonial rule. Singapore’s many small trading communities, such as the 
Hadhrami Arabs, the Parsis, and the Armenians, waited to see how the Japanese might govern 
one of Southeast Asia’s most important ports. Others were terrified that the Second World War 
had finally reached Singapore. While most of their members had fled, the small remaining 
Jewish community was anxious about what might happen to them under Axis rule. And the 
overseas Chinese, who comprised more than three-quarters of Singapore’s population and had 
provided critical aid to Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-Shek) in his half-decade-long war of resistance 
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against the Japanese through the China Relief Fund, were horrified to see the war extend into 
Southeast Asia. 
Unfortunately for the people of Singapore, and for the Chinese in particular, the violence 
of the Malayan Campaign did not end with the British surrender. On February 17, Yamashita 
announced that Singapore would be renamed Shōnan (Ņ), the Light of the South, after 
Hirohito, the Shōwa (Ņ¢) emperor. New Chinese- and English-language propaganda papers 
appeared promising a “New Order (shinchitsujo/xinzhixu Ľǌÿ)” under Japanese rule.89 That 
same day, however, the local Chinese population got the first hint of their place in this “New 
Order.” The 25th Army headquarters circulated a notice instructing all Chinese men between the 
ages of eighteen and fifty to report to a mass “inspection” by the Japanese military police, or 
Kempeitai (Ĥwɢ), on February 21.90 Some young men ignored the order and hid at home.91 
The clear majority, however, were too afraid of the consequences for not complying. 
Immediately after the occupation began, a group of eight looters had been captured by the 
Japanese and, to set an example, their severed heads were displayed at different locations around 
town.92 This incident impressed upon the residents of the newly renamed Shōnan that the 
Japanese military was willing to use extreme violence against civilians who did not follow its 
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rules. And so, on February 21, most of the male Chinese population reported for the mass 
inspection. 
When they arrived at the designated inspection sites in their neighborhoods, they found 
detention centers where they had to stay for hours, or days, waiting for brief interviews with 
Kempeitai officers and hooded local informants. After these interviews, some were released with 
pieces of paper or, when paper ran out, articles of clothing or bare skin stamped with the 
character for “inspected” (ken Ũ). Edmund Tay remembers that he did not wash the stamp from 
his forearm for many days.93 This was because, by the time he was released two or three days 
into the “inspection,” it was clear that many thousands of young Chinese men were not returning 
from the detention centers. Tay did not realize the danger when he was waiting for his interview, 
but Soh Teoh Seng remembers seeing men who did not pass the inspection loaded onto trucks 
and driven away.94 Many thousands of men boarded these trucks, never to be seen again. 
For the remainder of the occupation it was unclear what exactly had happened to these 
men, though rumors quickly swirled around the island about mass killings in the countryside. 
Omar bin Hitam, who lived in an isolated kampung (village) where Changi airport is today, 
remembers that Japanese soldiers brought a group of Chinese “gangsters” (orang ingin jahat) to 
a spot outside the village, had them dig a large hole, and then shot and buried them in it.95 Koh 
Soh Goh, who had a relatively easy time passing through the inspection center in rural Paya 
Lebar, met a teacher named Lai who had been taken away in these trucks but escaped after being 
shot in the leg. Lai later surreptitiously took groups of people to the site he had escaped from, 
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and Koh claims that when he went he saw a pit in the jungle filled with skulls.96 Only after the 
war, during local war crimes trials, was there a public admission of what many Chinese families 
had long suspected: the Japanese military police had determined that their loved ones were anti-
Japanese elements (kangri fenzi įłTÍ) for reasons as simple as having tattoos, speaking 
English, or wearing glasses. After the mass inspection, they had been driven to remote parts of 
the island, murdered, and buried in shallow graves or left on beaches to be swept out by the tide 
in what would become known as the Sook Ching (ǛƉ) Massacre.97 
The Kempeitai’s “mass inspection” ended on February 25. Severed heads rotted in the 
tropical sun at points around town, and bloated corpses with hands bound behind their backs 
began washing up on the city’s waterfront, a couple of dozen per day.98 It was in this 
environment that a new round of detentions swept through the overseas Chinese community in 
Shōnan. This time, the Kempeitai used documents seized from prewar organizations such as the 
China Relief Fund and volunteer units like Dalforce to arrest those who had been involved in 
anti-Japanese activities before the war.99 The reputations of wealthy Chinese residents in the late 
1930s had come to depend on large, public donations to anti-Japanese groups and, as a result, the 
Kempeitai dragnet targeted a broad cross-section of the prewar Chinese social elite. Both 
Japanese and Chinese sources attest that these detainees were tortured, often with 
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waterboarding.100 During this wave of arrests, on March 1, several Chinese leaders were ordered 
to assemble at the former Goh Loo Club (ƷbŬɏ) in Chinatown. Looking around, an 
attendee at this meeting would have recognized many the community’s accommodationist 
colonial elite. The most senior Chinese leader in attendance was Lim Boon Keng (Şĺģ), a 
septuagenarian physician and co-founder of the Straits Chinese British Association. Former 
leaders of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce, bankers, industrialists, and lawyers 
like Lee Choon Seng (Ŗ_Ĭ), Tan Ean Khiam (ɟąȨ), Lee Wee Nam (Ŗf), Yeo Chan 
Boon (ũǰĺ), and S.Q. Wong (ɴoƦ) were also seated around the room. They were even 
joined by the Shaw brothers, Run Run (ɌNŪ) and Runme (ɌNş), who operated movie 
theaters and amusement parks in Singapore before the war.101 Almost all of these men had held 
prominent positions in the China Relief Fund before the war, and many of them had been 
arrested, bloodied, and brought to the meeting at gunpoint. Rumors swirled that other prominent 
members of the Chinese elite, like Yap Pheng Geck (ȍúƣ), had been shot.102  
The meeting was convened by Wee Twee Kim (ɵ¼ɕ), a swaggering Taiwanese 
interpreter in Japanese uniform. Wee began the meeting by telling the assembled leaders that the 
Japanese Army was mulling over how to punish Shōnan’s overseas Chinese for the National 
Salvation Movement, the name for the campaign to support Jiang Jieshi and his army over the 
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preceding five years.103 According to one postwar account, Wee warned them that the people of 
Japan wanted to exile the Chinese population of Shōnan to a desert island to starve to death.104 In 
order to prevent this punishment, the overseas Chinese would need to “earnestly collaborate 
(hezuo [) with the Japanese army” with “repentant hearts” (huiguo zhi xin ğɄDĖ).105 
These threats carried real weight for those gathered at the Goh Loo Club: during the invasion of 
Malaya, the Sook Ching Massacre that followed, and the wave of arrests that immediately 
preceded the meeting, the Japanese army had demonstrated that it was perfectly willing to kill 
individual Chinese leaders.106 Wee used the threat of violence to keep the attendees of this 
meeting in a state of suspense, but in reality the new Japanese military administration had no 
intention of wiping out the overseas Chinese community in Shōnan or massacring its leadership. 
Even though the Chinese had consistently constituted the most anti-Japanese element of 
Southeast Asian society before the war, the earliest occupation plans produced by the military 
identified them, and particularly the conservative and often pro-Western businessmen and 
professionals who dominated Chinese communal politics in cities like Singapore, as critical 
partners in governing the region. This meeting with Shōnan’s overseas Chinese leadership was 
one of the first steps toward realizing Japanese wartime plans for Southeast Asia: policies that 
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sought to reconstitute the prewar colonial system under Japanese control through the cooption of 
the Asian accommodationist elite.   
 
The invasion and occupation of Southeast Asia had different meanings for the various 
Japanese participants in it. Japanese national policy limited the scope of the empire’s mission in 
the region to acquiring strategic resources. Individual Japanese soldiers and civilians dreamed of 
new political, economic, and social possibilities in the occupied territories. But, after painstaking 
negotiations in the last months of 1941, the military command and civilian cabinet had agreed 
that winning the wider Asian war they were about to initiate took precedent over other 
considerations. Southeast Asia’s natural resources were understood to be the key to victory.  
Before 1941, Japan had imported petroleum, tin, bauxite, rubber, and other strategic resources 
from the increasingly hostile colonial masters in the region to sustain its war in China. By the 
end of that year military and civilian leaders agreed that, by taking the resource-rich colonies of 
Southeast Asia for themselves, they could fend off Allied efforts to retake them, making it 
possible finally to crush Chinese resistance. To compensate for the material superiority of the 
United States and the British Empire, this strategy depended on Japan’s ability to transport 
Southeast Asian resources to the home islands as quickly and smoothly as possible. As a result, 
decision-makers in Tokyo were intent on avoiding any radical change in Southeast Asia that 
might disrupt the flow of these resources. Instead, they hoped that Malaya, Burma, the 
Philippines, and the former Dutch East Indies would play the same economic role as subordinate 
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parts of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere that they had previously done for the Allies 
as Western colonies. 
In this thinking, these territories would remain suppliers of raw materials for an imperial 
metropole, with their economic centers of gravity shifting from the West to Japan.107 Politically, 
they would follow prewar precedent. Burma and the Philippines, which had been granted limited 
autonomy by Britain and the United States before the war, would have “independence under the 
forceful guidance and command of the empire.”108 The native aristocracy in Malaya and the East 
Indies, meanwhile, would be granted ceremonial status but in fact rule under the guidance of 
Japanese advisors, much as they had under the British and the Dutch. Singapore and the other 
Straits Settlements would be placed under the direct control of the Japanese army as an economic 
and military “base for imperial rule in the South.”109 The newly renamed Shōnan would serve as 
the nerve center from which Japan would “manage” (keiei Ǥª) the economic integration and 
development of Southeast Asia, but Japanese leaders determined that, even here, day-to-day 
administration would continue as it had before the war. 
This aversion to radical change ran counter to wartime Japanese discourse on the Co-
Prosperity Sphere, which was dominated by romantic visions of Asian brotherhood and a new, 
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egalitarian regional order. But it was a common theme in the occupation guidelines drafted by 
Japanese strategic planners and adopted by the heads of the army, navy, and civilian government 
in the months before the invasion. This limited and conservative occupation policy can be traced 
back to a March 1941 report commissioned by the Army General Staff—the first official 
consideration of the occupation of Southeast Asia—which was written by a small team of 
researchers lead by Col. Obata Nobuyoshi (èƭaȅ). Obata’s report argued that, to acquire 
Southeast Asia’s strategic resources, the army would need quickly to restore order in the 
occupied territories without placing an undue burden on Japan. Obata and his team claimed that, 
because the colonized peoples of Southeast Asia had a “low cultural standard,” the simplest way 
to do this without causing unrest would be to work through preexisting colonial governments.110 
But the report argued for more than political continuity: the occupation authorities would need to 
maintain colonial social hierarchies as well. The drafters warned against supporting nationalist 
movements or uplifting the position of the “natives” (dochakumin ³ƽŹ), preferring that 
economic power remain concentrated at the upper echelons of colonial society where it could be 
more easily mobilized. This report, and the occupation guidelines that developed from it, were 
committed to “maintaining the status quo” (genjō iji ƨƜǧİ) in colonial Southeast Asia.111  
The guidelines called for the cooperation of conservative Southeast Asian leaders, a point 
often neglected in postwar scholarship on the war. Historians have tended to highlight instances 
of collaboration between the Japanese army and Southeast Asian nationalists, such as the 
formation of the Indian National Army (INA) by Capt. Mohan Singh and Maj. Fujiwara Iwaichi 
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(ȑîö), or the assistance that Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob’s Kesatuan Melayu Muda (Young 
Malays Union, KMM) provided the Japanese Army during the invasion of Malaya.112 But these 
were temporary alliances that fell apart in the aftermath of the campaign: the KMM was forcibly 
disbanded in the summer of 1942 and by the end of that year the INA was in disarray and Mohan 
Singh was under house arrest.113 Scholars like Joyce Lebra and Cheah Boon Kheng, and many 
before them, have recognized that the Japanese army’s cooperation with these local radicals was 
opportunistic. What is less clear from their work is that it was also rare. Most Japanese 
administrators were reluctant to work with radical nationalists unless forced to out of strategic 
necessity. Before the deteriorating war situation forced the Japanese government openly to 
support Southeast Asian nationalist movements, those radicals who worked closely with local 
military administrations had to have an obsequious attitude toward the Japanese, which disgusted 
their former comrades. As they organized the military administrations of Southeast Asia, the new 
occupiers largely followed the spirit of the Obata report, seeking out people most closely 
associated with the Western colonial powers to be their partners in governing the region. 
Japanese policy called on military administrators in British Malaya, for instance, to work with 
Malay aristocrats, Chinese businessmen, and even compliant Westerners in the name of 
minimizing disruption and achieving rapid victory against the Allies. During the first months of 
the occupation, as the Japanese military administration in Malaya became more familiar with the 
different groups who had worked closely with the British, their field of partners in cities like 
Shōnan expanded to encompass other colonial elites, including Arab landowners, Indian lawyers, 
and Eurasian (mixed-race) doctors. All these men—and they were exclusively men—were united 
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by their close affinity to the prewar colonial system, and Japanese war plans portrayed them as 
the key to getting that system up and running in service of the Empire. 
In practice these occupation policies quickly fell apart. To protect themselves and their 
communities, Southeast Asia’s accommodationist elite did agree to work with the Japanese 
administration. But, as we will see, they were not as effective at rallying the “natives” to the 
Japanese cause as planners like Obata had hoped and, as Japan’s strategic position deteriorated, 
different military administrations turned to charismatic nationalist politicians like Subhas 
Chandra Bose and Sukarno to bolster their authority. Still, the policies set down in the months 
before the war continued to informe the basic structure of the military administration throughout 
the occupation. For instance, after learning in July 1943 that Tōjō’s cabinet wanted them to 
encourage local political participation in Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Borneo, and Celebes 
(Sulawesi), Japanese authorities in Shōnan formed an Advisory Council (Sanjikai GV) to 
represent the interests of local residents to the administration. The new councilors, however, 
were almost exclusively members of the prewar colonial elite.114 Nor was the continuing 
importance of accommodationist elites in the Japanese administration was not unique to Shōnan. 
In the rest of Malaya, Chinese businessmen and Malay aristocrats, who had often been members 
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of British colonial councils, became advisory councilors to the Japanese.115 Malay aristocrats 
continued to be critical partners of the administration in East Sumatra while, in Aceh, the 
Japanese continued to work closely with the formerly Dutch-allied ulèëbalang.116 Even in Java, 
where the comparatively liberal military administration of the 16th Army took a decisive turn 
toward working with secular nationalists and grass-roots ulama (religious teachers) in 1943, they 
continued to rely on traditional rulers and village heads to govern the island.117 While the 
Japanese administration of Southeast Asia would come to be characterized by bureaucratic 
infighting and muddled attempts to adapt to the rapidly changing war situation, the preference 
for working with the forces of continuity and social stability in the occupied territories would be 
a lasting legacy of Japan’s prewar occupation plans. 
 
Blueprint for the Occupation of Southeast Asia: The Obata Report of March 1941 
 The Japanese Empire began the year 1941 in a geostrategic crisis of its own making. The 
1937 invasion of China, which Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro (ȾȖĺɳ) had begun with the 
vague goal of chastising Jiang Jieshi and his Nationalist government, had turned into a bloody 
stalemate.118 Three years later, in 1940, the Japanese government set up a Chinese puppet regime 
                                               
115 Paul Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: A Social and Economic History (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press, 1997), 70. 
116 Radical nationalists and religious reformers in these two parts of Sumatra had initially hoped that the Japanese 
would help them bring about revolutionary change but, even though the Japanese initially flirted with radical 
religious forces in Aceh, they quickly made clear that they were interested in governing through the leaders who 
represented tradition and colonial accommodation. Anthony Reid, The Blood of the People: Revolution and the End 
of Traditional Rule in North Sumatra, 2nd ed. (Singapore: NUS Press, 2014), 101–103, 109, 134–135. 
117 Kurasawa Aiko Ʀŉü, Nihon senryōka no Jawa nōson no henyō ŨŽ·ʑX3GOɟſîĈ (Tokyo: 
Sōshisha Ƞłǣ, 1992). Ethan Mark, “Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture, and the Problems of Imperial Modernity 
in Japanese-occupied Java,” (Phd. Diss., Columbia University, 2003). Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising 
Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945 (The Hague: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1958), 132–168. 
118 Konoe’s lack of any specific strategic goals in China led even Ishihara Kanji, one of the masterminds of the 
Manchurian Incident, to criticize his government for allowing a minor dispute in North China to escalate into a full-
scale Japanese invasion. See John Hunter Boyle, China and Japan at War, 1937–1945: The Politics of Collaboration 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), 44–60. 
 55 
led by Wang Jingwei (żǜȖ), a long-time rival to Jiang, but this Reorganized National 
Government of the Republic of China failed to gain traction among the people.119 Foreign 
criticism of Japan’s war mounted, coaxed along by Chinese diplomats who were savvier than 
their Japanese counterparts about working through Western, and particularly Anglophone, media 
outlets.120 Meanwhile, in 1939, when the outbreak of war in Europe left the Western colonies of 
Southeast Asia vulnerable, imperial dreamers inside and outside the government pushed to 
expand Japanese influence further South, hoping thereby for a breakthrough in China. In 1938, 
Konoe had called for a “New Order” in East Asia, but this new pressure prompted Foreign 
Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke (ŜíƂ), on August 1, 1940, to call for the construction of a 
“Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Daitōa Kyōeiken ÃŚJvŢ²)” that included 
colonial Southeast Asia. Jeremy Yellen has argued that Matsuoka’s speech was meant, at least in 
part, to dissuade the Germans from claiming French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies after 
overrunning France and the Netherlands, but this did not prevent the British and Americans from 
seeing in Matsuoka’s rhetoric a threat to their colonies in Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines.121 
They grew even more dismayed when Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Italy and Germany 
on September 27, 1940, compelled Vichy France to allow Japanese troops into Northern 
Indochina, and entered into heavy-handed trade negotiations with the Dutch East Indies. 
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At the end of 1940, however, only a smattering of Japanese far-right thinkers and radical 
officers dreamed of invading Southeast Asia.122 Such an act of aggression would provoke a war 
with two of the world’s premier military powers, the United States and Great Britain, and 
Japan’s leaders were preoccupied with forcing a conclusion to the intractable “China Incident.” 
Japan’s occupation of Northern Indochina was meant to cut Jiang off from outside aid, and a 
significant number of government leaders was committed to negotiating with Southeast Asia’s 
colonial rulers to acquire the region’s strategic resources through trade, rather than seizing them 
by force.123 But, as tensions with the Anglophone powers rose and negotiations with the Dutch 
foundered early in 1941, the military leadership began contemplating a campaign to seize 
Southeast Asia. In February, the Army General Staff ordered Col. Obata Nobuyoshi to draw up a 
plan for the occupation of the region. Obata and his research team, Lt. Cols. Nishimura Ototsugu 
(șŗE«) and Tōfuku Seijirō (ŚǈƉŲɍ), worked quickly and worked alone: according to 
Nishimura, the team had no direct discussions with the Army Ministry; it did not even solicit the 
opinions of the Navy or the Cabinet Planning Board.124 By the end of March, Obata’s team 
submitted its final report, the “Draft Guidelines for Governing Occupied Territories in the 
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Southern Areas Campaign,” along with detailed proposals for the occupation of Indochina, 
Malaya, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies.125 
Obata had been given an impossible task. Ordered by his superiors to come up with some 
sort of plan for the already overstretched empire to administer an additional five-thousand-
kilometer swath of territory that was home to over one hundred million people, he was forced to 
focus on what was absolutely necessary for the occupation to succeed. Even so, the trio of 
planners needed to premise their occupation guidelines on unrealistic assumptions, such as the 
racist supposition that “backwards” Southeast Asians would readily submit to Japan’s might and 
that local colonial administrative structures could continue functioning normally after the 
invasion with minimal Japanese oversight. As a result, the limited occupation goals laid out in 
the Obata report were based on both a sober evaluation of Japan’s limited resources and a 
naively optimistic assessment of how easy the occupation might be.  
In his summary of the report, Obata set out one clear goal for the occupation: its “first 
principle (Ǔ;Ǵ)” would be the acquisition of resources needed to engage in a drawn-out war 
with the British Empire, the United States, and, if necessary, the Soviet Union.126 Obata 
elaborated on this point later in the report: “These policies were drafted, to put it bluntly, based 
on a plan of technical (gijutsuteki ĭȕƳ) exploitation (sakushu Ĵ) of the occupied territories 
to the greatest extent possible within the limits of international law, thereby reducing our war 
expenditures while maintaining and cultivating our war potential.”127 The loftier goal of creating 
a new regional order under benevolent Japanese guidance—“the great ideal of hakkō ichiu (tǠ
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;Ð)” or “the eight corners of the world under one roof”—could not be achieved without 
victory, and victory could not be achieved without the acquisition of these resources.128 The 
residents of the occupied territories, Obata concluded, must share the wartime hardships of the 
Japanese in order to “enjoy the benefits of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Tōa Kyōeiken Ś
JvŢ²).”129 This language about Asia’s utopian future offered a salve to the army’s 
committed ideologues, but for all practical purposes the occupation of Southeast Asia would be 
defined by wholesale economic exploitation. 
In order to get strategic resources to the empire as quickly as possible, the Obata report 
stressed that occupying armies should focus first on restoring public order (chian ſÑ).130 To 
avoid any additional economic commitments on the part of Japan, the military would need to 
finance and supply itself directly from the occupied territories.131 And to achieve these goals 
quickly and economically, the report recommended that any military administration in Southeast 
Asia rely as much as possible on preexisting government structures (zairai no tōchi kikō µř
Ǧſűū).132 If Japanese armies in the field worked through the basic structures of the region’s 
prewar colonial administrations, Obata’s team reasoned, they could rely on local administrators 
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to deal with day-to-day governance under the supervision of a small Special Affairs Department 
(tokumubu ƙɏ) led by each occupying army’s chief of staff.133 The report concluded that 
many white administrators would flee the colonies once the war began, but that the occupying 
armies could use “influential natives” (yūryoku domin ō³Ź) to reorganize the 
government.134 With this framework, the research team projected that regional military 
administrations could get by with only a couple hundred Japanese staff.135 
Obata and his team saw several benefits to working through prewar colonial 
governments. If the military could avoid the complex and time-consuming process of creating a 
new administration for the occupied territories, it could focus its attention on defending the 
region and acquiring strategic resources for the war effort. More important, historian Iwatake 
Teruhiko has argued that Obata and other strategists in Tokyo believed that it would help 
Southeast Asia avoid the fate of occupied China.136 Although central planners were committed to 
a “policy of military colonization” (gunjiteki shokuminchi seisaku ȷGƳŧŹ¶ĶǕ), they 
were also acutely aware that Japanese soldiers left to themselves could do serious damage to the 
imperial project.137 In the 1930s, Japanese armies in the field had more than once created puppet 
governments in China that were beholden, not to the imperial government in Tokyo, but to their 
own headquarters. This began in Northeastern China in 1932 with the creation of Manchukuo, a 
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puppet-state staffed by Japanese and Chinese civilian bureaucrats but consistently dominated by 
the general staff of the Guandong Army (ɝŚȷ) stationed there.138 During the wider invasion 
of China in 1937, when the military and government lacked firm strategic goals, let alone a 
detailed policy toward occupied territories, military units had organized Peace Maintenance 
Committees (chian iji kai ſÑǧİV) led by local notables across China to maintain public 
order and supply Japanese troops. It was only through months of effort that the Special Affairs 
Departments of the North China Area Army (NCAA, Kita Shina Hōmengun ĵɊľɧȷ) and 
Central China Expeditionary Army (CCEA, Naka Shina Hakengun AĵɊƅɈȷ) were able to 
weld these committees together into two “provisional” governments based in Beijing and 
Nanjing.139 These two armies jealously guarded the prerogatives of their separate provisional 
governments, so that it took the direct intervention of the central government to make 
commanders on the ground acquiesce to the formation of that Wang’s collaborationist regime in 
1940. Even then, this was only possible after the NCAA and CCAA had both been incorporated 
into the China Expeditionary Army (CEA, Shina Hakengun ĵɊƅɈȷ) in 1939, and for the 
next five years Wang’s regime would exercise only tenuous control over collaborative 
organizations outside the Yangtze Delta.140 Local authorities in occupied China continued to be 
beholden, first and foremost, to whatever Japanese military unit controlled their area. The ad hoc 
growth of collaborative regimes and subsequent lack of centralized authority led to 
administrative chaos throughout occupied China. 
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A logistics officer, Obata had spent much of his military career in Tokyo, including stints 
as an instructor are the Army War College. But he had also served in Manchuria and was a 
member of the staff of the Tenth Army during the Battle of Nanjing and the massacre that 
followed.141 Obata would have seen firsthand the chaotic and fragmented way in which 
occupation policy had been implemented in China, and it is clear from his 1941 report that he 
hoped to avoid this in Southeast Asia. He and his team carefully stipulated that Japanese field 
armies must conform to occupation policy set by the Imperial General Headquarters (Daihon’ei 
ÃŒª).142 Through strict adherence to the chain of command, and by limiting the size of the 
military administration, the occupation could avoid the “troubles” (hanrui Ɣǡ) associated with 
the direct involvement of field armies in daily governance.143 Southeast Asia would still be under 
strict military rule, but by establishing a centralized hierarchy for the military administration that 
reported directly to Tokyo, Obata’s team hoped to mitigate the centrifugal tendencies of the 
Japanese army. 
Obata was also worried about another significant shortcoming of Japanese soldiers and 
civilians alike: most of them knew nothing about Southeast Asia. In his report on Malaya, 
Nishimura noted that a large, powerful administration filled with staffers who had little insight 
into the region would be inefficient, and that for the time being the administration should rely on 
the smallest possible number of Japanese staff.144 This was a convenient line of reasoning, 
because the research team already had a strong incentive to recommend that the number of staff 
in Southeast Asia could and should be kept to a minimum. As Obata wrapped up his argument 
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for using preexisting government structures, he claimed that this was the best way to reduce the 
direct commitment of Japanese manpower to governing Southeast Asia.145 He repeatedly 
emphasized that if Japan was going to wage a war with Britain and America, let alone win one, it 
would need to make use of all the human and material resources at its disposal. The fewer 
administrators that Obata sent to Southeast Asia, the better. 
To keep the military from sabotaging its own occupation, to make up for Japanese 
ignorance about Southeast Asia, and to reduce commitments of scarce resources, Obata and his 
team were convinced that the Japanese needed to work through preexisting government 
institutions. This conviction led them to propose a preposterously small number of Japanese staff 
to the future military administrations of Southeast Asia. In Nishimura’s final remarks about the 
military administration of Malaya, for instance, he recommended that the former British 
territory, with its diverse population of over five million, could manage with 345 Japanese staff 
in Singapore and less than a dozen in each of the Malay states, with twenty translators each for 
“native” and European languages.146 This was less than a quarter of the number of British who 
had worked with the Malayan administration in 1940.147 The proposals for the occupation of 
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other Southeast Asian territories followed a similar pattern: a few hundred Japanese staff would 
oversee the operations of largely unchanged prewar colonial administrations.148 
The Obata report recommended that Japanese occupation authorities do nothing to 
improve the supposed low “civilizational development” (mindo Źă) of Southeast Asians. It 
warned that “educating” and “uplifting” local residents would cause more trouble than it was 
worth, and even suggested that propaganda should avoid dwelling on the Co-Prosperity Sphere 
and be careful not to arouse national consciousness.149 In his summary of the report, Obata 
warned that this sort of evangelism might cause social upheaval that would impede efforts to 
extract strategic resources.150 Instead, the report concluded that propagandists should encourage 
obedience among Southeast Asians, and help them understand the “might” (iryoku Ë) and 
“good intentions” (zen’i ¨ġ) of the imperial army.151 The report warned that any nationalist 
movements (minzoku undō ŹŁɃ) that developed during the Japanese occupation might 
“lack a real foundation” and could undermine public order. It recommended that military 
authorities refrain from inciting or promoting local nationalists until it could carefully judge their 
character and make use of them at some later date.152 This cautious approach would provide 
Japan with the greatest freedom of action once the war had been brought to a successful 
conclusion. The Obata report argued that avoiding commitments to Southeast Asians and 
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tamping down their enthusiasm for independence would give the Japanese time to observe local 
conditions and come up with appropriate postwar policies.153 
The report concluded that Japanese military authorities should “suppress” (dan’atsu č
´) Southeast Asian nationalist movements.154 But it also encouraged them to work with those 
local actors who had benefited most from Western colonialism. The Japanese would depend on 
“local authorities,” from Malay sultans down to regular police officers, to run the administration 
under their guidance.155 Obata also felt that allowing the wealth of Southeast Asia to stay 
concentrated at the top of the socio-economic ladder, as it was in the grossly unequal prewar 
colonial economy, would benefit Japanese occupation policy. He was particularly interested in 
compelling wealthy overseas Chinese to supply the capital needed to develop the region’s 
strategic resources. If they were willing to abandon their support for Jiang Jieshi and pledge their 
loyalty to Wang’s puppet regime, Obata even advocated “sacrificing (gisei ƚƘ) the natives” 
and favoring powerful Chinese.156 Obata and his team went so far as to suggest compelling white 
colonialists to help administer Southeast Asia if they submitted to Japan and gave up their 
prewar racial privileges.157 Ironically, the people that Obata seemed most concerned about 
disrupting social order in the occupied territories were Japanese, specifically private Japanese 
citizens. He conceded that the development and extraction of Southeast Asian resources would 
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depend in part on Japanese civilian capital, but he also hoped to prevent a repeat of the 
experience in China where private Japanese “profiteers and brokers” had bribed their way into 
the occupation hierarchy.158 And so Obata recommended strict controls over Japanese 
immigration to keep his “delinquent countrymen” (furyō hōjin @ȅɋM) out of Southeast 
Asia.159 
The Obata report thus envisioned limited goals for the military administration of 
Southeast Asia. The empire’s first priority was to acquire the region’s strategic resources. Obata 
and his team were convinced that a breakdown of public order would disrupt these efforts and 
recommended postponing any attempt to establish a “new order” in the region until the end of 
the war.160 In their conclusions, they recommended that military administrators in Southeast Asia 
maintain not only the political but also the social status quo. Local nationalists and private 
Japanese citizens constituted a threat to this effort, while the military’s ideal partners in the 
region were native administrators and aristocrats, wealthy Chinese, and even Westerners. 
Although Obata’s team peppered the report with reminders that guidelines represented temporary 
wartime measures, the only concrete plan they proposed for the occupation was to work closely 
with members of prewar administrations and socio-economic elites to maintain the colonial 
status quo in Southeast Asia. 
Given the unrealistic assumptions that Obata and his team adopted for their guidelines to 
seem practicable, it is worth considering whether they were convinced by their own proposals. 
Obata had served as a staff officer in Japanese armies in Malaya and Burma before he was 
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transferred to Manchuria in May 1943.161 According to an account by Maj. Fujiwara Iwaichi, 
who studied under him at the Army War College, Obata oversaw army intelligence operations in 
Southeast Asia when the war began.162 Unfortunately, he does not seem to have left any record 
of his thoughts about the fitful application of his occupation policies. Whatever his personal 
feelings about the feasibility of the plans might have been, however, they would have seemed 
less important when his team submitted their report to the Army General Staff, since by late 
March, Japanese diplomats had entered into a new round of negotiations with the Western 
colonial powers and tensions had cooled. 163 Obata’s research team was disbanded, and their 
report was shelved for the time being. 
 
Embracing the Colonial Status Quo: November–December 1941 
By July 1941, the possibility of war with the colonial powers in Southeast Asia loomed 
larger than ever. That month, Japanese troops occupied southern French Indochina. The empire 
had been able to exact this concession from the Vichy regime diplomatically, but only weeks 
earlier its military and government leaders had agreed that, if necessary, Japan would 
“accomplish this goal through military force,” and for the first time began explicitly to discuss 
war with Britain and the United States.164 The Anglophone powers, meanwhile, were incensed: 
Southern Indochina was far removed from the fighting in China but could easily serve as a 
jumping off point for a general invasion of Southeast Asia. In response, they slapped Japan with 
several economic sanctions, including a crippling oil and gasoline embargo by the U.S. This put 
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the Japanese war machine in an untenable position: the imperial navy had a limited supply of oil 
and its reserves would soon run out. At an Imperial Conference on September 6, Japanese 
leaders resolved that, barring a breakthrough in negotiations over the next month, the empire 
would prepare for war in October.165 The failure of these negotiations caused the fall of Prime 
Minister Konoe’s second cabinet and, with the ascension of Gen. Tōjō Hideki’s (ŚŤȈű) 
government, Japan’s zero-hour was postponed until midnight, December 1. When a final 
desperate round of negotiations also failed, another Imperial Conference authorized war with the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and the Netherlands, to commence one week later on 
December 8.166 
As Japan propelled itself toward war with the Allies, the military prepared for 
coordinated attacks against British and American targets in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. On 
November 6, as the Navy prepared to attack Pearl Harbor, the Army laid out its order of battle 
for the coming conflict. It created the Southern Expeditionary Army (Nanpōgun ľȷ), which 
would coordinate the operations of the 14th Army in the Philippines, the 15th Army in Burma, the 
16th Army in Java, and the 25th Army in Malaya and Sumatra. On November 20, a Liaison 
Conference—a high-level meeting of civilian and military leaders—agreed on three clear and 
limited goals for the occupation of Southeast Asia: military administrations would restore public 
order, quickly acquire strategic resources, and secure the self-sufficiency of armies in the field.167 
Five days later, on November 25, the Army Department of the Imperial General Headquarters 
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elaborated on these principles by providing the Southern Expeditionary Army with detailed 
occupation guidelines.168 In early December the Southern Expeditionary Army completed its 
own occupation guidelines, which it distributed to the armies under its command to guide them 
through the first months of the campaign.169 
According to Iwatake Teruhiko, who worked extensively on the trajectory of Japanese 
plans for the occupation of Southeast Asia, we know little about the planning process between 
the submission of the Obata report in late March 1941 and the completion of these guidelines in 
November and December.170 The Japanese Ministry of Defense’s National Institute of Defense 
Studies holds draft occupation guidelines attributed to the general headquarters of the Southern 
Expeditionary Army dated November 3, three days before that army was formally created.171 
Given its detail, Iwatake suggests that this draft was by no means the first.172 And the fact that 
the Imperial General Headquarters occupation guidelines from November 25 use the exact same 
language as this draft in many sections, and that Col. Ishii Akiho (ƾIǉǍ), a member of the 
Army Ministry who drafted the November 20 Liaison Conference agreement, has his name 
written across its front page, indicate that these planning documents travelled both up and down 
the chain of command before occupation policy was completed. What we can say is that all these 
documents—from the Liaison Conference agreement to the occupation guidelines of both the 
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Imperial General Headquarters and the Southern Expeditionary Army—were heavily influenced 
by the Obata report.173 
According to the final guidelines, the military administrations of Southeast Asia would 
work under strong, centralized control. In the minutes of the November 20 Liaison Conference, 
Army Chief of Staff Sugiyama Hajime (ŕìn) noted that conference members had agreed to 
“establish unitary (ichigenteki ;nƳ) control over the administration of the Southern Areas” in 
order to avoid the “extremely dissatisfying results” brought about by the “heterogenous” 
(tagenteki ÂnƳ) approaches of different occupying armies in China.174 The Imperial General 
Headquarters and the Southern Expeditionary Army guidelines laid out what unified control in 
occupied Southeast Asia would look like: economic and political goals would be set in Tokyo, 
policy guidelines would be decided by the Southern Expeditionary Army, and policy 
implementation would be left to the military administrations of the constituent field armies.175 At 
every level, however, the occupation of Southeast Asia would be committed to its “three great 
goals” (sandaiganmoku =ÃƻƸ): restoring public order, acquiring resources, and maintaining 
self-sufficiency.176 To facilitate this, all the plans specified that the military administration 
should rely on “pre-existing government structures” (zanson tōchi kikō ŷÎǦſűū) and their 
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native staff to administer Southeast Asia.177 In the occupied territories Allied citizens would be 
compelled to cooperate, the rights of Axis citizens would be respected but not expanded, and 
resident Chinese would be alienated from the Jiang regime and compelled to cooperate with 
Japanese policy.178 The customs of local peoples would be respected but “the premature 
encouragement of native independence movements [would] be avoided.”179 Finally, the plans 
stipulated that the administration should compel any Japanese residents of the occupied 
territories too cooperate, but that the entry of new private citizens would be carefully 
controlled.180 While they lacked its detail and blunt tone, the Obata report was referred to as the 
“springboard” (tatakidai ) for these final policy guidelines.181 Like the Obata report, 
these guidelines were preoccupied with the China experience, where uncoordinated occupation 
policies had left a lasting, debilitating impact on local administration.182 They were narrowly 
focused on acquiring the strategic resources Japan needed to subdue China and expel the hostile 
Western powers from their Southeast Asian spheres of influence, and facilitating this by 
restoring public order through preexisting government structures while reducing the burden that 
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occupying armies represented for the imperial treasury. Taken together, these plans represented 
the formal acceptance of the Obata report, officially committing the Japanese Empire to 
preserving the colonial status quo in Southeast Asia under its leadership. 
Iwatake identifies two themes that ran through the entire Japanese planning process: the 
specter of the war in China and the desire for centralized control. Few of the army officers who 
wrote these reports and agreements and guidelines had any experience in Southeast Asia. All had 
spent years in China, however, and had witnessed the disastrous aftermath of Japan’s ill-planned 
war. According to Ishii, when Japan invaded China in 1937 with no clear occupation policy, 
debates that should have been settled before the war instead played out in real time between 
different factions of the army, leading to constant interference by Japanese officers in local 
administration and the alienation of the Chinese people.183 No matter what side they had taken in 
these debates, Japanese war planners seem to have agreed that they needed to set clear goals for 
the occupation and establish a formal administrative hierarchy beholden to Tokyo before 
invading Southeast Asia. 
If one considers these occupation guidelines from the perspective of the people who 
would live under them, however, another theme emerges. Before the war, many Southeast Asian 
nationalists held a deep admiration for Japan. The country had successfully modernized and, in 
the Russo-Japanese War, had beaten a Western imperial power at its own game.184 From the 
beginning of the twentieth century, a small but significant number of Southeast Asian 
nationalists had begun to pursue their education in Japan rather than in Europe. While their 
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activities were often monitored by the Japanese police, over the course of the 1920s and 1930s 
many of them participated in the Pan-Asian movement, meeting with Japanese philosophers, 
politicians, soldiers, and aristocrats to reaffirm their commitment to “Asian brotherhood.”185 In 
Southeast Asia, as tensions with the Anglophone powers mounted, Japanese intelligence 
agencies began to provide aid to local independence movements.186 Some nationalists were 
disturbed by the Japanese invasion of China. Mohammad Hatta, the future vice-president of 
Indonesia, argued that if Japan was truly committed to “Asia for Asians” it would need to bring 
peace to China and treat all Asians as equals.187 Other Southeast Asian radicals, however, were 
more willing to overlook the war in China if it meant they could secure Japanese aid for their 
causes. Hatta, who had been educated in Europe, was willing to cooperate with “Dutch 
democracy” against “fascist Japan,” but others like Aung San in Burma and Ibrahim Yaacob in 
Malaya saw the Japanese army as a potential agent of colonial liberation.188 To these nationalists 
the occupation guidelines set in Tokyo in late 1941 were a betrayal. Japanese policymakers had 
singled out the nationalists as a danger to the new administration. They would work instead with 
the very people that the nationalists criticized for enabling Western domination over their 
homelands: native civil servants, the colonial police, Chinese capitalists, and even white 
colonialists. As we will see in the coming chapters, these groups were not necessarily happy to 
be appointed Japan’s favored partners in Southeast Asia, but they worked with the Japanese 
administration in the interest of protecting their communities (and themselves). 
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You Go to War with the Plans You Have 
It quickly became clear to Japanese administrators in Southeast Asia that Tokyo’s 
guidelines were deeply flawed. To begin with, they failed to anticipate how effectively 
Westerners had constructed local colonial administrations around themselves. The British in 
particular had systematically excluded non-whites from positions of authority in the various 
layers of colonial administration in Malaya. The sudden flight of British colonialists during the 
rapid Japanese invasion left government offices in disarray. In Penang, the British Army led 
away the local European population on the night of December 16, leaving behind one white 
doctor and the Asian population to face the Japanese assault on the island. The surrender of the 
city—the oldest British settlement in Malaya—was left to the Indian editor of a local 
newspaper.189 The collapse of British rule elsewhere in Malaya was not always as shameful but 
was just as complete. In the months after the fall of Singapore the Japanese were forced to admit 
that propping up the prewar administrations of Southeast Asia would require a much larger 
commitment of manpower than planners had anticipated. By August 1942, the Southern 
Expeditionary Army requested that the central government send 7,652 new administrators to 
make up for this shortfall. They asked for 2,615 new staffers to be sent to the 25th Army in 
Malaya and Sumatra alone—more than a six-fold increase from Nishimura’s proposal a year-
and-a-half earlier.190 
Centralized control over the administration in Southeast Asia was also weaker than 
policymakers in Tokyo had hoped. The Southern Expeditionary Army’s Gunseisōkanbu 
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(Miltiary Adminsitration Directorate ȷĶǩƶɏ), which was based in Shōnan for half of the 
occupation, was unable to act effectively as an intermediary between the Imperial General 
Headquarters and Army Ministry in Tokyo and regional military administrations.191 Japanese 
administrators in Java, Burma, and even Shōnan often disregarded their subordination to the 
Gunseisōkanbu. They interpreted occupation policy to suit their own needs and sought help from 
informal allies in Tokyo when problems arose.192 Some of these administrators may have done 
this because they anticipated the failings of the occupation guidelines. Col. Watanabe Wataru (Ɗ
ɉƊ), a leading figure in the 25th Army’s administration of Malaya and Sumatra (including 
Shōnan), denounced the resource-focused occupation policy as larcenous and Obata and his team 
as naïve.193 He also realized that the administrative needs of Malaya and Sumatra would call for 
far more Japanese staff than Nishimura had proposed. Once Watanabe had been assigned the 
task of organizing the administration of these regions in late 1941, he requested an emergency 
allotment of five hundred additional administrators. He received twenty-five and the opportunity 
to recruit fifty more “volunteers” on his own.194 Even before the war began, prospective 
administrators like Watanabe were running up against the limits of the occupation plans for 
Southeast Asia. 
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Watanabe was by no means an enlightened figure: he believed that the occupation must 
have a firm guiding principle beyond the cynical acquisition of resources, but in his opinion that 
principle should be the “spiritual cleansing” of the “hedonistic and wasteful” Southeast Asians 
whose failure to resist Western domination was a moral outrage for which he would compel 
them to repent.195 And, no matter how prescient his critiques of the Obata report and the 
occupation guidelines it inspired, these were the documents that he and other military 
administrators carried with them to the southern part of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Watanabe 
considered himself a China expert because of his long experience as an intelligence officer on 
the continent, but most Japanese administrators who departed for Southeast Asia in early 1942 
had little knowledge of the region and its inhabitants. These planning documents offered a clear 
set of goals around which they could conceptualize and organize their work in Southeast Asia. 
Well after the war, these policies would continue to frame how former members of the 
administration understood their mission in Southeast Asia.196 For all his bluster, Watanabe 
himself adhered closely to the Imperial General Headquarters and Southern Expeditionary 
Army’s occupation guidelines when he helped draft the “Guidelines for Implementing the 25th 
Army Military Administration.”197 A few new phrases gave this document a more draconian tone 
than its predecessors—instead of “respecting” preexisting organizations and customs, it would 
“generously allow those that did not have ill effects to continue”—but on the whole Watanabe 
seems to have had little choice but to work within the framework set by the imperial 
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headquarters and government in Tokyo.198 Nakano Satoshi, who has argued that Japanese 
occupation policy in Southeast Asia on a whole was inclined toward appeasement (yūwashugi Ú
¢BǴ), claims that Watanabe ignored the letter of these guidelines by imposing military 
autocracy in Malaya.199 As we will see in the coming chapters, Watanabe was much more 
constrained in his actions than Nakano might imply.200 Not only was Watanabe forced to adhere 
to central guidelines when drafting his own in Malaya, he was also blocked from introducing 
radical changes in Malaya, such as the abolition of the local sultanates and prohibition of the use 
of English, by superiors in the Southern Expeditionary Army and in Tokyo. Nakano is right to 
point out that Watanabe’s administration in Malaya was more draconian than that of the 
Philippines or Java. But this was possible because Nakano’s “appeasement” was only one side of 
a spectrum of different Japanese interpretations of appropriate policy toward the Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. The dictum that Watanabe could not violate, despite his best efforts, was that the 
Japanese administration in wartime Southeast Asia should maintain the colonial status quo.  
 
Centering the Overseas Chinese  
While the occupation guidelines were clear that Japanese administrators should work 
with the local leaders who had been most invested in the prewar colonial status-quo, they were 
often vague about which specific figures they should approach to help them govern the region. 
There was one group, however, that decision makers in Tokyo singled out as critical to the 
                                               
198 Nanpō sakusen ni tomonau senryōchi tōchi yōkō, 170. “Dainijyūgogun gunsei jisshi yōkō,” 280. 
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200 See Chapters 2 and 4. 
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success of the occupation. On February 14, one day before the capitulation of Singapore, the 
leaders of the Japanese military and civilian government met in a Liaison Conference. It was at 
this meeting that the leaders of the empire agreed on Shōnan as the new name for Singapore.201 
But this was also the meeting in which they produced the succinctly named “Guidelines for 
Overseas Chinese Policy” (Kakyō taisaku yōkō ȋjãǕȚǨ). The policy prescription in this 
document was relatively straightforward: in regions occupied by the Japanese military, the 
overseas Chinese would be alienated from Jiang Jieshi’s regime and made to proactively support 
and contribute to the completion of the Greater East Asian War.202 This policy toward the 
overseas Chinese aligned with what had already been written in the occupation guidelines issued 
a few months before, but on the eve of the fall of Singapore they bore repeating. The document 
went on to describe how, precisely, the overseas Chinese would serve the new military 
administrations of Southeast Asia: under Japanese control they would contribute to the 
cultivation and acquisition of strategic national defense resources. While they would eventually 
need to constrain the social power of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, for the time being 
Japanese could take advantage of their economic prowess to achieve the occupation’s single 
most important goal.203 
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February 14, 1942, NIDS, 183. 
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Two decades after the war, one of Watanabe Wataru’s closest confidants, a civilian 
named Takase Tōru (ɯƑĕ) told historian Akashi Yōji that the “Guidelines for Overseas 
Chinese Policy” was based on a document that he and Watanabe had drafted on December 28, 
1941: the 25th Army’s “Principles for Implementing Overseas Chinese Operations” (Kakyō 
kōsaku jisshi yōryō ȋjõ[×ŀȚɩ).204 Akashi suggests that there were other central 
planners who left their imprint on the Liaison Conference agreement, but it makes sense that 
Watanabe, one of the army’s premier “China experts” tasked with setting up the military 
administration of one of the most heavily Chinese areas in Southeast Asia, would have some 
influence over imperial policy toward the overseas Chinese.205 Akashi notes that these two 
documents struck different tones: the Liaison Conference agreement was abstract and lenient, 
while the guidelines that Watanabe and Takase drafted were concrete and vindictive.206 As we 
will see, Watanabe’s harsh rhetoric would alienate him from more sober-minded members of the 
administration throughout his tenure in Malaya. But, as with the guidelines he had created for the 
25th Army’s military administration, his overseas Chinese policy stayed within the framework 
agreed upon by the Liaison Conference on February 14. The “Principles for Implementing 
Overseas Chinese Operations” called for a rejection of the “conciliatory policies of the past 
(jūrai no yūin kōsaku đřȤĈõ[)” and took a zero-tolerance approach toward overseas 
                                               
204 Akashi Yōji ŬǝにȖ, “Watanabe gunsei: Sono tetsuri to tenkai ƴいɝśʬÒǈĕɾ” in Akashi Yōji, 
ed. ŬǝにȖȉ, Nihon senryōka no Eiryō Maraya/Shingapōru ŨŽ·ʑXȞʑDKH92Q-CRM (Tokyo: 
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governors of Malaya on April 19, 1942. Shinozaki, 68. Ōdachi Shigeo Denki Kankōkai, 181. 
205 Akashi suggests that Amano Masakazu (òɷƛS) of the Army General Staff, who had been just returned from 
an inspection tour of Southeast Asia, also contributed to the Liaison Conference agreement. Akashi, “Watanabe 
gunsei,” 78–79. 
206 Akashi, “Watanabe gunsei,” 41. 
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Chinese who refused to pledge their obedience to Japan.207 At the same time, the document was 
even more effusive about the importance of the overseas Chinese to the Japanese occupation of 
Southeast Asia. It suggested that their de facto power (jitsuryoku ×) and economic 
competency (shōsai ¥ī) should be used to further the Japanese management of the Southern 
Areas (Nanpō keiei ľǤª).208 In time, the Chinese in Southeast Asia could be used to ruin 
the “Jiang regime” and harmonize Sino-Japanese relations.209 The document ended by 
hyperbolically claiming that the economic might of the overseas Chinese would be the future 
“logistical driving force of [Japan’s] grand strategy (daihōsaku no sakugenteki suishinryoku Ã
ľǕǕƌƳĲɂ)” in Southeast Asia and beyond.210 Watanabe may have endorsed harsh, 
repressive measures against the overseas Chinese, but only because he saw them as critically 
important to the future of the empire. As Southeast Asians who were heavily invested in the 
colonial status quo, the overseas Chinese, who had played such a dominant role in the colonial 
economy, stood out as ideal partners in the region. 
  
The Chinese leaders that Wee Twee Kim had gathered in the Goh Loo Club could not 
have known this, but they were exactly the kind of people that Japanese war planners in Tokyo 
and administrators on the ground had identified as critical to the success of the wartime 
occupation. They had been some of Jiang Jieshi’s closest supporters for half a decade and, as a 
result, their lives of individual overseas Chinese leaders did not mean much to the Japanese 
military. As a group, however, Japan’s victory would hinge on their cooperation. Wee used the 
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threat of violence to cow the gathered men into fearful silence, but he had brought them together 
at Watanabe’s behest and would soon parade them in front of Takase, who ordered them to 
provide a $50 million “gift” as seed money for the 25th Army’s administration of Malaya and 
Sumatra. Japanese occupation plans, from the Obata report to the guidelines of the 25th Army, 
may have been imperfect and unrealistic, but they were the reason that Shōnan’s overseas 
Chinese leaders were the first local figures to be asked to mobilize local financial, human, and 




Chapter 2 – Identifying Japan’s Partners in Shōnan I: 
The Oversea Chinese Association 
 
 The March 1 meeting at the Goh Loo Club represented one of the earliest attempts by the 
new Japanese administration to establish control over Shōnan’s accommodationist elite. War 
planners from Obata in Tokyo to Watanabe in Malaya had identified the economically powerful 
Chinese community as the ideal group to help establish Japanese control over the region, if they 
could be compelled to renounce their support for Jiang Jieshi and cooperate with the Japanese 
army. The guidelines, however, represented more of a rough architectural sketch than a detailed 
blueprint of the administration. This was particularly true when it came to the treatment of the 
peoples of Southeast Asia: because Obata and his colleagues were preoccupied with acquiring 
resources for the war effort, social policies had received far less attention than economic plans. 
As a result, the task of identifying partners in occupied Southeast Asia fell to administrators on 
the ground. It was up to individual Japanese, particularly the handful present in the first few 
weeks of the administration, to identify who exactly these “influential natives” (yūryoku domin 
ō³Ź) might be.211 
The extent to which the details of wartime governance in Shōnan and elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia had to be worked out by individual officials led to bitter disagreements over how 
the occupation should function on a day-to-day basis. When it came to the Chinese, members of 
the new military administration disagreed over how coercive their approach should be. 
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Watanabe, constrained by the guidelines from Tokyo but still hoping that the war would provide 
an opportunity for a “spiritual cleansing” both of the Japanese and occupied peoples, believed 
that the Chinese were inherently “duplicitous” (menjūfukuhai ɧđǼǹ) and must be ruled 
autocratically.212 Others in the administration were less overtly racist (some even admitted that 
there were important differences between the Chinese communities of Southeast Asia and North 
China, where Watanabe and a number of others had had direct experience with military 
administration) and felt that the Chinese, like the other peoples of Southeast Asia, could be won 
over to the Japanese cause through conciliation and good governance.213 What administrators all 
agreed on, however, was the premise of official policy toward the overseas Chinese decided on 
February 14: that their economic power would be critical to the success of the occupation of 
Southeast Asia, and particularly to the acquisition of the region’s resources. 
At the Goh Loo Club, after Wee Twee Kim had threatened the extermination of Shōnan’s 
Chinese population, the gathered leaders of the Chinese community were informed that the 
septuagenarian doctor and former president of Xiamen University, Lim Boon Keng (Şĺģ), 
had been placed at the head of a new organization that they were all expected to join: the 
Oversea Chinese Association (OCA, Huaqiao Xiehui/Kakyō Kyōkai ȋjŌ). The OCA was 
to be the organizational successor of such prewar Chinese institutions as the Singapore Chinese 
                                               
212 Watanabe Wataru ƴいƴ “Senryō-chi tōji (chian shukusei) ni kan suru Watanabe taisa kōen sokkiroku ·ʑã
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Chamber of Commerce and the Straits Chinese British Association, but to the Japanese 
administration it was also a channel through which to mobilize the financial and human 
resources of the local Chinese community. It was in this spirit that Watanabe immediately called 
on the new association to demonstrate its loyalty to the Japanese with a $50 million “donation” 
to the 25th Army. The Chinese dignitaries forced to participate in the ensuing fundraising effort 
included some of the most important leaders of the National Salvation Movement. In other 
words, they had been among most vocal opponents of the Japanese empire in prewar Singapore. 
But these entrepreneurs, educators, professionals, and bankers were also exactly the sort of pro-
status quo figures with whom the Japanese hoped to work in Shōnan. When the OCA handed its 
“donation” to Lt. Gen. Yamashita in an elaborate ceremony on June 25, 1942, the occasion, 
which was widely reported in Japan, symbolized the subordination of these figures to the 
Japanese empire.  
To the Chinese community of Shōnan, this involuntary donation appeared as a 
coordinated Japanese effort to punish them for their support of Jiang Jieshi and humiliate their 
leaders. By the time Lim handed Yamashita the ceremonial check in June, some Japanese 
officials were themselves worried that Watanabe’s extortion had irrevocably alienated the 
Chinese from the administration. Kempeitai (military police Ĥwɢ) Col. Ōtani Keijirō (ÃȬĹ
Hɍ), Watanabe’s second-in-command in the administration during the donation drive and later 
chief of the Police Affairs Department, described the incident as the “worst episode in the history 
of the military administration” and a propaganda boon for the Communist guerrillas who were 
already establishing themselves in the jungles of Malaya.214 In fact, the OCA stood in the middle 
                                               
214 Akashi Yōji ŬǝにȖ, “Watanabe gunsei: Sono tetsuri to tenkai ƴいɝśʬÒǈĕɾ” in Akashi Yōji, 
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of a bureaucratic tug-of-war between Watanabe and more conciliatory members of the 
administration even before the meeting at the Goh Loo Club occurred. In the week after the 
British surrender on February 15, the Military Administration Department (Gunseibu ȷĶɏ) of 
the 25th Army, which was to be based in Shōnan and rule Malaya and Sumatra, was still finding 
its footing. At this time, Japanese authority in Shōnan was split between the 25th Army 
Headquarters (Shireibu Rɏ) at Raffles College in the interior of the island, its Defense 
Headquarters (Keibi Shirebu ȪhRɏ) at Fort Canning in the heart of the city, and the new 
Gunseibu at the Adelphi Hotel a few blocks closer to the waterfront. The Gunseibu was 
responsible for the administration of Shōnan, but it was preoccupied with organizing itself at the 
time, and the Kempeitai of the Defense Headquarters were made responsible both for 
maintaining security in the city and for carrying out the Sook Ching massacre. Because the 
bureaucratic responsibilities of each of these offices was so confused, and because records 
related to the massacre were among the first destroyed when the Japanese surrendered in 1945, 
few records from this period have survived. The only detailed account of the creation of the 
OCA comes from the problematic testimony of a civilian working in the Defense Headquarters 
named Shinozaki Mamoru (ǘðȫ). 
 
Shinozaki’s Story 
Shinozaki’s account of the creation of the OCA is found in three separate sources: in oral 
testimony he gave during the Singapore war crimes trials, in an interview that he gave to Lim 
Yoon Lin at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore) in 1973, and a written account 
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of the war, published in Chinese (1973), in English (1975), and Japanese (1976). These accounts 
differ slightly (his Japanese book was by far the most detailed), but Shinozaki’s general narrative 
of the events of late February and early March remained the same. Shinozaki had been a press 
attaché at the Japanese consulate in Singapore before he was arrested by the British and jailed for 
espionage in 1940. During the Malayan Campaign he was in Changi Prison, avoiding the fate of 
the Japanese residents in Singapore who were sent to India after the 25th Army landed in Malaya. 
According to his account, on February 16 the Kempeitai released him and a few dozen other 
Japanese nationals from Changi and brought them back into the city. Shinozaki remembers that 
he was warmly received by Lt. Col. Yokota Yoshitaka (ŭƫŃɡ), one of the senior Kempeitai 
commanders in Shōnan. After making arrangements for the other Japanese who had been 
released from Changi, Yokota took Shinozaki to see Lt. Gen. Yamashita, as well as Maj. Gen. 
Manaki Takanobu (ɭÇőĹa), head of the Gunseibu, Maj. Gen. Kawamura Saburō (žŗ
ɍ), head of the Defense Headquarters, and Lt. Col. Ōishi Masayuki (Ãƾŵü), who oversaw 
the work of the Kempeitai in Shōnan.215 These commanders congratulated him for surviving his 
imprisonment and making it back into imperial service, and Shinozaki claims to have made the 
most meaningful connection with Manaki. Both had worked in the Japanese embassy in Berlin at 
different times in the late 1930s and quickly bonded over stories of Germany and their mutual 
acquaintances.216 After they spoke, Manaki charged Shinozaki with looking after the German 
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community in Shōnan; to facilitate this Kawamura made him a special adviser for foreign affairs 
(tokubetsu gaiji kōtōgakari ƙ{ÁGɯǔ^) at Defense Headquarters.217 In this capacity, 
Shinozaki moved with Yokota’s unit into the Tōyō Hotel, which had been Japanese-owned 
before the war, and began issuing protection passes (hogoshō `ȫȣ) to the citizens of Axis and 
neutral countries, starting with Swiss consul Heinrich Rudolf Arbenz and his wife.218 
According to Shinozaki’s account, when Tay Ho Jin (ɒÏN), the cook at the Tōyō 
Hotel, returned to work Shinozaki wrote out a protection pass for him as well. Word of these 
passes spread through the Chinese community, which had been victimized by the Japanese army 
even before the Sook Ching massacre, and Shinozaki recounts that he was soon printing 
thousands of passes which he handed out to any person or organization who asked for them.219 
When the Kempeitai posted notices ordering Chinese men to report for a “mass inspection” on 
February 21, the demand for Shinozaki’s passes skyrocketed. Shinozaki claims that he first 
began to suspect how the mass inspection would end when he accompanied a Chinese nurse, 
who had worked for a Japanese clinic before the war, to the detention center on River Valley 
Road to secure the release of her relatives. There he found thousands of Chinese men sitting in 
the tropical sun, surrounded by Japanese soldiers with fixed bayonets. Because he had already 
met many of the Kempeitai officers on the day of his release from Changi, including Lt. Gōshi 
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(ė) at the River Valley Road detention center, Shinozaki says he was able to secure the 
release of the nurses’ relatives but was haunted by the stares of the thousands of men who 
remained in detention.220 In all his postwar accounts, Shinozaki stresses, perhaps to himself more 
than the reader, that he spent the following days doing everything he could to release individuals 
from the detention centers, but that he alone could not save the Chinese community.221  
After the massacre the Kempeitai began its second round of detentions, focused on anti-
Japanese leaders in the Chinese community.222 Shinozaki was concerned about the fate of these 
men, having known many of them before his imprisonment by the British.223 He claims that he 
was able to free a few of them, such as S.Q. Wong (ɴoƦ), Ong Cheng Hway, Pang Chin Eng, 
and Lim Soo Siam (ŞůŦ).224 But he was unable to secure the release of many more, especially 
after new Kempeitai members who had not heard of Shinozaki’s imprisonment began to arrive in 
Shōnan. Around this time, as he was printing new protection passes, Shinozaki remembers a 
young Kempeitai officer bringing a visibly shaken Chinese gentleman into the lobby of the Tōyō 
Hotel.225 He recognized the elderly man as Lim Boon Keng, an Anglophone Chinese doctor who 
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had helped found the Straits Chinese British Association in 1900 and served as president of 
Amoy University from 1921 to 1937. Shinozaki asked the officer for some time alone with Lim 
and tried to calm the aged doctor down with a beer.226 According to his account, he was able to 
convince Lim of his fondness for the Chinese and stressed that they needed to convince the 
military that the community could renounce their pre-war anti-Japanese stance. He suggested 
that Lim, as one of the senior leaders of the overseas Chinese community, could act as the token 
head of an association that would cooperate with the Japanese in the name of all resident 
Chinese. This would allow the two men to produce a membership registry for the new 
association that they could use to free the Chinese leaders still in Kempeitai custody. Shinozaki 
admits that Lim had deep reservations about the plan, but impressed upon him the danger the 
imprisoned Chinese leaders were in: the Japanese army was intent on “severely punishing” them 
for supporting Jiang Jieshi and volunteering to fight alongside the British, and this new 
association might be the only thing that could save their lives.227 Once Lim agreed to lead the 
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accounts of this event do mention his creative reinterpretation of the meaning of Shinozaki Mamoru, but leave out 
his implicit criticism of the shibboleths about Japan and China’s shared culture and history that army propagandists 
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association, Shinozaki told him that he would draw up the bylaws of the association but that Lim 
himself would need to come up with a name for it. In Shinozaki’s mind, this would establish it as 
an autonomous organization distinct from the army-controlled Peace Maintenance Committees 
(chi’an ijikai ſÑǧİV) that had characterized the early years of Japanese occupation in 
North and Central China.228 And so, it was Lim, as Shinozaki stated in every account he gave of 
this meeting, who named the Shōnan Oversea Chinese Association (OCA). 
Shinozaki claims that Col. Yokota quickly agreed to support this new association (after a 
few beers Yokota apparently felt that Lim looked like his father).229 But the Kempeitai officer 
informed Shinozaki that he still needed the approval of the two generals with the greatest 
influence in the administration of Shōnan at the time: Kawamura at the Defense Headquarters 
and Manaki at the Gunseibu. Shinozaki recalls driving Lim home to his family and heading to 
Kawamura’s office at Fort Canning the next day. Kawamura gave his blessing to the OCA, 
noting that the new association would be under the Gunseibu’s jurisdiction anyway, and 
Shinozaki then headed to the Adelphi Hotel to secure Manaki’s approval.230 Manaki was 
receptive to the idea, but warned that the new association must not resemble a Peace 
Maintenance Committee. According to Shinozaki, he said that in Shōnan the army would need to 
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avoid the mistakes of the Sino-Japanese War and “respect the spontaneous will (jihatsuteki ishi 
wo sonchōsuru ȀƱƳġěåɓ)” of the Chinese community. Manaki was delighted to 
hear that Lim himself had suggested the name of the Oversea Chinese Association.231 With 
Manaki’s approval, Shinozaki drew up a membership registry for the OCA with the help of 
Lim’s former students from Amoy University, which allowed them to release around three 
hundred prominent Chinese from custody.232 
After a few heady days of freeing Chinese leaders from captivity Shinozaki recounts that 
his association with the OCA ended abruptly. In early March, he was summoned to the offices of 
Watanabe Wataru at the new headquarters of the Gunseibu in the Fullerton Building. According 
to Shinozaki, Watanabe had just replaced Manaki, whose sympathies toward local residents had 
upset hardliners in the 25th Army command, as the head of the Gunseibu.233 Watanabe brusquely 
informed him that the Gunseibu would assume control over the OCA and that Shinozaki, who 
was still attached to the Defense Headquarters, would have no further contact with it.234 In 
Shinozaki’s place, Watanabe dispatched Takase Tōru (ɯƑɀ) and Uchida Saburō (xƫ=ɍ), 
two civilian agents from the Japanese military intelligence network in China, along with a 
Taiwanese spy who had been in Singapore before the war, Wee Twee Kim.235 Shinozaki claims 
he was fine with this arrangement since to him the OCA had already succeeded in its purpose of 
securing the release of the imprisoned Chinese leaders. He could not then have dreamed, he 
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claimed, that Watanabe’s intentions for the OCA were to use it as a vehicle to extract a $50 
million “forced donation” (kyōsei kenkin Č}ơɕ) from the Chinese community.236 
Shinozaki’s account of his noble intentions for the OCA and the association’s quick 
appropriation by Watanabe and his cronies is widely accepted in both Japan and Singapore. 
Because Lim did not leave any record of these events, Shinozaki’s narrative the most direct 
account we have of the creation of the OCA. Yet there are inconsistencies and omissions in his 
account that have troubled those who lived through the occupation and postwar historians as 
well. The first critiques of Shinozaki’s account came after his testimony at Singapore’s war 
crimes trials in 1946 and 1947, issued by Singaporean Chinese journalists who were put off by 
Shinozaki’s defense of the Japanese officers, such as Ōishi and Kawamura, who had perpetrated 
the Sook Ching massacre. The journalists speculated that he had been given the power to issue 
“protection passes” during that violent period in order to entice local residents into working for 
the administration.237 The reaction in the Singaporean press after the publication of the Chinese-
language edition of Shinozaki’s wartime memoir was slightly more charitable, but some of the 
former members of the OCA were disappointed with a number of errors in names, dates, and 
places, as well as the messiah complex that permeated Shinozaki’s account. Tan Yeok Seong (ɟ
Ǹñ), a former student of Lim’s who was one of the OCA’s first secretaries, suggested that 
these inconsistencies could be explained by Shinozaki’s position as an occupier who ultimately 
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could not understand the suffering of the people of Singapore under Japanese rule despite his 
sympathy for them.238 
Japanese historian Hara Fujio offers a more cynical interpretation of the inconsistencies 
in Shinozaki’s narrative. Hara does not question the sincerity of Shinozaki’s desire to help the 
Chinese in Singapore, but sees in his account a “subjective intention” (shukanteki ito BȞƳġ
¯) to deny any connection between the creation of the OCA and Watanabe’s $50 million forced 
donation (or military violence in general).239 For instance, at no point does Shinozaki mention 
what happened to Lim before they met at the Tōyō Hotel, though in an article that Tan Yeok 
Seong published immediately after the war he claimed that: 
[Lim] at first refused to accept the … proposal of his becoming leader of the 
Chinese, whereupon the Kempeitai turned their anger on Dr. Lim’s wife. She was 
made to kneel down under the scorching sun for four hours at a stretch, in 
addition to bearing other insults. Eventually through the persuasion of Shinozaki 
Dr. Lim accepted and he and his wife were released from the camp and a 
Kempeitai spy was sent to stay in his house to keep watch over them.240 
 
In addition, while Shinozaki claims at one point that the Chinese flocked to register for the OCA, 
Hara cites a Chinese article published in 1971 that claims that every sort of threat and 
punishment was used to force the leaders of the overseas Chinese community to join the 
organization.241 Hara is also skeptical of Shinozaki’s depiction of Manaki as a gruff but humane 
general who had no connection to Watanabe’s forced donation, and particularly of the idea that 
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Manaki was pushed out of the administration for his sympathies to the local population. While 
Shinozaki claims that Watanabe took over the Gunseibu on March 1, Hara points out that 
Manaki was only transferred to a new position in North Borneo on April 10 and still referred to 
as the “President of the Military Administration” in the Syonan Times on March 12. In addition, 
Manaki oversaw the collection of a $3 million forced donation from the Chinese community of 
Sarawak, Sabah, and Brunei that summer, while he supervised the appointment of the aged 
Chinese leader Ong Tiang Swee (Ƥɚź) as the head of a new “OCA” (Kakyō Kyōkai ȋj
V) in Kuching that August.242 With the striking resemblance between the Chinese experience in 
Shōnan and elsewhere in Southeast Asia (Hara also points to evidence that an “OCA” was 
formed in Penang on December 19, 1941, and a Peace Maintenance Committee was formed in 
Muar on February 26), it is possible that the Shōnan OCA fit more neatly into a regional pattern 
of Japanese cooption of Chinese elites than Shinozaki wished to admit.243 Hara suggests that, 
regardless of whether Manaki harbored sympathies for the Chinese or not, he was only one cog 
in the enormous bureaucratic machinery of occupied Southeast Asia.244 
Shinozaki, perhaps inadvertently, suggests that he was swept up in the larger inertia of 
Japanese policy toward the overseas Chinese. Although he implies that it came out of his 
personal desire to release more Chinese leaders from Kempeitai custody, Shinozaki admits that 
his plan for the OCA predated his meeting with Lim. In fact, by Shinozaki’s own account the 
only contribution that the aged doctor made during the meeting was to give the OCA its name.245 
Shinozaki insists, in each of his written accounts, that the fact that Lim named the OCA was 
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what distinguished the association from the Peace Maintenance Committees of occupied China. 
This seems like a peculiar fact to emphasize, but it directly links the events that Shinozaki 
describes to Japanese occupation plans for Southeast Asia, dating back to the Obata Report. 
These plans sought to avoid the mistakes of the China occupation by reducing the direct role of 
Japanese military units in local administration.246 But this does not mean that Japanese war 
planners hoped to grant local autonomy in occupied Southeast Asia. In 1937, the Japanese army 
had invaded China without clear strategic objectives and no comprehensive plan for a long-term 
occupation. As Japanese units marched through China they had set up Peace Maintenance 
Committees to maintain order and supply them with resources, creating a chaotic patchwork of 
administrative bodies dominated by different and often antagonistic army units. The solution to 
this problem, from the perspective of Japanese war planners, was to place all administrative 
affairs in Southeast Asia under centralized control, under each occupying army’s Gunseibu. In 
Shōnan, the OCA precisely fit this model. It was not different from China’s Peace Maintenance 
Committees because it had greater autonomy from the Japanese, as Manaki’s comment about it 
representing the “spontaneous will” of the Chinese community implied. This might have been 
what Japanese administrators told themselves, or what Shinozaki wanted his readers in the 1970s 
to believe, but what truly made the OCA different from the Peace Maintenance Committees in 
China was the fact that it answered to a single, centralized military administration. 
Shinozaki may have harbored a genuine desire to create an autonomous representative 
organization for the Chinese community in Shōnan. Given the inconsistencies and omissions in 
his account, the fact that the OCA followed preexisting Japanese war plans, and its future use as 
a vehicle for the extortion of Chinese wealth in Malaya, it is also possible that the 25th Army had 
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already decided to set up the OCA and that Shinozaki’s exchange with Lim was only meant to 
give its creation the veneer of local participation. Yet it is unlikely that Manaki, Watanabe, and 
Shinozaki were coordinating their efforts. Akashi Yōji has gone through Watanabe’s wartime 
diary and an unpublished draft of his memoir, where the colonel described Manaki as 
incompetent, inconsistent, and overly distressed by what had happened in Shōnan right after the 
occupation began.247 Watanabe admitted to undermining Manaki’s role in the operations of the 
Gunseibu from the start of the occupation, which may explain Shinozaki’s belief that Watanabe 
had taken over the administration a month before he formally did so and with it his suspicion that 
Manaki’s sympathies for local residents had something to do with it.248 Manaki, meanwhile, 
certainly would have been pleased with Shinozaki’s work: the OCA represented the kind of local 
collaboration that Japanese war planners had laid out for the occupation. He may have even 
suggested the idea. But it soon became clear that there was no set policy for what to do with the 
OCA once it had been created, and the direction in which Watanabe took the organization would 
soon alienate huge swaths of the wartime administration. 
 
Disciplining the Chinese Community: The $50 Million Forced Donation 
However Shinozaki may have tailored his accounts to conceal his culpability in the 
subsequent treatment of the Chinese community, it is clear that Watanabe’s takeover of the OCA 
fundamentally transformed the experience of working for the association. Tan Yeok Seong, even 
in his critical 1973 review of Shinozaki’s book, describes this shift as it happened in the first few 
days of the OCA’s existence.249 Tan recalled first meeting Shinozaki on February 27, 1942, at 
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the Tōyō Hotel. He was among the former students of Lim’s who had agreed to help set up the 
OCA, a group that also included Dr. Hu Tsai Kuen (ǻȸ¹), Robert Tan Hoon Siang (ɟƍǆ), 
and Chng Kuek Thong (ŋɐť).250 Tan Yeok Seong remembered Shinozaki as gentle and 
cultivated, with a calm and cheerful disposition that distinguished him from the brutal 
Kempeitai. The early members of the OCA received armbands and identity cards from 
Shinozaki, and then spent the next two days searching for Chinese leaders on his behalf. On the 
third day came the sudden change: Wee Twee Kim called Tan and his colleagues to the Goh Loo 
Club (ƷbŬɏ).251 There they met many of the men that Shinozaki had unilaterally 
appointed as board members of the OCA in order to secure their release from Kempeitai custody, 
including Lee Choon Seng (Ŗ_Ĭ), Tan Ean Khiam (ɟąȨ), Lee Wee Nam (Ŗf), and 
Yeo Chang Boon (ũǰĺ).252  
According to Tan Yeok Seong’s 1973 account, before the meeting began the twenty or 
thirty attendees consoled each other and were relieved to see Lim safe and sound after the Sook 
Ching massacre and subsequent arrests.253 In an account Tan published in English in 1946, 
however, he describes a more distressing scene. He claims that Tan Ean Khiam was sweating 
and shaking, that Lee Wee Nam was wearing blood-stained clothes, and that many of these 
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leaders had been brought to the Goh Loo Club directly from jail.254 In this earlier account, 
written immediately after the war when many of the participants in this meeting had been 
labelled “race traitors” (hanjian ƎÉ) for their cooperation with the Japanese, Tan might have 
been exaggerating the duress that the Chinese leaders at the Goh Loo Club were under to justify 
their subsequent collaboration. It is also likely, however, that they were both relieved to see their 
friends and fearful of what the Japanese administration might have in store for them. Any relief 
they might have felt was quickly dispelled when Wee began to threaten them with the 
extermination of Shōnan’s entire Chinese population.255 These were empty threats, but they 
terrified the gathered leaders. Those who had not already joined the OCA formally did so, and 
Wee handed them credentials as the Gunseibu’s “Overseas Chinese Liaisons” (huaqiao 
lianluoyuan ȋjɁǥ£).256  
After the meeting concluded, Wee brought a group of delegates from the Goh Loo Club 
to Takase Tōru, the civilian advisor to Watanabe who had helped draft the 25th Army’s overseas 
Chinese policy. Takase berated them for their previous anti-Japanese activity and warned that 
they owed the preservation of their lives and wealth to the Japanese army.257 The next day, 
March 2, a larger group of Chinese leaders met at the Goh Loo Club and hastily elected a group 
of representatives from each dialect community. That afternoon these representatives passed a 
resolution pledging to hand over half of the Chinese community’s wealth to the Japanese while 
promising to safeguard the remaining half on behalf of the empire.258 This formal submission 
prompted an audience with Watanabe himself at his private residence on Nassim Road. 
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Watanabe watched the group of leaders silently while Takase suggested, “if you will offer a sum 
of, say 50 or 60 million [Straits] dollars in cash, I will do my best to prevail upon the military 
commanders to accept the gift.”259 While this sum was meant to be roughly equivalent to the 
money that the overseas Chinese had sent to Jiang Jieshi through the China Relief Fund over the 
past half-decade, it also happened to be the same amount that central planners expected 
Watanabe to raise locally to set up his military administration.260 Through this series of meetings 
Watanabe and his cronies had taken the first step toward establishing control over the economic 
resources of the overseas Chinese community. 
In the following days Takase made clear that he expected the overseas Chinese from 
across Malaya to work together to hand over $50 million within a month. The leaders at the Goh 
Loo Club scrambled to put together an institutional framework that could collect this vast sum. 
By March 4, the minutes of their meetings began to refer to this new body as the Shōnan Island 
Oversea Chinese General Association (Zhaonan-dao Huaqiao Zongxiehui ŅïȋjǮŌ), 
and by March 7 they had adopted a formal organizational structure. Lim Boon Keng was listed 
as its president, S.Q. Wong as vice-president, and Loo Tien Poh ( Ä`) as the head of its 
executive committee, while Tan Yeok Seong and Chng Kuek Thong became its first 
secretaries.261 Its executive committee, like the leadership of prewar organizations like the 
Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce, was made up of representatives from the different 
dialect groups in Shōnan: there were six Hokkien speakers, three Cantonese, three Teochews, 
two Hakkas, two Hainanese, two from the Sam Kiang community, and three Straits 
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(Anglophone) Chinese.262 The task ahead of the OCA was daunting, however, and it would have 
to call on the expertise of former China Relief Fund members to raise the $50 million that the 
Gunseibu demanded of them. Tan Ean Khiam, now a Hokkien representative in the executive 
committee, warned the OCA leadership that there was a total of about $220 million in circulation 
at the time of the British surrender.263 In order to collect almost a quarter of the currency in 
Malaya, the leaders of the OCA decided that they would need to take more drastic measures to 
mobilize Chinese wealth than the prewar China Relief Fund ever had. Rather than soliciting 
voluntary donations, they would require every Chinese resident of Malaya with assets greater 
than $3,000 to contribute eight per cent of their wealth to the “voluntary donation.” 
According to the minutes of the Shōnan OCA, on March 14 they organized a fundraising 
committee (choukuan weiyuanhui ǙŴÊ£Ō) and two days later determined how much each 
Malay state would contribute to the donation.264 In late March, however, the Shōnan OCA had 
only raised a third of the $10 million it had committed to.265 At that point it seems that 
Watanabe’s team attempted to introduce a more formal structure to the Oversea Chinese 
Association in Malaya to streamline the collection process. Takase summoned representatives to 
Shōnan from the different Chinese associations that the 25th Army’s troops had organized in the 
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other Malay states. He ordered them to reorganize themselves as branches of the Malayan 
Oversea Chinese Association informing them how much each state was expected to contribute, 
with April 20 as the deadline for the donation.266 Multiple sources from immediately after the 
war attest that when representatives from Malacca protested that they could not possibly raise the 
$5.5 million donation they had been assigned, they were promptly arrested.267 The remaining 
delegates made no further complaints and returned to their states to throw themselves into 
collecting their share of the “gift.” Around this time, on March 27 and 28, the OCA and the $50 
million “offering” (hōnōkin ÈǞɕ) were formally introduced to the Chinese-speaking 
community of Shōnan by the Syonan Jitpoh (Ņł¾).268 In early April, the Shōnan OCA sent 
out forms to the Chinese residents of the city, asking them to provide a full account of their 
assets. After checking their responses against various government records, the OCA directed 
each resident to make a deposit equal to eight per cent of his wealth to a specified Japanese bank. 
Even with this more streamlined organization, by mid-April the OCAs of Malaya had not 
collected nearly enough money, so Watanabe’s Gunseibu decided to intervene even more 
directly in the fundraising effort.269 On April 19, the Gunseibu finally distributed its guidelines 
for dealing with the overseas Chinese, the “Principles for Implementing Overseas Chinese 
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Operations” (Kakyō kōsaku jisshi yōryō ȋjõ[×ŀȚɩ), to the different state governments 
of Malaya.270 Aside from its grandiose statements about the importance of the Chinese to 
Japanese policy in Southeast Asia, this document made Watanabe’s forced donation a 
cornerstone of the Gunseibu’s policy toward the overseas Chinese and demanded that 
“representatives of the various chambers of commerce and other influential bodies as well as 
influential people … be gathered together and made to pledge their total cooperation with all of 
Japan’s industrial, trade, economic, financial, and cultural institutions in the South.”271 In many 
ways these guidelines simply formalized preexisting policy. Indeed, Takase claimed in a 1966 
interview that he and Watanabe had drafted the document in December 1941.272 Historian Chua 
Ser-Koon has suggested, however, that at this point the Japanese administration had become 
much more involved in the fund-raising effort.273 The Gunseibu and its subordinate state 
governments had already made colonial tax and land records available to the state OCAs so that 
they could more accurately determine what each individual’s “donation” should be, and the 
Kempeitai was checking on the accounts of the different OCAs.274 By May, the Japanese police 
became heavily involved in the collection process, especially in states like Perak that had trouble 
meeting their quotas. On May 16, the Japanese police in Taiping performed a “mass inspection” 
reminiscent of the Sook Ching massacre, gathering the wealthiest property owners of Perak in a 
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field for interrogation, jailing a dozen of them, and leaving the remainder with ominous warnings 
about what would happen if they did not pay up.275 
May came and went, and the OCAs were still nowhere close to raising the $50 million 
that Takase had demanded of them. No matter how bloody-minded Watanabe’s administration 
was in its demands for Chinese wealth, it was impossible for the associations to raise the same 
amount of money in a few months that the China Relief Fund had raised over the course of five 
years, even in the best conditions. And these were not the best conditions. The Japanese invasion 
had upended the financial system in Malaya and, even a few months after the British surrender, 
many local banks either remained closed or had been taken over by the Bank of Taiwan or the 
Yokohama Specie Bank.276 While the slow recovery of the financial system allowed many to 
start paying their contributions a few months into the occupation, much of the wealth of the 
overseas Chinese was tied up in agricultural land or industrial capital. Despite this fact, 
Watanabe’s Gunseibu demanded that the $50 million donation be paid in cash, forcing the 
wealthiest landowners and capitalists to sell property to make their contributions. As the market 
flooded with cheap property many of the richest overseas Chinese saw their wealth evaporate, 
particularly in agrarian Malacca and mining-dominated Perak.277 Even Lim Boon Keng was 
unable to fulfill his contribution of $2,200 and, unwilling to take a loan, he began drinking 
heavily. Tan Yeok Seong claims that he and other Amoy University students were able to pay 
the remainder on behalf of their old teacher.278 In early June, after months of effort, the Malayan 
OCAs had raised only $28 million. As criticism toward Watanabe’s policies from within the 
                                               
275 Chin, 77–79. 
276 Paul Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: A Social and Economic History (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press, 1997), 214–215. 
277 Chin, 79–81. 
278 Tan, “History,” 8. 
 103 
occupation administration began to grow, Takase allowed the OCAs to take out a $22 million 
loan from Japan’s Yokohama Specie Bank, with six per cent interest, to be paid back in one year, 
and began preparing an elaborate ceremony for the presentation of the “gift” to Lt. Gen. 
Yamashita.279 
The Oversea Chinese Association’s fund-raising effort was strikingly similar to that of 
the China Relief Fund. This was not a coincidence. Shinozaki’s early efforts to organize the 
OCA focused on an Anglophone doctor and a handful of his former students. But the Chinese 
leaders whom Wee Twee Kim gathered in the Goh Loo Club a few days later included some of 
the most important leaders of the anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement. Tan Ean Khiam, 
for instance, had directed the Nanyang Federation of China Relief Funds (ƂȋjǙȰǄ±ɥ
ŹǮŌ or jǮŌ) under Tan Kah Kee, and Lee Choon Seng had led the Singapore China 
Relief Fund Committee (Ľ¸ǙȰŌ).280 Threatened with violence if they did not raise a vast 
sum of money in a short amount of time, it is not surprising that these men relied on their prewar 
experiences to guide their work. As a result, the state OCAs closely resembled each state’s 
prewar China Relief Fund committee and were often led by the same people. The presentation 
ceremony might as well have been a reunion for the National Salvation Movement: the Shōnan 
delegation included six of the eight leaders of the sub-committees of the Singapore China Relief 
Fund.281 The similarities between the OCA and the China Relief Fund extended beyond 
leadership. Within each state, the fundraising effort was divided along the same dialect lines that 
it had been before the war: different sub-committees collected from those who shared their 
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dialects and, according to the English-language propaganda paper, the Syonan Times, the 
Hokkien, Cantonese, and Hainanese submitted their donations to the newly established local 
branch of the Bank of Taiwan, while the Teochew, Hakka, and Straits Chinese communities gave 
their donations to the Yokohama Specie Bank.282 As with the China Relief Fund, each branch of 
the OCA was responsible for the fundraising efforts within its own state and only communicated 
with the general association in Shōnan sporadically. Watanabe and his advisors did not seem to 
have any qualms about the similarities between the OCA’s activities and the anti-Japanese 
National Salvation Movement. Indeed, as they recruited former China Relief Fund leaders and 
streamlined the OCAs operations in Malaya, they seemed intent on recreating the prewar 
fundraising movement under their control. 
While the organization of the OCA may have mirrored that of the China Relief Fund, 
other aspects of the association were unprecedented. The prewar fundraising effort had been the 
first mass movement that had encompassed the entire Chinese community of Malaya. As 
opposed to previous political and social movements, the leaders of the National Salvation 
Movement had attempted to mobilize all Chinese residents to support the war against the 
Japanese, regardless of dialect, class, religion, or education. But, despite the enormous social 
pressure that different groups brought to bear to compel their neighbors to donate to the China 
Relief Fund, it remained a voluntary effort. In contrast, the OCA’s “donation” affected all but the 
poorest members of the Chinese community. Along with the Sook Ching massacre, it 
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represented a near-universal experience that united the Chinese of Shōnan and the rest of Malaya 
in a shared victimization. 
The Oversea Chinese Association in Shōnan and elsewhere in Malaya had a new sort of 
relationship with the administration. The British colonial state had remained aloof from the 
National Salvation Movement, and its leaders moderated their anti-Japanese activities to keep the 
colonial authorities from interfering with their fundraising efforts.283 The OCAs, in contrast, 
developed into unofficial arms of the Japanese regime and worked under the direction of the 
Gunseibu in Shōnan and state governments elsewhere in Malaya. The Japanese administration 
lent its direct support to the fundraising effort by sharing government documents with the OCA 
and brought the considerable coercive power of civilian and military police to bear on those who 
could not or would not pay their share of the donation. While some suspected that the leaders of 
different state OCAs took advantage of their relationship with the Japanese administration to 
settle personal grudges, historian Chua Ser-Koon notes that the charter of the Shōnan OCA 
(published in the Syonan Jitpoh on March 28) betrayed the fact that it was a puppet organization 
under the direct control of the Japanese commander, organized in its own words to “carry out the 
decrees of the imperial Japanese government and lead all the overseas Chinese in total 
submission to the administration.”284 Where the leaders of the China Relief Fund had maintained 
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their distance from the prewar British colonial state, the OCA could not escape its direct, 
hierarchical relationship with the Japanese wartime administration. 
 
Ceremonial Submission 
The presentation ceremony for the $50 million donation was held on June 25 at the 
Fullerton Building at the mouth of the Shōnan River. The proceedings were choreographed by 
Takase and Wee to emphasize the total subordination of the overseas Chinese to the Japanese 
empire. After a rehearsal, the ceremony began with the leadership of the 25th Army and the 
Gunseibu, sixty-nine overseas Chinese leaders, and the Japanese and local press in attendance. 
Lim Boon Keng, as the head of the OCA in Malaya, advanced toward Lt. Gen. Yamashita, 
flanked by Wong Thit San (ɴəƥ) of Selangor and Heah Joo Siang (Ɂȗǆ) of Penang. After 
bowing toward the commander, Lim advanced further and read a prepared address.285 In it, he 
lamented the fact that the overseas Chinese had long been “puppets” (kuilei gm) of the British 
and Americans, despite the fact that these countries had exploited the “races of East Asia” 
(dongya minzu ŚKŹŁ) for hundreds of years.286 He acknowledged the harm that the overseas 
Chinese had done to the Japanese empire out of ignorance of its true righteousness, especially in 
the few years before the current “holy war” (shengzhan Ƕĩ), an implicit acknowledgement of 
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the National Salvation Movement’s support for Jiang Jieshi. He stated that, after Japan’s 
sweeping victory in Southeast Asia, the overseas Chinese began to recognize the error of their 
ways, but they had not known how to atone for their crimes (zui Ǳ). They knew they deserved 
punishment and offered their lives and property to Yamashita. But Yamashita, commander for 
the “divinely martial and virtuous” (shengwu shengde ǶŶǶĔ) Japanese Emperor, granted 
them amnesty (dui wudeng jiayi teshe æǔSƙȲ). In response, the overseas Chinese felt 
that they must respectfully offer half the value of their property to the commander, to repay the 
sacrifices (fenshensuigu ǚȶǁɮ) of the army. Yet Yamashita had again returned their 
property. Lim stated that the overseas Chinese could never repay the commander for his 
compassion, pledging that there was no path forward but that of utter loyalty to Japan, and that 
they would adopt the frame of mind of the good subjects (liangmin ȅŹ) of that country and 
cooperate with the empire. He asked that Yamashita accept the $50 million donation as an 
expression of their sincerity.287 
In an article that appeared three days later, a reporter for the Asahi shinbun declared that 
“the speech had been written by the Chinese representatives with absolutely no input from the 
Japanese.”288 In reality, Wee Twee Kim had sent the speech back to Lim and Loo Tien Poh for 
revisions eight times. The first draft, reproduced in a collection of Chinese-language materials 
from the occupation, was full of four-character idioms and allusions to the Chinese classics, but 
it mentioned neither the Malayan Chinese community’s prewar anti-Japanese activities nor their 
support for the Allied powers. Instead, it lavished praise on the emperor and his army for setting 
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up the Co-Prosperity Sphere and saving the overseas Chinese from their misery (huaqiao 
minzhong dejie daoxuan yu shuishenhuore zhi zhong ȋjŹƼĒȟcĦĿźƈƒƕDA), and 
offered the $50 million donation as an expression of their gratitude and cooperation.289 
Yamashita is said to have been incensed by the lack of contrition in the draft and ordered that it 
be rewritten.290 Over the course of these revisions Lim and Loo were forced to add the 
humiliating language about their prewar subservience to the British and Americans and confess 
to “crimes” against the Japanese empire. The military ordered them to include language that 
emphasized the benevolence of Yamashita and the sacrifices that Japanese soldiers had made for 
the people of Asia. The final address bore no resemblance to the original eloquent draft that the 
OCA leadership had produced. The speech, like the ceremony itself, was meticulously crafted by 
Takase and Wee to suit the needs of the Japanese administration.  
The events of June 25, including the ceremony, Lim’s address, and the roughly hour-long 
speech that Yamashita gave afterward admonishing the overseas Chinese to wholeheartedly 
cooperate with the Japanese army, were meant for public consumption both in Shōnan and 
Japan.291 The next day, the ceremony received a brief mention in the English-language 
propaganda paper, the Syonan Times, but it dominated the front page of the Chinese-language 
Syonan Jitpoh.292 Lim’s address, which announced the humiliating submission of the overseas 
Chinese community to Japanese rule, was printed in full.293 It was also translated into Japanese 
and excerpts appeared in newspapers in the home islands over the following days. While the 
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OCA had proved less effective at mobilizing the wealth of the overseas Chinese for the military 
administration than Watanabe and Takase might have hoped, the ceremony symbolically 
performed the total submission of the overseas Chinese to the military administration. While this 
did not stop non-Chinese propagandists at the Syonan Times from questioning the sincerity of the 
Chinese pledge to cooperate with the Japanese Army, it formalized the control of the military 
administration over this critically important community.294 
After the ceremony, control over the Shōnan OCA was transferred from Watanabe’s 
military administration to one of its branch offices: the civilian-run Shōnan Special Municipality 
(Shōnan Tokubetsushi Ņƙ{ö).295 By the end of the summer, the OCA was placed under 
the authority of the Welfare Promotion Section (Kōseika ƪǊ) of the Welfare Bureau 
(Minseibu Źƪɏ), an office that the mayor had created specifically for Shinozaki Mamoru, 
who he had come to see as the best liaison between the municipal government and the local 
Chinese community.296 With the pan-Malayan fundraising campaign over and the Shōnan OCA 
back under Shinozaki’s supervision, it adopted a more streamlined organizational structure and 
moved its headquarters from the Goh Loo Club to the old Singapore Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce headquarters on Hill Street in September.297 Over the next few months the OCA was 
still the target of extortion by various military units but, as its failure to raise the full $50 million 
donation that spring had shown, there was a limit to the association’s ability to tap into the 
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economic resources of the Chinese community.298 One of Shinozaki’s main tasks from the 
summer of 1942 forward would be to find new uses for the OCA and organizations like it. 
 
When asked about the OCA’s donation during a 1966 interview, Watanabe admitted, “I 
might have overdone it a little.”299 Ōtani, who was charged with maintaining public order in 
Malaya and Sumatra from July 1942 to August 1943, would look back on the episode as the root 
cause of the failure of the military administration: it alienated the Chinese, helping to spark the 
communist insurgency that would plague the adminsitration throughout the occupation, while 
also unsettling other communities such as the Indians and the Eurasians.300 Ōtani was not alone 
in condemning Watanabe for his vindictive policy toward the Chinese. On March 21 the Army 
Ministry was already sending letters to the chiefs of staff for the Southern Expeditionary Army 
and 25th Army expressing concern about the damage the forced donation might do their efforts to 
win the cooperation of the peoples of Southeast Asia.301 Watanabe was able to deflect these 
concerns by arguing that it was only fitting that the people of the Co-Prosperity Sphere should 
help finance its defense, but internal criticism mounted as the rush to raise the $50 million 
became more desperate. Watanabe’s harshest critics were the Japanese civilian administrators 
who had begun pouring into Southeast Asia once the major fighting there stopped. Shinozaki 
claims to have been horrified by the donation drive, but that there was little he could do after 
being ordered away from the OCA by Watanabe. But Shōnan’s powerful Japanese civilian 
mayor, Ōdachi Shigeo (ÃɆȉɤ), also felt that the donation was vindictive, counterproductive, 
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and impractical, and he would not devote the city’s resources to compel local residents to pay 
their donations.302 According to his former subordinates, when the army ordered him to 
cooperate more actively with the effort, Ōdachi flatly refused.303 Inspired by Ōdachi’s example, 
other civil servants unleashed a torrent of criticism of Watanabe, creating a rift between them 
and Watanabe’s clique in the administration that would define the first year of Japanese rule in 
Shōnan.304 
 Watanabe would lose his fight with the civil servants and other critics who disapproved 
of his treatment of the Chinese. By January 1943 he was already bemoaning the fact that leaders 
in the administration had begun to entertain conciliatory attitudes toward the Chinese (which he 
straightforwardly described as “The Theory of Respecting the Overseas Chinese” or Kakyō 
Sonchōron ȋjåɓȦ).305 Even before Watanabe left the administration that March, overseas 
Chinese policy in Shōnan and the rest of Malaya had swung decisively away from coercion and 
toward suasion. What had not changed, however, was the identity of the administration’s ideal 
partners in the Chinese community. In the early days of the OCA, both Shinozaki and Watanabe 
had turned to established elites, men who had led storied prewar institutions like the Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce or the Straits Chinese British Association, to lead the new organization. 
After the humiliating donation ceremony some members of the OCA had left, while Lim 
withdrew from active participation. But much of its top leadership remained in place and would 
act as critically important partners to Shinozaki as the occupation wore on. Shinozaki may have 
thought that Takase’s ceremony a travesty, but it cemented the very figures who had led the anti-
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Japanese movement before the war as the closest collaborators with the Japanese wartime empire 
in Shōnan. 
 Despite the shift in occupation policy that occurred later, Watanabe’s donation drive left 
a lasting impression on the people of Malaya. All the conciliatory policies pursued by the 
Japanese after June 1942 could not erase the fact that the first major initiative of the 
administration was an act of mass extortion. Well after the war, Watanabe’s tenure in Malaya 
would be held up as an extreme example of hardline rule in occupied Southeast Asia, in contrast 
to less draconian administrations like the 16th Army’s in Java.306 It was also during the donation 
drive that the consequences of collaboration for the Chinese community’s accommodationist 
elite it began to be apparent. As the Japanese administration stepped up its efforts to extract 
donations from the overseas Chinese, ostensibly on the OCA’s behalf, people began to wonder 
whether the members of local contribution committees were pursuing personal vendettas, or 
whether the OCA leadership in Shōnan was forcing the Chinese in other parts of Malaya to pay a 
larger amount than they should have.307 These rumors hinted at a deeper crisis of leadership in 
the Chinese community, whose formerly respected leaders had gone from representing Chinese 
interests to the British colonial state and organizing the anti-Japanese movement to working 
directly with the very military who had just perpetrated the massacre in Shōnan. OCA leaders 
could argue that they did not have a choice but to work with the Japanese, but this argument was 
evidently not enough to protect Loo Tien Poh, who had directed the fundraising effort and fled to 
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Hong Kong immediately after the Japanese surrender.308 Participation in the donation drive 
would remain a stain on these men’s reputations long after the war had ended. 
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Chapter 3 – Identifying Japan’s Partners in Shōnan II: 
The Racial Framework of Japanese Social Policy 
 
Before they arrived in Shōnan, Japanese administrators had a few notions about the 
people they would find there. Some, like Shinozaki Mamoru, had already lived in the city and 
had developed their own impressions of local society, even if they were framed by their limited 
social networks. A few others considered themselves experts on the overseas Chinese, although 
they had not spent time in Southeast Asia. This was particularly true of Watanabe Wataru, 
considered one of the army’s China experts after the years he spent in Manchuria and North 
China. Watanabe felt that his time there gave him unique insight into the majority-Chinese 
population of Shōnan, although he did feel a glimmer of doubt as he passed through Saigon on 
his way south and was taken aback by the differences between the Chinese community there and 
their erstwhile countrymen in Beijing and Harbin.309 Mayor Ōdachi Shigeo may have clashed 
with Watanabe over Chinese policy in Shōnan, but one of the reasons that this powerful 
bureaucrat commanded so much respect in the administration was his own experience in the 
military occupation of Manchuria and Beijing, the same parts of northern China where Watanabe 
had operated.310 But Ōdachi also realized that there were major differences between the Chinese 
                                               
309 Akashi Yōji ŬǝにȖ, “Watanabe gunsei: Sono tetsuri to tenkai ƴいɝśʬÒǈĕɾ” in Akashi Yōji, 
ed. ŬǝにȖȉ, Nihon senryōka no Eiryō Maraya/Shingapōru ŨŽ·ʑXȞʑDKH92Q-CRM (Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten ęƪųĮ, 2001), 40. 
310 Shingapōru Shiseikai 2Q-CRMĢśy, Shōnan tokubetsushi shi: Senjichū no Shingapōru ůµǀĢÁˀ
ŏŰ\2Q-CRMˀ (Tokyo: Nihon Shingapōru Kyōkai, 1986), 336. 
 115 
of Manchuria and Shōnan, which is why he appointed Shinozaki to be the municipality’s liaison 
with the overseas Chinese community.311 
While both Ōdachi and Watanabe may have had some inkling of the nature and 
complexities of the Chinese community in Shōnan and a grasp of their importance to the success 
of the Japanese occupation, their approach to the other residents of Shōnan was far more 
muddled. This was partly due to their lack of experience in the region, but it also stemmed from 
the lack of specificity about social policy in the occupation guidelines that they brought with 
them to Southeast Asia. The overseas Chinese had featured as prominently as Allied and Axis 
nationals in these plans, but other Southeast Asian peoples were often simply referred to as 
“natives” (domin ³Ź or dochakumin ³ƽŹ) and their traditional leaders as “native rulers” 
(dokō ³]). Only the draft occupation guidelines of the Southern Expeditionary Army, which 
included notes on individual territories, briefly outlined policies toward the “Malays” (Maraijin 
ɭřM) and other “Orientals” (Tōjōjin ŚƂM) though it made no attempt to define who they 
were.312 Even Watanabe Wataru’s “Guidelines for Implementing the 25th Army Military 
Administration,” the foundational document for Japanese rule in Malaya and Sumatra, specified 
only that “Malays and other indigenous peoples (genjū minzoku YŹŁ) will be cared for as 
much as possible but the nationalist movement (minzoku undo ŹŁɃ) will not be supported 
or provoked, and their position will not be radically uplifted (kyūgeki naru chii no kōjō wa kore 
                                               
311 Like many of his contemporaries, Ōdachi would discuss these differences in derogatory terms. In a 1954 
interview with Tokugawa Musei, he described the Chinese in Shōnan as more “trustworthy” (shōjiki ƛǘ) than 
Chinese people in Manchuria or North China, for instance. “Chichi to Tokugawa Musei to no taiwaroku Ƽľğð
íČ「た” in Sakai Tokitada, Chichi “Ōdachi Shigeo” no omoide ƼñɬȟʈŇ (Tokyo: Amagasaki 
Insatsu Kabushiki Kaisha ĒĜ¸¢ƈĳyǣ, 1955), 14. 
312 Nanpōgun Sōshireibu µŤɝȈÃrɴ, Nanpōgun gunsei shikō keikaku (an) µŤɝɝśŦȱȽǍʡƉʢ, 
C14060706000, November 3, 1941, NIDS, 77–79. 
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wo okonawazu ĝƐ¶X>DȔ).”313 These guidelines were distributed to 
state governments in Malaya and Sumatra only in late April, more than two months after the 
British surrender. In Malaya and those parts of Sumatra ruled by Malay sultans, the document at 
least provided some specificity about the possible partners for local Japanese administrators, 
specifying that, for the time being, the political and social status of these “native rulers” would 
remain unchanged and the Japanese should rule through their administrations.314 In Shōnan, of 
course, there was no local sultan. Over the course of the occupation the research bureaus of the 
different levels of the Japanese administration poured an enormous amount of effort into 
categorizing and describing the peoples of the occupied territories, but their reports trickled out 
slowly over months and years.315 In the weeks after the British surrender, it was up to Japanese 
soldiers and civilians on the ground to improvise the approach to the diverse Malay, 
Minangkabau, Boyanese, Javanese, Bugis, Tamil, Bengali, Punjabi, Malayali, Arab, Parsi, 
                                               
313 Dainijyūgogun Shireibu Ǵf±gɝÃrɴ, “Dainijyūgogun gunsei jisshi yōkō Ǵf±gɝɝśăŦȶȇ,” in 
Bōeichō Bōei Kenkyūjo Senshibu ed. てȲĬてȲǟǱŒŏÁɴȉ, Nanpō no gunsei µŤɝś (Tokyo: Asagumo 
Shinbunsha źʌţȎǣ, 1985), 280. 
314 However, the sultans of the Unfederated Malay States, who had enjoyed a great deal of autonomy under the 
British, would need to accept Japanese advisors (Nihonjin komon ŨŽmʖÓ). “Dainijyūgogun gunsei jisshi yōkō,” 
279–280. Akashi Yōji has noted that Watanabe and some of his key allies in the administration, including his 
civilian advisor Takase Tōru and the Tokugawa Yoshichika (ľğȋȺ), a Japanese aristocrat with extensive 
experience in prewar Malaya and a personal friend of Sultan Ibrahim of Johor, hoped to gradually eliminate the 
political power of the Malay sultans and convince them to pledge their fealty to the Emperor, as Tokugawa’s family 
had done in the nineteenth century. By mid-1942, however, Tōjō and other policymakers in Tokyo had rejected 
this radical policy and sent new administrators to Malaya with strict orders to respect the sultans’ prewar positions 
and titles. Akashi Yōji ŬǝにȖ, “Watanabe gunsei,” 47–49. 
315 For instance, see Dainijyūgogun Gunseibu Chōsahan Ǵf±gɝɝśɴɋƆǆ, “Shiryō tōkei shū 
dainanago: ”Marē” no jinkō to jinrui ɘŢȅȽのǴTÂʬDNRm¾mʕ,” in Akashi Yōji ed. Ŭǝに
Ȗȉ, Nanpōgun gunseisōkanbu chōsabu/Marai gunseikanbu chōsabu hōkokusho, 1943–1945 µŤɝɝśȈǗɴ
ɋƆɴ9ʗƀɝśǗɴɋƆɴêÎųりわʩれりわʩʪ, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha やƳųȚ, 2006), 91–
101. Tomishūdan Gunseikanbu Gyōseika Chōsahan ĉのÛɝśǗɴȱśǫɋƆǆ, “Marē no minzoku kōsei DN
RƠŧƏŎ,“ in Akashi, Nanpōgun, Vol. 3, 351–392. Sōmubu Sōmuka Ȉ«ɴȈ«ǫ, “Minzoku taisaku sankō 
shiryō ƠŧČǶ»ȌɘŢ,” in Akashi Yōji ed. ŬǝにȖȉ, Watanabe Wataru shōshō gunsei (Maraya-Shingapōru) 
kankei shi-shiryō ƴいƴđĎɝśʡDKH92Q-CRMʢつÁ9ɘŢ, Vol. 3 (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha やƳ
ųȚ, 1998), 203–278. 
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Armenian, Jewish, and mixed-race minorities under their control. Where occupation guidelines 
were unclear, it was up to these local Japanese actors, working with their own ideological biases 
and through local informants with their own political agendas, to identify partners for the 
wartime empire in Shōnan and the rest of Southeast Asia. 
In the weeks after the British surrender, the relationship between the Japanese 
administration and the local Malay and Indian communities was mediated by collaborators 
inherited from the 25th Army’s invasion of Malaya. The Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM) and the 
Indian Independence League (IIL) were two nationalist organizations, one based in Malaya and 
the other in Thailand, which forged relationships with Japanese intelligence officer Maj. 
Fujiwara Iwaichi (ȑîö) before the invasion. The KMM and IIL, along with the Indian 
National Army (INA), which was created by Fujiwara and defecting British Indian soldiers 
during the campaign, played a critical role in helping the Japanese administration to identify the 
leaders of the Malay and Indian communities in Shōnan and, by doing so delineating the borders 
of these communities that would obtain during the occupation. These anti-colonial nationalists 
took a maximalist approach to defining what they hoped would be their future constituencies in 
the city. The new local branch of the IIL was led by non-Tamil Hindu professionals, for instance, 
but claimed that it spoke for the entire South Asian population of Shōnan including, not only the 
working-class Tamil majority, but also South Asian Muslims and, as the occupation wore on, the 
Ceylonese Tamil and Sinhalese communities as well.316 At the same time, the nationalists had 
been allies of convenience during the invasion; they were not at all the accommodationist elites 
that occupation guidelines had described as the ideal partners in Southeast Asia. Indeed, their 
movements were threats to the status quo and systematically suppressed after the British 
                                               
316 Ceylon, present-day Sri Lanka, was not then and is not now part of India. 
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surrender: the KMM had ceased to exist by the summer of 1942, while the IIL and INA were 
politically neutered by early 1943. Many prominent leaders of these organizations resigned in 
disgust or were arrested by the Kempeitai while a few of the more obsequious colleagues were 
able to maintain a foothold in the new Japanese administration. These collaborators had 
identified the leadership and boundaries of their communities for the Japanese, but one year into 
the occupation only those Malays and Indians who accommodated themselves to Japanese rule 
maintained positions of authority in those communities. 
While the administration’s understanding of the Malay and Indian communities in 
Shōnan was mediated by local collaborators, it was also shaped by Japanese imperial ideology. 
To find some sort of order in the linguistic, racial, and religious diversity of a city like Shōnan, 
Japanese relied on the concept that by the 1940s had become the principal concept for 
understanding the social divisions within the Japanese empire: minzoku (ŹŁ), the term imperial 
ideologues used to identify the different peoples of the Japanese empire hierarchically based on 
their level of social development.317 Japanese civilian and military administrators brought this 
conceptual racial hierarchy with them to Southeast Asia. To the members of the 25th Army’s 
Gunseibu, the population of Malaya consisted, not of Malayans, but of the “various local 
minzoku” (genchi shominzoku ƨ¶ȧŹŁ).318 Once the military administration found its 
footing, Watanabe’s office started promoting “minzoku guidance” (minzoku shidō ŹŁıç) as 
one of the primary responsibilities of Gunseibu offices in Malaya and Sumatra.319 By August, the 
Army General Staff had produced guidelines for minzoku guidance in Southeast Asia, declaring 
                                               
317 For a definition of minzoku, see page 11. 
318 Kurasawa Aiko, ed. Ʀŉü、ʒ, Hiroku: Senji Geppō/Gunsei Geppō ǬたRŏŰŷê9ɝśŷê, Vol. 1 
(Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha やƳųȚ, 2000), 371–372. 
319 Kurasawa, Vol. 1, 372. Sōmubu Sōmuka, 215. 
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that in the future the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere would be an “organic community 
of minzoku with the Yamato minzoku at its core” (Yamato minzoku wo kakushin to seru yūkiteki 
minzoku kyōdōtai Ã¢ŹŁţĖōűƳŹŁvZ).320 At a conference of the 
governors of the states of Malaya and Sumatra in November, Watanabe announced that, because 
these two areas would now be under the firm control of the empire, minzoku policy was 
particularly important to local administration and all Japanese staff had to be prepared to take 
part in minzoku guidance while preserving their own high educational and cultural standards and 
taking care to “maintain the purity of their blood.”321 
Not everyone agreed with the racial chauvinism of their superiors, and there were 
certainly many Japanese in the administration who ignored Watanabe’s injunction against 
fraternizing with local residents. But there was no one who publicly opposed the minzoku 
framework that defined the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as a racial hierarchy with the 
Japanese at the top. This definition led to confusion, however, when the Japanese were 
confronted with the diverse local society of Shōnan. In the decades before the Second World 
War, Japanese intellectuals had devoted an enormous amount of mental energy to defining the 
term minzoku and comparing it to Western concepts like “nation,” people, or Volk but not much 
time considering the minzoku of Southeast Asia. Prewar Japanese definitions of Southeast Asian 
peoples relied instead on work by Western anthropologists and geographers who were 
                                               
320 Sanbōhonbu Daijyūyonka »ɏŽɴǴ±ÙɊ, “Daitōa minzoku shidō yōkō (an) ñƁiƠŧŗďȶȇʡƉʢ” 
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on Minzoku Policy.” Sōmubu Sōmuka, 243.  
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avoid the fate of “Mohamed’s Saracen Empire,” which collapsed, it claims, chiefly because the Arabs did not value 
the purity of their bloodlines. Sōmubu Sōmuka, 246–247.  
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themselves deeply influenced by racial science.322 When Japanese administrators arrived in 
Southeast Asia they were confronted by the fact that the racial categories of different Western 
colonies often contradicted one another.323 Their Malay and Indian nationalist collaborators were 
eager to offer definitions of their own communities, but confusion reigned at the edges of these 
groups.  
Administrators like Watanabe and Shōnan’s Mayor Ōdachi Shigeo came to the city with 
a clear idea of the Han Chinese minzoku and, even though their previous experience in China had 
been restricted to North China and Manchuria, they knew how Hokkien, Cantonese, and 
Teochew residents in Shōnan related to it. Influenced by the nationalist collaborators, 
administrative documents soon began referring to local Malays and Indians as members of their 
own minzoku, rather than as the “natives” (dochakumin ³ƽŹ or genjū domin Y³Ź) of the 
prewar planning documents. Not everyone who the nationalists described as Malay or Indian, 
however, saw themselves as belonging to these communities. A month into the occupation, local 
Muslims presented themselves to the Japanese administration as the Shōnan Muslim 
Consultative Council. The Council included a handful of nationalists from the Kesatuan Melayu 
Muda, but it also represented the diversity of the Muslim population of Shōnan by including 
prominent Arabs, Bugis, and, in a move that was anathema to the Indian Independence League, 
South Asian Muslims. The body was short-lived, however, and when members of the council 
                                               
322 This becomes painfully clear in The World Historical Stance in Japan, where Nishitani Keiji can only recall having 
met one Filipino man while travelling to Europe, and instead draws heavily on German thinkers such as Karl 
Haushofer to inform his understanding of Southeast Asia. Kōsaka et al., 168, 263. 
323 This was particularly problematic for the Malayan Military Administration, which controlled both British Malaya 
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reemerged in the public eye it had split up into Arab, Indian, or other more clearly minzoku-
based communal organizations. Meanwhile, the Japanese administration made clear in internal 
documents that, while it would respect native religions, it still saw the various peoples of Malaya 
first and foremost as members of different minzoku. Muslim, Buddhist, and Christian bodies 
continued to operate during the occupation, and religious leaders would often be asked to work 
as propagandists for the war effort. But the Japanese administration did not attempt to use 
religious organizations to govern local society, instead ordering religious leaders to act as 
propagandists, and only from 1943. 
Religious communities were not the only ones that did not fit the minzoku logic of the 
wartime administration in Shōnan. The complex and divided Eurasian community defied the 
concept of minzoku altogether, while the local Jewish population complicated anti-Semitic 
assumptions that the Japanese had harbored for decades: as in most of British Asia, the Jewish 
community was Arabic speaking and generally traced its ancestry to Baghdad. These two groups 
were perplexing to the administration and also deemed racially suspect, and they were the only 
residents of Shōnan who were asked to register with the administration in the aftermath of the 
Sook Ching massacre. Throughout the occupation these two communities received an inordinate 
amount of attention from the Japanese, even though there were only a few thousand Eurasians 
and a few hundred Jews in the city when the British surrendered. By the end of the war the entire 
Jewish population had been interned while large numbers of Eurasians had been sent to an 
agricultural settlement in rural Malaya where many died of malaria and malnutrition.  
When the 25th Army ordered the Eurasians and Jews to register, they sent them to the 
Defense Headquarters to meet with its special advisor for foreign affairs: Shinozaki Mamoru. 
Shinozaki’s experience in prewar Singapore had made him indispensable as a mediator between 
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the fledgling administration and the overseas Chinese, but he also helped grapple with the 
complex minority communities of the city. He was not the only prewar Japanese resident to act 
as an intermediary between the administration and local residents. As the prewar Japanese 
community was repatriated to the city from internment in India they took jobs in the Gunseibu 
and Shōnan municipal government, often as translators. But none of them would have as large an 
impact on the organizational lives of the people of Shōnan as Shinozaki. Prewar occupation 
plans and imperial ideology provided the framework for the Japanese administration of Shōnan, 
but it was figures like Shinozaki and the nationalist collaborators, operating within the minzoku 
framework that Japanese were comfortable with, who forged the relationships with local allies 
that made the governance of Shōnan possible. 
 
Taming the Nationalists: The KMM, IIL, and INA in Shōnan 
 Maj. Fujiwara Iwaichi was dispatched to Thailand in September 1941 with orders to 
liaise with members of the nonwhite communities of Malaya and particularly the anti-British 
Indian Independence League (IIL), headquartered in Bangkok.324 He was sent with a handful of 
officers and translators, who formed the nucleus of the twelve-member F Kikan (Fűɝ), the 
intelligence agency that was to facilitate the Japanese invasion of Malaya if war broke out.325 
When Fujiwara arrived in October, the military attaché in Bangkok introduced him to Pritam 
Singh, the leader of the IIL. He learned that Singh’s organization had already infiltrated Malaya 
and was distributing anti-British literature to members of the British Indian Army stationed there. 
                                               
324 The organization was first named the Indian Independent League. Joyce Chapman Lebra, The Indian National 
Army and Japan (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 3. 
325 Standard practice should have dictated that the organization be called the Fujiwara Kikan after its leader. 
However, according to Joyce Lebra, Fujiwara preferred this name F Kikan because the letter “F” could represent 
“freedom” or “friendship.” Lebra, 4–7. 
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The two young men quickly developed a close working relationship. As the F Kikan quietly 
established itself in Bangkok during October, its members also reached out to sympathetic 
Chinese businessmen and were assigned to work with the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (Young Malay 
Union, KMM).326 
The KMM had been founded by Ibrahim Yaacob and a handful of leftist Malay 
nationalists in 1938. Its leadership, including Vice President Mustapha Hussain and central 
committee member Ishak Haji Muhammad (commonly known as Pak Sako), were educated 
young men who worked as teachers, journalists, and civil servants in Malaya.327 While the KMM 
was registered with the British authorities as a “social organization,” to its leadership the 
acronym also meant Kesatuan Malaya Merdeka, or “Independent Malaya Union.”328 This 
distinguished it from Malay political organizations such as the Singapore Malay Union, which 
advocated for Malay rights but never challenged British colonial rule.329 The organization was 
also hostile to the wealthy and powerful Malays, particularly the sultans, who had allowed the 
British to establish control over Malaya.330 In his memoirs, Mustapha remembers that the KMM 
looked across the Indian Ocean for inspiration, and particularly to the Young Turks.331 However, 
unbeknownst to him and many of the KMM leaders, Ibrahim Yaacob established 
communications with the Japanese soon after the group was founded. He began working with 
Singapore Consul-General Tsurumi Ken (ɲțĤ) as part of a secret agency code-named 
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331 Mustapha, Memoir Mustapha Hussain, 195. 
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“Kame” (Tortoise F) and received a sum of money from Tsurumi to buy the Arab-owned Warta 
Malaya newspaper in 1941.332 In November 1941, as war in the Southeast Asia loomed, the F 
Kikan took over liaison responsibilities with the KMM from Tsurumi and the Singapore 
consulate.333 
In December 4, days before the Japanese invasion, the British police in Malaya arrested 
more than one hundred members of the KMM, including Ibrahim and Ishak. But, by the end of 
the month, the 25th Army had invaded and advanced into the northern state of Perak, where 
Mustapha lived with his family. Mustapha remembers that he was approached by Onan Haji 
Siraj, Ibrahim’s brother-in-law and devotee, and some Japanese soldiers, who brought him to 
meet with Fujiwara.334 Mustapha was shocked to learn of Ibrahim’s work with the Japanese but, 
surrounded by armed Japanese soldiers, agreed to work with Onan and a handful of other KMM 
members as liaisons of the F Kikan with the Malay community as the 25th Army marched 
south.335 A few weeks earlier, when Commonwealth troops surrendered to Japanese in Kedah, 
Fujiwara and Pritam Singh had met a young Sikh Captain in the British Indian Army named 
Mohan Singh. Mohan Singh had been frustrated by the lack of advancement available to Indian 
officers in the army and quickly came to admire Fujiwara’s earnest support of the Indian 
independence movement. By the time that Mustapha joined the F Kikan, Mohan Singh was in 
Perak negotiating with Fujiwara to create a new independence-oriented Indian National Army 
(INA), which would recruit its members from among the thousands of Indian soldiers who were 
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surrendering to the Japanese advance.336 Over the next month and a half, as the 25th Army moved 
toward Singapore, Fujiwara had Mohan Singh, Pritam Singh, Mustapha, and Onan by his side to 
negotiate with Indian and Malay soldiers and civilians he encountered on his way while IIL, 
INA, and KMM members performed reconnaissance for the 25th Army. 
Maj. Fujiwara Iwaichi was, by all accounts, sympathetic to the young idealists of the 
KMM and INA. But these nationalists hoped to abolish the colonial status quo, the very thing 
that formal Japanese occupation policies sought to preserve. Fujiwara was wary of encouraging 
the KMM, in particular, because favoring an explicitly Malay organization might upset the 
multi-racial “status quo” in Malaya. 337 He was also worried about the KMM’s hostility to the 
sultans and Malay ruling class, “because such a movement would be contrary to the ideals of the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the basic principles of the Japanese military 
administration in Malaya.”338 Fujiwara’s concern about the divisive nature of the KMM was 
compounded by his own racist attitudes: he felt that their “inferior status” of Malays in Malayan 
society was due to their “low political and cultural standards, their indolence and their weak 
physical conditions.”339 Like Obata and his research team in early 1941, Fujiwara used the 
supposed “low cultural standards” of the Malays as an excuse to dismiss the political aspirations 
of a nationalist group that threatened the effort to maintain existing social hierarchies and 
reconstitute the colonial order under Japanese control. But the KMM was still assisting the 25th 
Army, and Fujiwara decided that the best he could do for them was convince the Gunseibu to 
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offer its members positions in the administration and allow it to restart publication of the Warta 
Malaya.340 
Although he makes no mention of it in his memoir, Fujiwara’s reservations about the 
KMM may have been compounded by Mustapha’s actions. When the F Kikan reached Kuala 
Lumpur in January, Mustapha resolved to demand Malaya’s independence before the fighting 
was over. He felt that he had to tackle the issue in a roundabout way because of the asymmetry 
of power between the KMM and the 25th Army. As an entrée into the issue, he worked with two 
friends to compose a song that would flatter the Japanese army while also proclaiming, in its last 
line, that they had come to “liberate” (memerdekakan) Malaya. Mustapha claimed that, although 
they had written the song to sound out Japanese intentions for their country, he secretly hoped 
that it could be used as the National Song of Free Malaya (Lagu Kebangsaan Malaya 
Merdeka).341 He gave the song to the Japanese on January 14 and was pleased by their reaction 
until they came to its final line, when they shouted “no!” (nai!) in Japanese. They were appalled 
when Mustapha explained to them the secret meaning of KMM; they seemed to have assumed 
that the Malays had no “desire for independence” (hasrat mahu merdeka).342 The members of the 
F Kikan (not named by Mustapha) may have been naïve to think this, but their shock was not in 
itself shocking. The occupation guidelines, which came from the highest authorities, had 
expressly forbidden them from encouraging independence movements in the occupied territories. 
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Yet, by recognizing the KMM as the “sole representative organization of the Malay minzoku” 
(pertuubuhan yang mewakili seluruh bangsa Melayu), they had done precisely that. 
Three days later, a delegation of KMM members including Mustapha and Onan were 
invited to meet with a “High Official of the Political Bureau of the Japanese Army” (Pegawai 
Tinggi Biro Politik Tentera Jepun).343 They were received warmly, but when the officer asked 
what the purpose of the KMM was, Mustapha answered that it had been formed to fight for the 
independence of Malaya. After a few more questions the officer launched into a longwinded 
speech filled with excuses for the fact that he could not promise them anything at this time, then 
ended his statements, in English, with, “Let the Japanese be the father. Malays, Chinese, and 
Indians live like a family. If the Malay child is thin, we will give him milk.”344 Mustapha was 
unimpressed by this infantilizing reference to his people but did not pursue the issue any further. 
He left crestfallen, convinced that the Japanese were just another “colonizer” (penjajahan).345 
When Singapore fell and was renamed Shōnan, the F Kikan freed Ibrahim, Ishak, and the 
KMM leaders the British had jailed a few months earlier. Mustapha wrote in his memoirs that he 
was happy to see his friends released, but that Ibrahim berated him when he heard about his 
oblique request that the Japanese grant independence to Malaya. According to his account, 
Ibrahim shouted “What! Are you crazy? Want to have your head cut off!”346 A split rapidly 
developed between Ibrahim and his followers, and the other members of the KMM leadership 
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were unhappy to be working for a new set of colonizers.347 Then in March, Watanabe at the 
Gunseibu assumed responsibility over the KMM. He immediately ordered that the revolutionary 
organization reform itself as a cultural body, and in June 1942, he abolished the KMM 
altogether.348 Mustapha and other KMM leaders who were disgusted by Ibrahim’s 
obsequiousness toward the Japanese and his increasingly aloof leadership style had left the 
organization months earlier.349 Ibrahim, however, was rewarded for his accommodating attitude 
after the dissolution of the KMM when Watanabe appointed him as his personal advisor on 
Malay affairs.350 In this capacity he was able to lead a series of smaller organizations such as the 
Malayan Youth Federation (Marai Seinen Renmei 04ɦûɁƵ) and often spoke on behalf 
of the Malay community during propaganda broadcasts and at major public functions.351 A few 
other nationalists continued to work with the administration for their own reasons. Onan worked 
closely with Ibrahim and would serve as his representative in organizations like the municipal 
Malay Welfare Association (Marai Kōsei Kyōkai ɭřƪV). Ishak spent most of the 
occupation as the editor of the Malay-language propaganda paper Berita Malai and magazine 
Semangat Asia, where he was able to gradually introduce Malay nationalist themes and even 
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subtle criticisms of Japanese policy toward Asia.352 There was also a lone Indonesian nationalist 
who would play a prominent role in occupied Shōnan: Minangkabau physician Mohd. Gaus bin 
Mahyuddin. But Dr. Gaus owed his position in the administration to his medical training rather 
than his politics. Born in West Sumatra, he had moved to Singapore after receiving a medical 
degree from Jikei University in Tokyo, and his fluency in Japanese landed him a position first as 
a translator for the Japanese police in Shōnan and later in the municipal welfare department in 
the Shōnan Special Municipality. While he was recruited to help run various Malay 
organizations in the city, he remained an Indonesian nationalist at heart and was even 
reprimanded at one point by Shinozaki Mamoru for sowing divisions among the Malay 
community by continuing to claim he was not one of them.353 
Ibrahim, Gaus, and Ishak had been allies of convenience in the Malayan campaign and 
the first weeks of the occupation. But once Gunseibu and Shōnan Special Municipality were up 
and running, Japanese administrators began to seek out a different class of Malay leaders to help 
govern the island. When Shinozaki Mamoru organized a Malay Welfare Association to serve as 
the administration’s principal liaison with the Malay community in December 1943, he included 
Onan, Gaus, and Ishak. The other appointees to the association, however, were members of the 
prewar accommodationist elite with whom he and other administrators had spent the past year-
and-a-half cultivating relationships. Its president and vice-president were Tungku Abdul Kadir 
bin Ahmad and Tungku Hussein bin Ali.354 Both men were members of the local Malay 
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aristocracy: they traced their ancestry to the defunct Singaporean royal family and had received 
stipends from the British before the war. Onan served as general secretary, and in addition to 
Gaus and Ishak the committee included Haji Ambo Sooloh, a wealthy leader of the Bugis 
community and former president of the accommodationist Singapore Malay Union; Daud bin 
Mohammad Shah, the penghulu of the Malay community in Siglap and president of the 
Singapore Malay Union after Haji Ambo; and Zainal Abidin Ahmad (commonly known as 
Za’ba), a public intellectual who was committed to linguistic and education reform in Malaya but 
was hardly a revolutionary before the war.355 Once the war turned against the Japanese, the 
administration would begin a flurry of new concessions to the Malay nationalists, rewarding 
Ibrahim for cooperation. But, aside from a handful of KMM survivors, in the critical first phase 
of the occupation the Japanese administration embraced those figures most closely associated 
with the accommodationist politics of prewar British colonial Singapore. 
It took a while longer for the Indian nationalists to become disillusioned with the 
Japanese military administration. During the campaign, Fujiwara had been much more 
enthusiastic in his support of the IIL and INA than the KMM. These organizations had their 
political sights focused on India, which lay outside Japanese-occupied territory, and Fujiwara 
developed close friendships with both Pritam and Mohan Singh. But soon after the campaign 
was over he was replaced by Col. Iwakuro Hideo (îƮȮɤ), an influential and politically astute 
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intelligence officer who had helped found the Nakano School, the Japanese army’s intelligence 
training center.356 The F Kikan was reorganized as the Iwakuro Kikan (îƮűɝ) and its staff 
increased from twelve to two hundred and fifty.357 This new agency and its leader treated the 
members of the IIL and INA less as comrades from the Malaya Campaign and more as 
intelligence and propaganda assets. As the occupation continued, Iwakuro’s attempts to establish 
firmer control over the two organizations caused friction with their leaders and led to the arrest 
and imprisonment of the commander of the INA, Mohan Singh, in December 1942.   
 Commander Singh’s imprisonment symbolized the failure of the first Indian National 
Army. It was also exceptional. During the first year of the occupation, other Indian nationalists 
were able to stay out of prison, although they experienced the same marginalization and 
disenchantment as many of their Malay counterparts. During the campaign, as he followed 
Fujiwara south to Singapore, Pritam Singh set up branches of the Indian Independence League 
across Malaya. In Bangkok the IIL had been dominated by local Sikhs, but Pritam Singh 
recruited the leadership of the IIL in Malaya from former members of the Central Indian 
Association of Malaya (CIAM), a pro-Indian National Congress organization that had been 
formed in the aftermath of Jawaharlal Nehru’s visit to Malaya in 1937.358 The former chairman 
of the CIAM, Penang native N. Raghavan, became the first president of the All-Malayan IIL, 
while Singapore-based CIAM leaders S.C. Goho and K.P.K Menon became president and vice-
president, respectively, of the Shōnan IIL. All these men were lawyers and, despite their 
commitment to Indian independence, had also been prominent members of Malayan colonial 
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society and were “Anglophile in their attitudes and political style.”359 Goho, in fact, had been 
anti-Japanese before the war: he co-authored a pamphlet with Tan Kah Kee “in support of the 
Allies against Japanese fascists” and led the Indian Passive Defense Service Corps during the 
Japanese invasion.360 Nevertheless, Pritam Singh introduced Goho and Menon to Fujiwara as 
“recognized leaders of the Indian community in Singapore.”361 
Regardless of their anti-Japanese activities before the war, the two lawyers represented 
the best of both worlds for the new Japanese administration: the Indian nationalists would be a 
propaganda boon, and yet they had been comfortably ensconced within the Anglophone elite in 
colonial Malaya. They could help threaten the British in India without harming the colonial 
system that the Japanese planned to reconstitute in Southeast Asia. Goho and Menon also seem 
to have left a good first impression with Fujiwara. He praised Goho, in particular, for his 
“sincerity, willpower, and executive ability” as well as his “political wisdom, magnanimity, and 
compassion.”362 Whatever Fujiwara might have thought of them as individuals, at no time does 
he seem to have questioned whether this pair of highly educated Bengali (Goho) and Malayali 
(Menon) lawyers were the best representatives of the South Asian community in Shōnan, which 
was predominantly Tamil and working-class. As it turned out, the absence of Tamils in the 
leadership of the IIL would hinder efforts to mobilize this community in support either of the 
Indian nationalist movement or the Japanese administration: during the first year of the 
occupation Tamils began to complain that none of the speakers in the mass propaganda rallies 
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they were asked to attend spoke a language that they understood. Indeed, Goho was forced to 
issue a public apology after one such rally for his “ignorance of the Indian language known to 
the majority of the people in the Island.”363 Fujiwara’s reliance on Pritam Singh, and the 
preference of Japanese officials for working with members of the social elite, meant that the 
poorer and historically marginalized residents of Shōnan lacked a voice in the occupation. 
 The first few months of Japanese rule were a hopeful time for the elite Indian nationalists, 
buoyed as they were by Fujiwara’s enthusiastic support of their movement. In March 1942, a 
delegation from Southeast Asia, including Pritam Singh, Mohan Singh, Raghavan, Goho, and 
Menon, visited Tokyo and met with Japan-based Indian activists, including Rash Behari Bose, a 
fellow nationalist who had fled to Japan after an attempted assassination of the Viceroy of India 
in 1912.364 Although Pritam Singh and few other Indian nationalists died in a plane accident on 
this trip, the meeting led to a larger IIL conference in Bangkok in June. At this conference, Bose 
was elected the president of a new Council of Action, which included Raghavan and Menon 
from the civilian side of the IIL and Capt. Mohan Singh and Lt. Col. G.Q. Gilani from the 
INA.365 This conference set the stage for a confrontation with the Japanese. 
The former leadership of the CIAM, all of whom were lawyers, worried about the legal 
standing of the IIL and the INA. To clarify these points Raghavan and Menon drafted a 
resolution requesting that the Japanese acknowledge the IIL as the sole representative of Indian 
residents in the occupied territories, treat the INA as full-fledged allied army, and commit to 
respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of India once the British were defeated.366 
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Iwakuro, correctly anticipating that his superiors in Tokyo would refuse these concessions to the 
IIL, vacillated in his response to the Bangkok Resolution.367 His equivocation in the face of the 
IIL’s political demands seemed to confirm the Malayan Indian leaders’ worst fears about 
Japanese intentions toward Asia. They continued to press for a formal Japanese response to the 
Resolution and, over the next few months, their relationship with Iwakuro soured. Bose, like 
Ibrahim, worried that antagonizing the Japanese would lead to the suppression of their movement 
and urged Rhagavan and his supporters to back down. As a result, the Malayan Indian leaders 
began to see Bose as a Japanese puppet.368 On December 5, 1942, Raghavan tendered his 
resignation from the IIL’s Council of Action. He was followed by the other members of the 
council, Menon, Gilai, and Mohan Singh, leaving Bose alone with his Japanese handlers.369 
Raghavan maintained his leadership of the All-Malayan IIL, and Mohan Singh his 
command of the INA, but only temporarily. In the previous few months the independently-
minded Singh had had his own falling out with both Iwakuro and the civilian leadership of the 
IIL. Singh was outraged to discover that the Iwakuro Kikan was training Indian troops and 
altering IIL-INA propaganda materials without his consent, while Singh had upset the Council of 
Action by transferring INA troops to Burma without informing them.370 On December 29, 
Iwakuro summoned Singh and demanded to know whether he still intended to collaborate with 
Japan. Singh refused. Iwakuro promptly arrested him with Bose’s consent.371 With its 
commander’s arrest, the INA collapsed. By the end of January 1943, more than eighty per cent 
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of its soldiers had left the army. Meanwhile, in his capacity as head of the All-Malayan IIL, 
Raghavan gathered the heads of the state branches of the IIL, including Goho from Shōnan, and 
sent a memorandum to Bose demanding that he ask the Japanese to clarify their Indian policy 
and codify the IIL’s position as representative of the Southeast Asian Indian community. Joyce 
Lebra argues that Bose saw this as a plot by Raghavan to destroy the IIL and orchestrated his and 
his allies’ resignation from the organization in March 1943.372 This shakeup was so jarring that 
the Syonan Times was forced to address it, claiming that both Raghavan and Goho had resigned 
their positions “due to ill health.”373 
These upheavals crippled the political effectiveness of the IIL and the independence of 
the INA, but they did not lead to a fundamental transformation of the leadership of the Indian 
community in Malaya. Dr. M.K. Lukshumeyah, who replaced Raghavan as head of the All-
Malayan IIL, had been head of the Selangor IIL and was vice-president of the CIAM before the 
war.374 A. Yellapa, another local lawyer, replaced Goho as the head of the Shōnan IIL.375 In 
effect, the independent spirit of the Indian nationalists had been crushed. And yet, as the 
educated Anglophile professionals who had dominated communal politics before the war, they 
remained the preferred partners of the Japanese in the local Indian community. And like the 
Malays, they had successfully defined the boundaries of their national communities. The former 
leaders of the CIAM, all of whom were professionals who had operated comfortably in the upper 
echelons of Asian colonial society and few of whom had any connections to the working-class 
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Tamil majority in the South Asian population of Shōnan and the rest of Malaya, had been able to 
use the Japanese administration to establish themselves as the leaders of a broadly defined Indian 
national community. The same was true of Ibrahim Yaacob. Before his arrest in 1941 the KMM 
president had complained that “there were still too many who thought of themselves as 
Minangkabau or Boyanese, or as subjects of a particular raja instead of as members of the Malay 
bangsa pure and simple."376 By the middle of the occupation, however, the Sumatra-born 
Minangkabau Dr. Gaus would be chastised by the authorities for claiming that he was 
Indonesian, rather than Malay. Ibrahim had leveraged his relationship with the Japanese into a 
position of authority in the Malay community that rivaled that of the Sultans, but he had also 
convinced them to accept the KMM’s catholic definition of the Malay bangsa/minzoku. Malay 
and Indian nationalists may have run into trouble with the conservative, status quo-oriented 
military administration early on, but as the intermediaries between the Japanese and local society 
during the Malayan Campaign and immediately after the British surrender they were able to 
shape how the Japanese understood local society for the duration of the occupation. And, by 
setting the parameters of Japanese social policy in Shōnan, they shaped how members of their 
community saw themselves. 
 
Perplexing Minorities: The Eurasian and Jewish Communities of Shōnan  
There were Japanese officials with some knowledge of the Han Chinese minzoku in 
Shōnan, and they were working with collaborators who claimed to speak for the Malay and 
Indian minzoku before the invasion began. But the Japanese authorities had trouble approaching 
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other groups in Shōnan who did not fit so neatly into their minzoku-centric understanding of 
social difference. One group that confounded the early occupation state were the Eurasians, a 
complexly divided mixed-race community that was concentrated in the city center and the 
suburb of Katong. Many local Eurasians traced their ancestry to the early Portuguese residents of 
Malaya and India in the sixteenth century while others came from mixed British and Asian 
families. Excluded from prewar Singapore’s most elite social clubs because they were not white, 
the Eurasian community nonetheless enjoyed preferred access to certain institutions and careers 
because of their partial European heritage. To the Japanese, this group represented both an 
administrative problem and a threat.377 Their existence challenged the minzoku basis of Japanese 
imperial ideology, while their perceived racial proximity to the Allied powers led the 
administration to believe they might try to undermine Japanese control over Southeast Asia. 
Japanese confusion about what to do with the Eurasians led to arbitrary and cruel treatment of 
the community, especially in the first weeks after Singapore fell. As Japanese troops fanned out 
across the island, interning Allied nationals, Eurasians who looked “white enough” to the 
soldiers were also interned. Benedict de Souza remembers that the Japanese interned his fair-
skinned sister and brother-in-law, who were later “repatriated” to Britain, while they left the rest 
of his family alone. He claims, in fact, that once it became clear that the Japanese were sending 
“Europeans” to Allied-controlled areas, Eurasians began to take advantage of the ignorance of 
the Japanese and claimed they were Europeans in order to flee Shōnan.378 Others adopted the 
opposite strategy, consciously avoiding European accents so that the Japanese they encountered 
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in Shōnan would assume that they were Malay or Indian.379 In De Souza’s words, “All they 
knew was Chinese, Malays, and Indians. If you said Eurasian, it didn’t ring a bell at all.”380  
In order to deal with this problematic community, the 25th Army’s Defense Headquarters 
announced that all Eurasians must report for registration on March 3 at the former Singapore 
Recreation Club, the center of Eurasian social activity before the war.381 Those who reported 
were required to divulge their previous association with Straits Settlements Volunteer Force or 
the British colonial government. Having witnessed the deadly aftermath of the Chinese 
“registration,” many Eurasians were fearful of the process, and some who lived outside the city 
center did not report.382 Many of those who did were relieved to find that, after supplying some 
personal information to the Japanese and listening to a didactic speech from Defense 
Headquarters chief Maj. Gen. Kawamura Saburō about the dangers of individualism, liberalism, 
and materialism, they were allowed to return home.383 But life did not return to normal for 
Eurasians. Those with white parents or spouses were required to wear red armbands in public, 
and in 1945 these first generation Eurasians were interned as the threat of a British counter-
invasion loomed.384 The Syonan Times denounced the Eurasians for their prewar association with 
the British, although many of the articles were written by editor Charles Nell Leembruggen, a 
disgruntled member of their own community.385 Eurasians were targeted by the Kempeitai for 
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their alleged pro-British sentiments, and many were detained and tortured at the notorious 
Kempeitai Headquarters on Orchard Road.386 Starting in late 1943, thousands of local Eurasians 
had been sent to work on “model farms” on the Malay peninsula, where many died of malaria 
and malnutrition. Although Eurasians in Shōnan did their best to avoid the attention of the 
Japanese administration, the Gunseibu and municipal government seem to have been perpetually 
concerned with this community, which defied minzoku categorization and was therefore suspect.   
Herman Marie de Souza had commanded a Eurasian company in the Straits Settlements 
Volunteer Force and stated as much when he was called to register at the Singapore Recreation 
Club. It so happened that the Defense Headquarters staff member overseeing the registration was 
Shinozaki Mamoru, and to De Souza’s surprise, the young bureaucrat gave him a civilian pass 
and told him to go home. But because some of De Souza’s men had been detained, he queued up 
again and confronted Shinozaki, demanding that he be locked up with them. De Souza recalls 
that this surprised Shinozaki, who was also impressed by the discipline of his volunteers and was 
able to convince the Kempeitai to release them with a warning.387 Shinozaki would later recruit 
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De Souza, who had been a teacher in Malacca, to work with him in the municipal education 
department and, from the registration forward, expressed a particular concern for the welfare of 
the Eurasian community. It is perhaps not surprising that the Defense Headquarters would assign 
Shinozaki to register the complex mixed-race community. He was one of the few Japanese 
people in Shōnan immediately after the surrender who had had any prewar experience in the city. 
Shinozaki’s offices were also the site where the 25th Army’s Defense Headquarters 
ordered the other group of people deemed racially suspect—the tiny Jewish community—to 
register.388 The majority of the Jewish population had fled before the British surrender, but the 
few hundred Jews who remained in Shōnan drew an outsized amount of attention from the 
Defense Headquarters and the Gunseibu. This was because anti-Semitism pervaded every level 
of the Japanese occupation, from the central government through the military administrations of 
Southeast Asia to the individual Japanese stationed in Shōnan. Japanese anti-Semitism during the 
Second World War is often overshadowed by the actions of a handful of individual Japanese 
such as Sugihara Chiune (ŕƯ) of the Japanese consul in Kovno, Lituania, who saved 
thousands of Jewish refugees from Europe.389 But Sugihara was censured for his actions by the 
Foreign Ministry, and the history of anti-Semitism in the wartime empire is more muddled than 
his case suggests. The Japanese government did not actively participate in the Holocaust, but this 
does not mean that anti-Semitism was absent in the empire. On March 11, 1942, the Liaison 
Conference agreement that determined that expelling the Jewish population of Japanese-
occupied territories would not conform “with our national policy of hakkō ichiu” (hakkō ichiu no 
wagakokuze tǠ;Ðħ°ņ) and would fuel Allied propaganda, also warned that Japanese 
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military adminsitrations would have to strictly monitor Jewish residences and businesses because 
of the “minzoku characteristics” of the Jewish people.390 In March 1943, the administration in 
Malaya was more blunt when it used anti-Japanese sentiment among the “sinful Jews” (zaishō 
Yudayajin ǱɣƢÅM) and their “secret-war-like machinations” (himitsusenteki sakudō ǋßĨ
ƳǕ) as a justification for interning more than one hundred Jewish men in Shōnan.391 This 
was part of an empire-wide shift that month in the treatment of Jews that also saw the interment 
of the Jewish population of Java and the creation of a ghetto in Shanghai, albeit one that was 
“nothing like its European counterparts.”392 The women and children of the Jewish community 
of Shōnan avoided internment until 1945, but they were forced to wear the same red armbands as 
first-generation Eurasians and had trouble finding work, not least because classified ads for 
language tutors for the new Japanese residents of Shōnan began to specify that Jews should not 
apply.393 
These anti-Semitic actions stemmed from Japanese imperial ideology, which posited 
Judaism as the ultimate enemy of the Japanese minzoku. This was the basis of the declaration by 
Tōhoku Imperial University professor Atago Hokuzan (ĢÓì) that “The degree to which 
countries retain a democratic character is precisely the degree to which they are subject to the 
Jewish dictatorship… The extent to which the so-called fascist countries are totalitarian and 
espouse ethnic nationalism (minzokushugi ŹŁBǴ) is precisely the extent to which they have 
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thrown off the Jewish yoke.”394 Japanese ideologues associated the Jewish people with the 
Western ideologies of liberalism, individualism, and communism they claimed were anathema to 
the new order in East Asia. This anti-Semitic association that was the root of Watanabe Wataru’s 
diagnosis of Japanese society on the eve of the war as having “lapsed into a Jewish culture 
(yudayateki bunka 3'2Ƴĺ) that overemphasized pleasure, self-interest, rationality, and 
liberty.”395 By the time that he and other administrators arrived in Shōnan, anti-Semitism was a 
key element to the identity of the Yamato minzoku. 
Japanese administrators may have brought anti-Semitic attitudes with them to Shōnan, 
but the city’s Jewish community also presented a problem for their racialized understanding of 
the wartime empire. While Japanese rhetoric about Jews borrowed heavily from the Nazis, 
military authorities in Shōnan found the local Jewish community difficult to categorize. This was 
because the vast majority of Jewish Singaporeans were not of European or Mediterranean 
descent but traced their ancestry to Baghdad and generally spoke Arabic.396 As a result, in the 
first few weeks of the occupation Japanese soldiers and police had some trouble sorting out who 
belonged to the Jewish community. Like their Eurasian counterparts, some tried to take 
advantage of this confusion by that they were Iraqis instead of Jews.397 Ultimately it fell to 
Shinozaki, with his experience in prewar Singapore, to deal with this community for the military 
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administration. While Watanabe froze him out of working with the overseas Chinese in the first 
weeks of the occupation, Shinozaki quickly established himself as an indispensable figure by 
making Shōnan’s diverse society legible to the military administration. 
 
Religion and Minzoku 
The Eurasian and Jewish communities in Shōnan did not fit into preconceived minzoku 
categories, but these communities were not large enough to impel the administration to discard 
the concept of minzoku altogether.398 A far greater challenge to the minzoku hierarchy came from 
the residents of Shōnan who organized their social lives, not around their linguistic or racial 
communities, but around religion. In late March 1942, while the references to the OCA first 
appeared in the Syonan Times and Syonan Jit Pao, another new organization came into being. At 
a mass rally on March 27 reportedly attended by a few thousand local Muslims of Malay, Arab, 
and South Asian descent, a number of speakers “exhorted the gathering to be loyal and obedient 
to His Imperial Nipponese Majesty and to His Majesty's Government, and to cooperate 
wholeheartedly with the Nipponese Authorities in their administration of Syonan-to.”399 This 
rally resulted in the formation of the Shōnan Muslim Consultative Council. Members of the 
council included a handful of nationalists like Ibrahim Yaacob and Dr. Gaus, but a cross-section 
of the Malay and Muslim leadership of prewar Singapore as well. Haji Amboo Sooloh, Daud bin 
Mohd. Shah, and Za’ba, who would all later included in the Malay Welfare Association, were 
listed as council members. But so were Syed Ahmad bin Mohamad Alsagoff and Syed Hussein 
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bin Ali Alsagoff, Hadhrami Arabs who were members of one of the wealthiest families in the 
city.400 Wanjor Abu Bakar, a close associate of another Alsagoff—Muslim Missionary Society 
(Jamiyah) president Syed Ibrahim bin Omar Alsagoff—was also listed as a member.401 Dr. 
Mohamed Ibrahim bin Shaik Ismail, known popularly as Dr. S.I.M. Ibrahim, rounded out the 
council as the representative of the South Asian Muslim community.402 These men represented 
the organizations that had dominated Malay and Muslim communal life in Singapore before the 
war, including the Malay-oriented Singapore Malay Union (Kesatuan Melayu Singapura) and 
Arab-dominated bodies such as the Singapore Islamic Association (Persekutuan Islam 
Singapura, PIS). And they were hardly revolutionaries: even the KMS had never challenged 
British colonial rule in its energetic advocacy for Malay interests during the interwar period. On 
the surface, the new Muslim Consultative Council seemed like the perfect local partners for the 
status quo-oriented Japanese administration. And yet, after this initial announcement, the 
organization disappears from the historical record. 
Occupation plans had directed military officials in Southeast Asia to “protect pre-existing 
religions and strive to respect faith-based customs.”403 But religion was not considered an 
appropriate social principle for the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and 
Christianity would be respected, and their local leaders might be asked to encourage their 
congregations to support the war effort. But the idea of minzoku so permeated the Japanese 
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understanding of local society that the closest equivalent to the term “social policy” in internal 
documents was in fact “minzoku policy” (minzoku taisaku ŹŁãǕ).404 Different voices within 
the Japanese wartime empire in Southeast Asia disagreed over the extent to which they should 
encourage minzoku movements in the region. The Obata report warned that impudently 
“awakening minzoku consciousness” (minzoku ishiki wo kanki suru ŹŁġȩ©ȴ) 
would destabilize Southeast Asia. In occupied Java, Foreign Ministry bureaucrat Saitō Shizuo 
(ĻȑɘƬ) felt that “raising minzoku consciousness” (minzoku ishiki wo takameru ŹŁġȩ
ɯ) would convince local peoples that the Japanese had their best interests at heart and 
cause them to cooperate wholeheartedly with the military administration.405 But among the 
Japanese occupiers of Southeast Asia no one questioned their own reliance on the concept of 
minzoku to comprehend local society. They would tolerate religious institutions but evinced a 
preference for organizing and governing through minzoku-based organizations over from an 
early date. 
For instance, when Anglican reverend D.D. Chelliah founded a Federation of Christian 
Churches in Shōnan at the end of September 1942 and attempted to expand the organization to 
all of Malaya, a sternly worded editorial in the Syonan Times declared that the administration’s 
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reconstruction of Malaya and “the development of this country and its peoples to their proper 
positions as units of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” was a much more vital concern 
than religion or religious organizations, and suggested that even the charitable work of religious 
bodies should be placed under the direction of the Shōnan Special Municipality’s Welfare 
Department rather than churches.406 The Shōnan Muslim Consultative Council did not elicit the 
same sort of comments in the Syonan Times, and, indeed, the Japanese authorities were careful to 
avoid offending Muslim sensibilities throughout the occupation.407 But the idea of a broad-based 
Muslim association did not gain traction with the Japanese administration.408 A top-secret 
internal report from late March suggests that the Gunseibu even forbade future meetings of the 
council. In a section commenting on the Gunseibu’s responsibility to guide the healthy 
development of religion in Malaya it stated that, for the immediate future, religious 
representatives would not be allowed to hold any public meetings other than prayer services.409 
Religion seemed too fraught an issue for the Gunseibu to involve itself with in the early weeks of 
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the occupation, so for the time being it would approach the people of Shōnan on the terms that 
the Japanese were more comfortable with: as Chinese, Malays, Indians, and other minzoku. 
The Shōnan Muslim Consultative Council may have disappeared, but its council 
members did not. Syed Ahmad Alsagoff, Haji Aloo Sooloh, Daud bin Mohd. Shah, S.I.M. 
Ibrahim, and Za’ba would all go on to play important roles in the organizational life of Shōnan 
alongside Gaus, Ibrahim, and Ishak. Often, however, they were presented in the propaganda 
papers as leaders of their minzoku. Ibrahim and Syed Ahmad Alsagoff, for example, appeared 
together during the choreographed Japanese commemoration of the first anniversary of the 
beginning of the war in Southeast Asia in December 1942, but they spoke on behalf of the Malay 
and Arab communities, not for Shōnan’s Muslims.410 By the end of that month, the propaganda 
papers began to introduce Alsagoff as the head of Shōnan Arab Working Committee even on 
overtly religious occasions such as Hari Raya Haji.411 Haji Aloo, Daud, and Za’ba, as we have 
seen, would go on to join the Malay Welfare Association when it was created in December 1943. 
But, while Malay and Arab leaders continued to appear together at events, South Asians were 
excluded from the Muslim community altogether by the actions of both the Japanese 
administration and Indian nationalists. 
 In June, an organization called the All-India Muslim Club took out an advertisement in 
the Syonan Times, claiming that it could help find registered members employment in Shōnan.412 
The name bore a striking resemblance to that of Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s All-India Muslim 
League, the political organization that advocated the establishment of a majority-Muslim nation 
on the subcontinent and whose leaders frequently expressed distrust of the Hindu-dominated 
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Indian National Congress. The local All-India Muslim Club seems to have grown out of a similar 
desire among the Muslim Indian community for autonomy from the Hindu-dominated, Congress-
influenced Indian Independence League. The organization was led by K.S. Anwari, a former 
secretary of the charismatic South Asian missionary and Jamiyah founder Muhammad Abdul 
Aleem Siddique, who had worked as a publisher in Singapore in the late 1930s. In the years 
before the war, Anwari had published the magazine Genuine Islam on behalf of Syed Ibrahim 
bin Omar Alsagoff, the president of Jamiyah, before beginning the magazine Voice of Islam on 
behalf of Tunku Temmengong Ahmad, a member of the Johor royal family.413 Anwari was one 
of many Muslims in prewar Singapore who saw themselves as part of a multiethnic spiritual 
community that spanned the Indian Ocean, and he was therefore deeply ambivalent about the 
pretentions of Indian nationalists to speak for the local South Asian community.414 
 However firmly Anwari promoted South Asian Muslim autonomy in Shōnan, the All-
India Muslim Club did not survive the summer of 1942. One reason for this was the fact that he 
seems to have founded the organization without formal authorization. Shinozaki recalled that 
Anwari approached him early in the occupation with a proposal to form an “Indian Welfare 
Association” independent from the Hindu-dominated ILL, but that he worried about pitting the 
municipal government against the F Kikan and so gave Anwari a noncommittal answer.415 When 
mention of the explicitly sectarian All-India Muslim Club began appearing in the Syonan Times, 
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the paper’s editors questioned whether it was operating with Japanese approval.416 By the end of 
July, reports appeared in the paper of meetings at Anwari’s home between “local Muslims,” two 
Muslim officers from the INA, and S. Haque, who had represented Java at the IIL conference in 
Bangkok the month before.417 One day later, Haque published an editorial in the Syonan Times 
calling for Hindu-Muslim unity in the fight for Indian independence.418 While Haque took a 
positive view in his piece, another editorial published the same day assailed the All-Indian 
Muslim Club for failing to make clear whether it would support the IIL and intimated that its 
members were fifth columnists.419 One week later, Anwari announced that he had reached a 
“gentleman’s agreement” with Mohan Singh and the INA to ensure that Indian Muslims could 
participate in the independence movement “with unimpaired dignity and self-respect.”420 From 
this point forward Anwari seems to have taken a more proactive role in cooperating with the 
administration, speaking at an event celebrating the first six months of the Japanese occupation 
on behalf of the “All-India Muslim League.”421 As the Quit India movement swept through the 
subcontinent that August, however, the such an association became untenable. The Syonan Times 
covered the protests and the brutal British crackdown that followed, but it also reported on 
Jinnah and the Muslim League’s resolution of August 20, which condemned the Quit India 
movement as an “open rebellion” and that its objective was “not only to coerce the British 
government into handing over power to a Hindu oligarchy… but also to force the Musalmans to 
submit to surrender to the Congress terms and dictation.”422 Three days later, Anwari publicly 
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announced his support of the Quit India movement, arguing that Jinnah’s resolution would only 
play into the hands of the British. He also announced that the All-India Muslim Club would 
dissolve and that its members would join the IIL.423 In short, the pro-INC Indian Independence 
League had cemented its place as the only representative body in Shōnan for the Indian 
community.424 
 The demise of the Muslim Club was a significant coup for the IIL, since the suspicion 
and occasional outright hostility of Indian Muslims toward the Hindu-dominated nationalist 
movement had posed a problem for independence activists inside and outside India for decades. 
The Japanese authorities, who had the power to ban the Muslim Club at any time, seem to have 
temporized over the summer of 1942. It was pressure from the IIL, and particularly from the 
INA, that seems to have been the decisive factor in the dissolution of the Muslim Club. Much of 
this pressure came from influential Muslims in the INA and IIL, and in the end it was an 
agreement among the elite leadership of these organizations that brought the Indian Muslim 
community firmly into the nationalist fold. Any camaraderie the leaders might have felt did not, 
however, necessarily translate to the lower ranks of its membership. During the first 
independence rally that followed Anwari’s dissolution of the Muslim Club, fighting broke out 
between Hindu and Muslim participants and became so disruptive that Goho was forced to make 
a public statement about it in the Syonan Times.425 Religious tension compounded the already 
troubled relationship between the IIL leadership and the majority-Tamil Indian population in 
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Shōnan, yet it remained the sole official representative of the Indian community in Shōnan 
because it suited the Japanese vision of minzoku-based social organizations led by recognized 
prewar leaders. 
 Religious organizations did not disappear in occupied Shōnan. Their leaders learned to 
present their institutions as strictly apolitical and to find allies in the administration. When Syed 
Ibrahim Alsagoff and Jamiyah reappeared in the Syonan Times at the end of the summer of 1942, 
Alsagoff pledged that the missionary society would shun any form of politics.426 Even the 
Federation of Christian Churches, which had drawn such harsh criticism from the Syonan Times 
that September, was able to operate freely from November after it found a patron within the 
administration—Capt. Ogawa, head of the Gunseikanbu Education and Culture Section 
(Bunkyōka ĺĸǊ), who was himself a Christian.427 By early 1943 the Education and Culture 
Section had become the principal liaison between the administration and religious organizations, 
and its officials began to exert greater influence over the actions of religious leaders in Shōnan 
and Malaya.428 This was precisely the moment when the Allied counteroffensive against Japan 
began to gain momentum. Over the next few months the Gunseikanbu found it propitious to 
reassess its relationship with Islamic leaders in Malaya and Sumatra, a shift that culminated in a 
three-day Islamic conference held in Shōnan in April 1943. 
The attendees at the conference sat through speeches by Maj. Gen. Nishiōeda Yutaka (ș
ÃŘǺ), head of the Gunseikanbu, Col. Ōkubo Kōichi (ÃC`ĉ;), his propaganda chief, and 
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Marquis Tokugawa Yoshichika (ēóǴȝ), special advisor on Malay affairs.429 It soon became 
clear that the Japanese wanted the gathered Islamic leaders to act as the administration’s 
propagandists in Malaya, exhorting their congregations to cooperate with the Japanese, become 
more productive workers and farmers, and engage in “character training.”430 While it was clear 
to the attendees that this was a ploy to use Islam to bolster support for Japan’s war, they were 
gratified by the conference, the first of its kind in Malayan history, and by the Japanese promise 
to work to deepen the faith of the people of Malaya.431 Indeed, the conference represented a 
turning point for the relationship between the Gunseikanbu and Malayan Muslims, as mosques 
and prayer rooms became key vectors to spread Japanese ideals at the local level. But some 
things did not change. Shōnan’s delegation to the Islamic conference was led by the highest 
Islamic official on the island, Chief Kathi Tuan Haji Ali, but he was joined by Jamiyah leader 
Syed Ibrahim Alsagoff, former Singapore Malay Union president Daud bin Mohamed Shah, 
local aristocrat Tungku Hussein bin Ali, and All-India Muslim Club founder K.S. Anwari.432 
Even as changes in Japan’s strategic position prompted the Malayan military administration to 
allow religious institutions a larger role in the occupation, the same group of prewar elites 
continued to appear in the rosters of nearly every collaborative organization. And, while men 
such as, particularly Alsagoff and Anwari may have been eager to reembrace their Muslim 
identity after being forced to fit into the minzoku mold, in the city of Shōnan minzoku-based 
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organizations like the Oversea Chinese Association, the Indian Independence League, and the 
municipal Malay Welfare Association with its mixed nationalist and accommodationist elite 
membership, continued to play a preeminent role in the daily governance. 
 
The task of identifying local partners to help govern the ethnically and religiously diverse 
city at the heart of occupied Southeast Asia was neither straightforward nor simple. Occupation 
guidelines had provided the general framework, but with few details for their implementation. In 
the event, it was serendipity and the whims of administrators and their local collaborators, all 
with their own agendas and biases, that determined who would be tapped to collaborate with the 
Japanese. Although it is easy to get lost in the welter of forces that brought different individuals 
into this position, there were two persistent themes in the process by which officials as disparate 
in experience and disposition as Shinozaki Mamoru, Fujiwara Iwaichi, and Watanabe Wataru 
identified and organized local partners in Shōnan. One was their preoccupation with minzoku as 
the social category for organizing the people of Shōnan. The other was their preference for 
putting the accommodationist elite of prewar British Singapore to work for the Japanese empire. 
While anticolonial Malay and Indian nationalists had an enormous impact at the beginning of the 
occupation, over the course of its first year they were nearly all displaced by figures who had 
been deeply invested in the British colonial status quo. Japan’s declining military fortunes 
offered opportunities for these nationalists to return to prominence later in the war, but it was 





Chapter 4 – Patterns of Japanese Leadership in Shōnan: 
Colonel Watanabe Wataru and Mayor Ōdachi Shigeo 
 
 Although Singapore was the largest city in British Malaya before the war, in 1942 much 
of the island was still rural, dominated by mangrove swamps, jungle, farming estates, country 
clubs, and interior or coastal villages (kampung). Urban development was for the most part 
restricted to a strip of coastline running approximately nine miles east from the southern tip of 
the island near present-day Keppel Harbor, through the heart of the city at the mouth of the 
Singapore River, and across the Kallang Basin to the suburbs around Katong (See Figure 1). 
Arriving from the sea, as many Japanese did after the British surrender, one could take in much 
of the city from a boat in the harbor, including the civic district around the Singapore (renamed 
Shōnan) River. Traditionally the nucleus of political and economic power, this area was home to 
the grand architecture of British imperial power. The Japanese administration inherited these 
buildings, and from April 1942 the Gunseibu of the 25th Army had its headquarters in the 
Fullerton Building, one of the most imposing edifices in the urban landscape. This neoclassical 
building sat at the mouth of the Shōnan River, and the directors of the Gunseibu sat in their new 
offices overlooking the Shōnan Strait with a view of the islands of the Riau Archipelago 
beyond.433 
The building’s orientation toward the outside world was appropriate: the Gunseibu was 
charged with governing all of Malaya and, until March 1943, the island of Sumatra in the former 
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Dutch East Indies as well.434 Although they regularly intervened in daily administrative affairs in 
Shōnan, Gunseibu bureaucrats also focused their attention on regional economic planning, 
security issues, and the movement of goods and people between Shōnan and other parts of 
Southeast Asia and Japan. As the 25th Army’s military administration grew from its first four 
departments (General Affairs, Industry, Finance, and Transportation) to the elaborate 
bureaucracy of late 1942, it reopened the courts, set up propaganda organs, trained local police, 
and coordinated economic activity in the name of keeping the peace and developing Malaya and 
Sumatra’s resources.435 For the first year of the occupation it did so under the leadership of 
Watanabe Wataru (ƊɉƊ), who had undermined the authority of the first head of the Gunseibu, 
Manaki Takanobu (ɭÇőĹa), before taking complete control of the administration in April 
1942.436 Not everyone in the Gunseibu agreed with Watanabe’s hardline attitude, but the policies 
he pushed through during the first year of the occupation—such as the Chinese community’s $50 
                                               
434 Initially Japanese war plans called for Malaya and Sumatra to be governed separately, but Watanabe and 
Takase lobbied vigorously for the two territories—both sides of the strategic Malacca Strait—to be combined. They 
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enormous power over the daily administration of Malaya and Sumatra. Yoji Akashi, “Bureaucracy and the Japanese 
Military Administration, with Specific Reference to Malaya,” in William H. Newell, ed., Japan in Asia, 1942–1945 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981), 52–53. 
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million forced donation to the 25th Army—colored the relationship between the Japanese and the 
people of Malaya and Sumatra for the remainder of the occupation. 
From a boat in the harbor a passenger might also look through the trees along the 
waterfront and beyond the Padang, a colonial era-cricket ground, to catch a glimpse of City Hall. 
Across the Shōnan River from the Fullerton Building, this was the headquarters of the Shōnan 
Special Municipality from March 1942. Removed from the coast in the heart of the civic district, 
this building contained the offices of Shōnan’s Japanese mayor and the bulk of the municipal 
staff. The municipality was, on paper, a branch office of the Gunseibu. It had jurisdiction over 
Shōnan, as well as the islands of the Riau Archipelago and the Natuna and Anambas Islands. 
This sprawling maritime territory was devised by the Japanese military to place the strategic 
fulcrum of Southeast Asia under a single wartime jurisdiction.437 In practice, only a handful of 
municipal staff dealt with the outlying islands. Most the bureaucrats in City Hall on governing 
the roughly 700,000 inhabitants of Shōnan Island. The Shōnan Special Municipality inherited the 
departments of the defunct Singapore Municipality and was given control over four departments 
that had been controlled directly by the Straits Settlements administration: police, education, 
public works, and the custodian of enemy property set up in 1939.438 In many respects the 
municipality continued the work of prewar British administrators (though with far fewer 
                                               
437 The idea of combining the nearby Dutch-controlled islands of Bintan and Batam within the Japanese 
administration of the former Straits Settlements first appeared in the Obata Report, in the section on Malaya 
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438 Shingapōru Shiseikai 2Q-CRMĢśy, Shōnan Tokubetsushi shi—Senjichū no Shingapōru ůµǀĢÁ
よŏŰ\2Q-CRM (Tokyo: Nihon Shingapōru Kyōkai ŨŽ2Q-CRM´y, 1986), 144. All of these 
offices had existed in Singapore before the war, though the Singapore Municipality was subordinate to the 
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resources)—managing the botanic gardens, repairing the electric grid, running civilian hospitals, 
issuing business licenses, and controlling mosquitos. 
Technically subordinate to the Gunseibu, the administrators in City Hall were physically 
separated from their superiors in the Fullerton Building and developed their own bureaucratic 
culture. The first mayor of Shōnan was Ōdachi Shigeo (ÃɆȉɤ), a Home Ministry bureaucrat 
with years of experience in Japan and occupied China who abhorred Watanabe’s hardline 
approach. He felt that the people of Shōnan would only commit themselves to the new order if 
they trusted the Japanese, and that the administration could only build this trust by protecting 
local lives and livelihoods. Ōdachi used his connections in the army and metropolitan 
government to carve out an autonomous space for his staff in City Hall, from which he worked to 
stymie Watanabe’s radical policies.439 The sense of autonomy that came from working under 
Ōdachi shaped the attitudes of municipal staffers, as did their limited jurisdiction. In contrast to 
the regionally-focused Gunseibu, the municipal administration offered “comparatively more 
opportunities to become intimate with locals and converse closely with them.”440 City Hall’s 
local focus meant that its Japanese staff were much more involved in the daily lives of Shōnan 
residents than the officials in the Fullerton Building were. They worked with more Chinese, 
Malay, Indian, and Eurasian employees, and their duties often took them out into the city and 
local communities. While the Gunseibu’s offices faced the sea and the world beyond Shōnan, the 
municipal offices were embedded within the city itself. 
And perhaps most significantly, the municipal government was entirely run by civilians. 
The Obata Report of 1941 had grossly underestimated the number of administrators needed to 
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govern Southeast Asia, with the result that the military administrations of Malaya and the other 
occupied territories were severely understaffed. Col. Ishii Akiho (ƾIǉǍ), a member of the 
Southern Expeditionary Army’s staff who translated the Obata Report into national policy during 
the fall of 1941, recalled that “a debate began over the entire structure of the military 
administration” after the American surrender at Corregidor in the Philippines on May 6, 1942.441 
This debate resulted in a massive increase in the number of Japanese in the region, almost all of 
whom were civilians.442 The Tokyo government demanded that government offices around the 
country relinquish supernumerary staff to work in the Southern Areas, and soon thousands of 
Japanese civil servants began arriving in Shōnan, either en route to other parts of the region or to 
work in Shōnan itself.443 By the end of September 1942 less than ten percent of the staff of the 
Gunseibu were active servicemen, although Watanabe and other military officers still controlled 
the critical general affairs, police, propaganda, and accounting departments.444 At City Hall, 
meanwhile, Ōdachi took advantage of the influx of civil servants to remove every military 
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Ʀŉü、ʒ, Hiroku: Senji Geppō/Gunsei Geppō ǬたRŏŰŷê9ɝśŷê, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha やƳ
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serviceman from the municipal government.445 This task was completed on August 1, when 
Ogata Shin’ichi (Ǫľa;) replaced a Kempeitai officer as head of the municipal police 
department’s special branch. In Ogata’s words: 
“With this, foreign elements were eliminated from the Shōnan Special 
Municipality and the Shōnan police were freed from the hands of the Kempei. It 
swept away the Kempei ‘politics’ that had caused so many problems in the past 
and created a clear structure [for the municipal government].”446 
 
The Kempeitai continued to operate in Shōnan through the end of the war, and arrested, tortured, 
and killed anyone they saw as a threat to Japanese power. Most people in Shōnan were therefore 
not able to appreciate the details of the place of the Kempeitai’s in the occupation. But to the 
civil servants and other Japanese staff of the municipal government, the perceived independence 
of City Hall from the military helped to foster a paternalistic sense of duty to the people of 
Shōnan, which motivated their work even as the wartime empire crumbled around them during 
the final years of the occupation. Even after Ōdachi was recalled to Tokyo in May 1943, the 
officials in the municipality drew inspiration from the words and deeds of the first mayor of 
Shōnan. 
Tension between the Gunseibu, renamed the Gunseikanbu in July 1942, and the 
municipality was constant, in a large part because of the philosophical (and personal) conflict 
between Watanabe and Ōdachi. The conflict manifested itself in many ways, but several who 
served in the administration remember the controversy over “eliminating enemy languages” as a 
representative episode. In October 1942, the leadership of the Gunseikanbu set a deadline for the 
elimination of English and Dutch from Malaya and Sumatra. Use of these languages would be 
forbidden in schools, and they would be removed from public documents, road signs, 
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advertisements, and eventually newspapers. The post office would no longer accept letters for 
censorship and mailing if they were written in enemy languages. Japanese was to become the 
official language of public life in the occupied areas by the summer of 1943.447 This policy was 
the brainchild of Watanabe. He believed that, to win the war, the Japanese needed to lead local 
peoples away from the Western individualism and materialism that had “stained the indigenous 
culture,” and instead instill in them a Japanese “spirit” (seishin ǜǅ) that would encourage them 
to cooperate with the imperial army.448 Watanabe thought that knowledge of the Japanese 
language was essential to a true embrace of the Japanese spirit, and so he made language 
education a cornerstone of the Gunseikanbu’s educational policies.449 The elimination of English 
and Dutch would force the people of Malaya and Sumatra to learn Japanese or risk being cut off 
from society. Even if the scramble to learn the new language over the next couple months caused 
a major upheaval across the region, to Watanabe these were the sorts of radical changes required 
to create a new East Asia. On November 2, he sent a timeline for the elimination of English from 
the Fullerton Building to the governors of Malaya, including Mayor Ōdachi in Shōnan.450 
 It did not take long for Watanabe’s notice to cross the river from the Fullerton Building to 
City Hall. Dazai Hirokuni (ÅÛɋ), the head of the municipal education department at the 
time, remembered showing the notice to the mayor. Ōdachi immediately blurted out, “even 
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stupidity has its limits!”451 From his perspective there were several reasons that banning the use 
of English in Shōnan made little practical sense. Despite the Gunseikanbu’s best efforts to 
promote Japanese language education over the past several months, few Shōnan residents had 
more than an elementary understanding of the language.452 This was true even in City Hall, 
where the majority of clerks, doctors, engineers, and laborers were local employees.453 Because 
of this, and because the city government was run along the same lines as the old Singapore 
municipality and often used prewar forms and document templates for day-to-day business, 
English remained the lingua franca at City Hall.454 Not all the Japanese civil servants were 
comfortable in the language, but they were helped by a number of young Japanese translators—
women and men—many of whom had lived in Singapore before the war. 
 Ōdachi’s dismay at the ban on enemy languages came from a deeper concern than the 
inconvenience it would pose to the municipal bureaucracy. English, along with Malay and 
Hokkien, had been an important common language for the linguistically diverse population of 
prewar Singapore. To many, particularly among the Eurasian and Straits Chinese communities, it 
was the primary language of work and family life. In Dazai’s words, if this policy was 
implemented “newspapers couldn’t be read. Communication would become impossible. Even 
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leaving the house would become impossible. This would force civil life to become mute.”455 To 
Watanabe, this crisis of daily life would help to catalyze a spiritual and material renovation to 
transform the people of Shōnan into productive members of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. To Ōdachi, it threatened to derail the occupation, and he was committed to preventing 
this threat to Japanese rule from coming to pass.456 
There was little Ōdachi could do about the newspapers and postal system, which fell 
outside municipal jurisdiction (the Gunseikanbu controlled the mail and its propaganda section 
oversaw local newspapers). He could delay the production of new Japanese street signs, 
however, claiming the municipality did not have enough paint for such a large job.457 More 
significantly, he was willing to go outside the formal hierarchy of the military administration to 
fight the ban. When he served as a civilian advisor to the North China Area Army in the 1930s, 
Ōdachi had become close to Count Terauchi Hisaichi (âxä;). One month before Pearl 
Harbor, the Imperial General Headquarters promoted Terauchi to Field Marshal (gensui nø) 
and appointed him Supreme Commander of the Southern Expeditionary Army (Nanpō-gun ľ
ȷ), which oversaw all army operations in Southeast Asia. Terauchi supervised the invasion of 
Southeast Asia from Saigon but in June 1942, with fall of Corregidor and the Allies in retreat, he 
moved his headquarters to Shōnan and settled into Government House, the palatial former 
residence of the British governor of the Straits Settlements.458 From his position in the 25th Army 
Gunseikanbu, Watanabe was Ōdachi’s boss. But Terauchi was the boss of everyone. 
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He also happened to be Ōdachi’s Go partner. According to the mayor’s personal 
secretary, Takamizawa Mankichi (ɯțŽ<), Ōdachi often visited Government House to play 
Go, and Terauchi even slipped away to the mayor’s residence on Holland Road for the 
occasional game.459 Takamizawa remembers that Ōdachi thought Terauchi was “a miserable Go 
player, but a good person.”460 He often took these social occasions as an opportunity to discuss 
political and policy matters with Terauchi and other military leaders in attendance.461 The order 
banning the use of English became a regular topic of conversation, and Ōdachi’s pragmatic 
arguments appealed to these commanders, who in the 1930s had seen ideologically driven 
subordinates like Watanabe initiate war in China and stage failed coups in Tokyo. Through these 
frequent, informal meetings with Watanabe’s superiors, Ōdachi convinced them to extend the 
deadline for the elimination of English and, after Watanabe was recalled to Tokyo in March 1943 
after a falling out with 25th Army commander Lt. Gen. Saitō Yaheita (ĻȑĊúÅ), to abandon 
the policy altogether.462 In Dazai’s words, he had “prevented posterity from making [the ban on 
English] a laughable example of idiotic occupation policy.”463 
 Episodes like this one made Ōdachi a hero in City Hall. Long after the occupation ended, 
local municipal staff looked back fondly on their days working under the tenacious mayor. 
Ōdachi encouraged them to give the welfare of the people of Shōnan priority over the demands 
of the military, and his “personality, discernment, sense of justice, and dynamism” allowed them 
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to fulfill their duties with a clean conscience and peace of mind.464 It can be difficult to penetrate 
layers of hagiography that surround accounts of Ōdachi, most of which were written by friends 
and colleagues. But it is clear from these accounts that Ōdachi and other civil servants in Shōnan 
were complicit in the construction of Japan’s new imperial formation in Southeast Asia. They 
valued their sense of independence from the military, but Ōdachi was most effective at fighting 
military ideologues when he appealed to their more pragmatic superiors for help. And, although 
Ōdachi’s posthumous biography describes him as the “affectionate father of the townsfolk,” he 
was also committed to keeping them in their place. Hosoda Tokuju (Ǣƫēä), a bureau chief in 
the municipality, claims that “undoubtedly the most important aspect of Ōdachi’s character was 
the purity, or rather the greatness, of a man who could practice true democracy (shin no 
minshushugi ƺŹBBǴ): the ability to place himself in the shoes of those he ruled and 
understand the world from their perspective.”465 This definition of democracy may not have 
struck the residents of Shōnan as particularly democratic, but in practical terms it meant that 
Ōdachi and his civil servants would pay attention to their welfare even as they denied them any 
meaningful role in the policy-making process. Ōdachi advocated a gentler authoritarianism than 
Watanabe, but he was equally committed to the Japanese imperial project in Southeast Asia. 
 The difference between Watanabe and Ōdachi lay, not in Ōdachi’s humanism or his faith 
in Southeast Asians to govern their own affairs (of which he had none), but in their very different 
views on how Japan could emerge victorious from the war, which both saw as a continuation of 
the crises the empire had weathered in the 1930s. Watanabe resented the status-quo-oriented 
policy prescriptions of the Obata Report and subsequent Japanese occupation guidelines for 
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Southeast Asia because, with their focus on maintaining the colonial status quo to facilitate the 
acquisition of strategic resources, they lacked a strong foundation—a political vision for the 
future of East Asia—and as such left Japanese authority in the region on shaky ground.466 He 
would find ways to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of these occupation guidelines through 
policies such as the OCA’s $50 million forced donation and the ban on enemy languages because 
he was convinced that to win the war against the materially superior United States and Britain, 
the people of East Asia needed to undergo what historian Akashi Yōji has called a “spiritual 
cleansing” (misogi Ǉ).467 Watanabe was not alone in such beliefs. For much of the 1930s, 
radical young military offers, right-wing civilian ideologues, and so-called reform bureaucrats 
had echoed Watanabe’s calls for a “national renovation” (kokka kakushin °ÜɨĽ) to restore 
Japan’s “traditional spirit and vitality.”468 As Janis Mimura has demonstrated, radical reformers 
in the military and civil service were the driving force behind the development of the puppet-
state of Manchukuo in the decade before the invasion of Southeast Asia.469 In the latter half of 
the 1930s, however, these reformers were unable to export their agenda back to Japan. Most 
radical elements within the army were crushed after an attempted coup in 1936. Mimura argues 
that bureaucratic reformers were stymied in their efforts to introduce truly radical change by 
entrenched business interests and traditionally-minded bureaucrats, their opposition culminating 
in a purge of “reds” from the government in 1941.470 While some reform bureaucrats were able 
to regroup over the next few years, this was the context in which the occupation of Southeast 
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Asia was planned and set up, in short, an environment of deep suspicion on the part of Japan’s 
military and civilian leaders toward calls for radical change, even from within their own ranks.471 
 Ōdachi was one of these leaders. Before the war he had risen to the rank of Vice Minister 
of Home Affairs, after a colorful career in Japan and occupied China. As a member of the Home 
Ministry, Ōdachi was part of an elite, conservative, and tradition-bound branch of the Japanese 
civil service. As a former star student who had risen almost to the pinnacle of the bureaucracy, 
Ōdachi was a fierce defender of the prerogatives of his ministry and disdainful of those 
reformers who might challenge its preeminence in the government. Ōdachi’s close friendship 
with Tōjō Hideki reveals his position in the power structures of the Japanese empire. Tōjō Hideki 
was a leader of the Control Faction (tōseiha Ǧ}ƅ) in the Japanese army, a group focused on 
reforming and modernizing the Japanese military and civilian economy to support a “national 
mobilization state,” which would enable Japan to fight superpowers like the Soviet Union or the 
United States.472 But its members were also repelled by the tendency of military radicals to 
ignore the chain of command. Ōdachi himself was eager to rationalize the work of the 
bureaucracy by silencing voices outside of it. As governor of Fukui prefecture in the early 1930s 
he had tried to eliminate political parties from the policymaking process to allow the Home 
Ministry bureaucrats within the prefectural government to work unhindered by political 
concerns. Tōjō and Ōdachi shared was a total commitment to the ostensibly meritocratic social 
and bureaucratic order that had served themselves so well. The conservative impulses of men 
like Tōjō and Ōdachi were reflected status-quo-oriented occupation policies for Southeast Asia. 
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Watanabe may have raged against them, but by 1943 he had been expelled from the 
administration, Ōdachi had ascended to even loftier heights within the leadership of the empire, 
and the Home Ministry bureaucrat’s paternalistic authoritarianism came to characterize Japanese 
rule in Shōnan. 
 
Approaches to Occupation – Watanabe and Ōdachi in China 
 Ōdachi and Watanabe were not acquainted before arriving in Shōnan in early 1942, even 
though they lived parallel lives in Japanese-occupied China during the 1930s.473 Both served in 
Manchuria in the mid-1930s, working to establish the newly created Japanese puppet-state, 
Manchukuo (Manzhouguo/Manshūkoku Ƌô°). After the Japanese invasion of north and 
central China in 1937, both worked for the North China Area Army (NCAA) to set up a new 
puppet regime: Provisional Government of the Republic of China (Zhonghua Minguo Linshi 
Zhengfu AȋŹ±ǿŇĶĂ) of Wang Kemin (Ƥrķ).474 Ōdachi and Watanabe briefly 
reported to the same office: the NCAA’s Special Affairs Department (Tokumubu ƙɏ) in 
Beijing.475 While it is certainly possible that the two crossed paths in the halls of the Special 
Affairs Department, they would have had little reason to work together because of their very 
different administrative tasks in North China, where the Japanese occupation state was overlaid 
                                               
473 This is, at least, the claim of Ōdachi’s biographer, noted transwar journalist Takamiya Taihei (むąóĨ). Ōdachi 
Shigeo Denki Kankōkai, ed. ñɬȟʈzɀȱyȉの, Ōdachi Shigeo ñɬȟʈ (Tokyo: Ōdachi Shigeo Denki 
Kankōkai ñɬȟʈzɀȱy, 1956), 170. 
474 Wang’s regime was organized on December 14, 1937 and was given nominal authority over much of the North 
China Plain. Only a few months later, on March 28, 1938, Japan’s Central China Area Army decided to set up its 
own puppet regime in the Yangtze River Delta: Reformed Government of the Republic of China (Zhonghua Minguo 
Weixin Zhengfu \ȤƠßȆţśį) of Liang Hongzhi (Ɗもŀ). Both were incorporated into a “reorganized” 
Republic of China under Wang Jingwei (ƤǾȲ) on March 30, 1940, while Jiang Jieshi’s Republic of China 
continued to fight the Japanese from their capital at Chongqing from 1938 through 1945. 
475 Akashi, “Watanabe gunsei,” 73. Ōdachi Shigeo Denki Kankōkai, 147. 
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on the already heterogeneous administrative structures developed in the decades after the fall of 
the Qing dynasty in 1911. With a decade-and-a-half of experience in domestic administration in 
the Home Ministry, Ōdachi was a legislative advisor whose job was to ensure that Japan’s 
puppet regimes in China functioned smoothly. Watanabe worked closer to the ground in the 
army’s Special Affairs Agencies (Tokumu Kikan ƙűɝ), which were flexible organizations 
that handled military intelligence, propaganda, and the enforcement of Japanese occupation 
policies.476 From these different vantage points, Ōdachi and Watanabe reached different 
conclusions about the best approaches to governing a population under military occupation. 
 
Producing a “China Expert”: Watanabe and Army Intelligence on the Mainland 
 Watanabe, a native of Okayama prefecture, graduated from the Army War College in 
1927. After two years as a company commander in Ibaraki, he was brought to Tokyo to work for 
the army’s General Staff, where he was assigned to the Second (Intelligence) Department, China 
Section (Shinaka ĵɊȥ).477 Historian Kitaoka Shin’ichi has demonstrated that, by the end of 
the 1920s, this office of “China experts” (Shinatsū ĵɊɀ or, in postwar scholarship, 
Chūgokutsū A°ɀ) had developed into one of the most insular and narrow-minded in the 
military bureaucracy.478 Several factors contributed to the China Section’s bureaucratic isolation. 
                                               
476 Hata Ikuhiko, ed. ǭɲķ, Nihon rikukaigun sōgō jiten (2nd edition) ŨŽなƯɝȈÅeʴǴるƿア (Tokyo: 
Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan-kai Ɓlñýƿy, 2005), 403. 
477 Shigetō was head of the China Desk (řɰǆɽ) in the General Staff’s Second Department from 1926 and 1927, 
and then from 1929 to 1930. He took over as head of the Department’s entire China Section (řɰɊɽ) from 1930 
to 1932. Kitaoka Shin’ichi, “China Experts in the Army,” in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., 
The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 341. 
478 In Kitaoka’s words: “It is said that officers in other departments came to regard the China Section officers as 
somewhat strange. It seems that this isolation resulted, first, in a lack of breadth in the views of the China Section 
officers and, second, in difficulty securing the cooperation of other departments.” Kitaoka, 343. 
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The General Staff’s Second Department tended to attract some of the brightest officers in the 
army, but it offered fewer chances for promotion than the even more prestigious First 
(Operations) Department of the General Staff or the Military Affairs Bureau of the Army 
Ministry.479 In addition, between 1917 and 1937, only three China experts were chosen to run the 
Second Department, which was otherwise dominated by specialists on the West.480 As a result, 
the members of the China Section spent most of their time working for men who had little 
understanding of their field of expertise. 
 China Section staffers were graduates of the army’s War College, but they rarely 
graduated with honors and as such were shut out of choice assignments in more elite parts of the 
army bureaucracy.481 Once assigned to the China Section they spent much of their time on the 
continent, building up networks of Chinese and Japanese civilian informants and liaising with 
warlords and other local authorities. This meant that they had less time in Tokyo to build 
relationships with powerful general officers whose patronage could get them out of the China 
Section and into the upper echelons of the army. Physical and bureaucratic isolation from the 
levers of power in Tokyo led to the development of a combative esprit de corps among these 
men, who came to see themselves as the only people understood how Japan would secure its 
interests in China. Watanabe was no exception. As a member of the China Section in the early 
1930s, he developed a pugnacious attitude toward his superiors that remained throughout his 
career.482 Isolated though they were, China Section alums radically transformed Japanese policy 
in China, but they did so not from Tokyo, but on the ground after insinuating themselves into the 
                                               
479 Kitaoka, 335–336. 
480 Kitaoka, 338–339. 
481 Between 1908 and 1937, only one head of the China Section had graduated with honors. Kitaoka, 339. 
482 Akashi, “Watanabe Gunsei,” 54, 75. 
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staff of the Guandong Army (Kantōgun ɝŚȷ) in Manchuria. Created to defend the Guandong 
Leased Territory (Kantōshū ɝŚô) at the southern tip of the Liaodong Peninsula in Manchuria, 
as well as Japanese rights to the South Manchuria Railway, the Guandong Army was one of the 
most important instruments of Japanese imperialism in northern China. China Section alumni 
would use their positions within it to orchestrate the assassination of Chinese leaders in 
Manchuria as well as the full takeover of the region in 1931.483 It was as a member of the China 
Section, a bureaucratically isolated office that bred contempt for higher authority and a 
willingness to pursue a violent, independent agenda on the continent, that Watanabe first 
travelled to China in 1932. 
 Watanabe spent the next two years gathering intelligence and working with local 
authorities in Beiping, Zhangjiakou, and Jiujiang.484 After a brief stint with the 9th Division, in 
late 1935 he was assigned to the Guandong Army as a member of the Harbin Special Affairs 
Agency (Harubin Tokumu Kikan *5+8ƙűɝ).485 Founded in 1917 in the run-up to 
Japan’s military role in the Siberia Intervention (1918–1922), the Harbin Agency was one of the 
earliest and most important of these hybrid intelligence, propaganda, and administrative bodies. 
It was the intelligence headquarters of the Guandong Army, and as the center of the Special 
Affairs Agency network in Manchuria, it was the linchpin of Japanese anti-Soviet intelligence 
                                               
483 Former China Section member Kōmoto Daisaku (ƧŽñ) used his position in the Guandong Army staff to 
orchestrate the assassination of the erstwhile closest ally of the Japanese in China, Zhang Zuolin (ĵʍ). In 1931, 
Itagaki Seishirō (ƃçĺÙし), Doihara Kenji (âȓºɚf), and Ishiwara Kanji (ǝºȢƽ), who had not worked for 
the China Section but joined the Guandong Army staff on Kōmoto’s recommendation) used their positions within 
the Guandong Army to orchestrate the Manchurian Incident, which provided them an excuse to seize the entire 
region. Drea, 166, Kitaoka, 365. 
484 The Nanjing-based Republic of China under Jiang Jieshi had renamed Beiping (Northern Peace ¯Ĩ) in 1928. 
See page 36. 
485 Hata, Nihon rikukaigun, 174. 
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gathering efforts until the end of the Second World War. 486 In 1935 Ōdachi was also in 
Manchuria, writing legislation for the puppet-state of Manchukuo, while Watanabe and his 
colleagues in Harbin focused on the concrete application of Japanese power and on crushing 
local and foreign threats to it. 
 In the summer of 1937, Japan began its invasion of northern and central China. There had 
been no real preparation for governing the vast swath of Chinese territory that the Japanese army 
now controlled, so Japanese soldiers began to fill the power vacuum with Peace Maintenance 
Committees (Chian Ijikai ſÑǧİV) beholden to their individual units. In an attempt to bring 
order to this welter of administrative bodies, agents from the China Section began to set up 
Special Affairs Agencies in the occupied territory. Watanabe was attached to the NCAA’s 
Special Affairs Department (Tokumubu ƙɏ) in this capacity in November 1937. He was first 
tasked with setting up a new Special Affairs Agency in Beiping, renamed Beijing by the NCAA. 
He was able to do so quickly and effectively, and three months later he took control of the Jinan 
Special Affairs Agency, which coordinated special affairs in Shandong province.487 His talent for 
this work caught the attention of one high-ranking officer in particular, Lt. Gen. Yamashita 
Tomoyuki (ì?Èĺ). 
In the summer of 1938, the future “Tiger of Malaya” was then the Chief of Staff of the 
NCAA. He came to respect Watanabe’s approach to administration during regional meetings of 
Special Affairs Agency chiefs from across northern China.488 By this time the central 
government, under Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro, had begun to set up the East Asia 
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Development Board (Kōain ȂJɞ), a body that would attempt to standardize and centralize 
occupation policy in China.489 When the Development Board established a North China Liaison 
Department in Beijing in March, 1939, Yamashita suggested that Watanabe should run its 
Political Affairs Bureau. Over the next few months the two men developed a close relationship 
that helped reduce friction between the Development Board and the NCAA.490 It also gave 
Watanabe a powerful patron who praised his China expertise to the army leadership. The next 
year, in September 1940, Watanabe returned to Tokyo to serve as the Army General Staff’s 
representative in the new Total War Research Institute (Sōryokusen Kenkyūjo ǩĨƿǎ
Ī).491 A little over a year later Watanabe was assigned to the 25th Army’s staff to set up the 
military administration of Malaya, much to the satisfaction of Yamashita, its commanding 
officer.492 
Watanabe spent only one year at the Total War Institute but, as Akashi Yōji has shown, 
the experience helped him to reflect on and analyze Japan’s geopolitical crisis on the basis of his 
years of experience at the front lines of the Japanese occupation of China, creating a cohesive 
conception of how a military occupation ought to operate.493 In a lecture to the Army War 
College on May 7, 1941, he instructed his audience to act decisively at the beginning of a 
military occupation to restore public order (chian ſÑ) through the application of military force. 
                                               
489 See Shibata Yoshimasa ƅǊÕʉ, “Chūgoku senryōchi gyōsei kikō toshite no Kōain \Ý·ʑãȱśƓƏ
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Anyone in the occupied territories who resisted in the slightest should be “thoroughly chastised” 
(tetteiteki ni yōchō subeku ĕĀƳǽĥ	) and the occupiers must not reveal their 
weakness by treated people with careless magnanimity.494 It was necessary to use military force 
to “awe [occupied peoples] into submission” (ifuku seshimeru ËŎ), so that they 
would be grateful their lives had been spared.495 He also suggested that military occupiers 
quickly establish control over the enemy’s administrative, financial, and security agencies along 
with other influential bodies (like the recommendations of the Obata Report submitted to the 
General Staff five weeks earlier) and that the people of the enemy territories not be allowed to 
run them.496 
Once order was established, Watanabe believed that an occupation administration should 
remain flexible and adapt to changing conditions to deal with enemy interference. Unfortunately, 
in many parts of China the occupation had ossified, as civil servants who only cared about the 
“rule of law” (hōchi ƀſ) took over the administration and the army preoccupied itself with the 
futile task of crushing guerrilla forces, or “bandits” (hizoku ȯ), causing the breakdown of 
public order by acting as if military and political affairs were separate.497 Watanabe’s experience 
in the Total War Research Institute, where he was joined by one navy captain but otherwise 
worked with bureaucrats from the Agriculture, Commerce, Home, Finance, and Foreign 
                                               
494 “Senryōchi tōchi (chian shukusei) ni kan suru Watanabe taisa kōen sokkiroku ·ʑãȅƨʡƨÿǽƱʢ<つ4
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495 “Senryōchi tōchi,” 54. Watanabe used the term Sook Ching (shukusei ǽƱ) in this lecture to describe this 
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Ministries, deepened his convictions that Japan’s career civil servants, with their lack of 
discipline and slavish devotion to the bureaucratic process would lead their country to ruin.498 By 
the end of the war Watanabe began to articulate his disdain for the civil service in grandiose 
terms, declaring that, in every era, military autocracy (budan Ŷļ) and civil administration 
(bunchi ĺſ) arose as action and reaction to each other and that, while both could be politically 
useful “as a general rule a politics that lapsed into civil administration (bunchi ni dashita seiji ĺ
ſ½Ķſ) would lose its way.”499 In order for an occupation administration to be 
successful, Watanabe believed that politically astute officers (of the sort he fancied himself) 
should run it as a flexible and arbitrary military autocracy. 
 Akashi Yōji identified another insight that Watanabe gained at the Total War Research 
Institute. As he studied Japan’s national strength compared to that of the British and the 
Americans he began to fear that a war with these powers would be unwinnable.500 He came to 
believe that the only hope for the Japanese minzoku was to undergo a spiritual purification 
(misogi Ǉ) that would expunge the Western materialism with which they had been infected.501 
By the summer of 1941, Watanabe believed that the Japanese economy and daily lives of the 
people should be put on a war footing, and that the nation ought to undergo reforms (kakushin ɨ
Ľ) that would dispense with useless officials, while veterans associations and other 
organizations devoted to “moral suasion” (kyōka soshiki ĸǣǯ) would guide the people in 
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conditioning themselves to serve the nation.502 Watanabe came to believe that radical reform and 
spiritual purification would be salvation of not only the Japanese, but all people in the Greater 
East Asia Prosperity Sphere who were living in “a depraved way of life tainted by liberalism, 
materialism, and epicureanism.”503 This was all the more true for Southeast Asians, whose 
submission to Western colonial rule Watanabe considered a moral outrage. He was bent on 
forcing them to “repent” and learn to “endure hardship as citizens of greater Asia.”504 
Watanabe’s beliefs about the degraded state of Asian societies and their need to return to 
their “traditional spirit” (dentō seishin WǦǜǅ), combined with his belief in autocratic military 
rule to shape his draconian approach to governing Shōnan as well as policies such as the ban on 
enemy languages. During his time in China, he had also developed an openly racist attitude 
toward the Chinese people. In his lecture to the Army War College he declared that the Chinese 
had “grown accustomed to rule by foreign races,” and its people were duplicitous, spoiled, and 
unmanageable. Occupiers, he concluded, should follow precedents from ancient times in China 
and give no administrative responsibilities to the Chinese people.505 While central authorities in 
Tokyo hoped that their armies would work with the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia to 
rebuild the economic infrastructure of East Asia, Watanabe scoffed at these conciliatory policies, 
claiming in his memoirs that if the Japanese tried to “make use of the Chinese,” the Chinese 
                                               
502 Akashi, “Watanabe Gunsei,” 27. Here I use Sheldon Garon’s translation of the knotty Japanese term “kyōka” 
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would be able to make use of them.506 While Watanabe himself did everything he could to use 
the overseas Chinese in Malaya, he made them cooperate with the administration the only way 
he believed possible—through force and the threat of violence. Although Watanabe had 
ultimately to work within the framework of the occupation policy set in Tokyo, which restricted 
his pursuit of the radical reform he held dear, his uncompromising and bigoted attitude toward 
the population of Malaya in general and local Chinese in particular soon made itself felt in local 
policy. 
 
Champion of the Civil Service: Ōdachi Shigeo in Japan and Occupied China 
 Ōdachi Shigeo, born in 1892, was only four years older than Watanabe. But while 
Watanabe took almost a decade to work through the Army Academy and War College, Ōdachi 
established himself as one of the most active junior bureaucrats in the Home Ministry. Ōdachi 
was raised in Shimane, on the Sea of Japan, the second son of a sake brewer. He excelled at 
school and successfully tested into the First Higher School in Tokyo in 1909. From there he 
continued to Tokyo Imperial University where he graduated in 1916 from the School of Law—
the apex of the imperial education system. He graduated fifth in his class and was recruited into 
the Home Ministry, despite having received a low score on the civil service exam the year 
before.507 
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 The Home Ministry was the most powerful civilian agency of the Japanese imperial state. 
Ōkubo Toshimichi (ÃC`|ɀ) founded the ministry in 1873 to deal with internal threats to the 
new Meiji government, and it had since grown to assume responsibility over local government, 
elections, the national police system, public hygiene, religious shrines, labor relations, welfare, 
and many aspects of domestic life. The staff of the Home Ministry had worked their way to the 
peak of the education system, passed the grueling civil service exam, and, under the Meiji 
constitution, served directly at the pleasure of the emperor.508 Like Ōdachi, many in the Home 
Ministry had been recruited directly from Tokyo Imperial University’s School of Law.509 Some 
outside the ministry thought its officials suffered from an acute superiority complex, with their 
obsession over the details of the administrative law they had studied in school and their disdain 
for the opinions of those outside the civil service. Some reform-minded young School of Law 
graduates eschewed the aloof and old-fashioned Home Ministry for less prestigious agencies 
where they felt they could enact more change.510 But for the academically successful young men 
who had no objections to the social system of which they were the top, the Home Ministry 
remained a ticket to the highest levels of power in imperial Japan. 
 Ōdachi’s first posting in 1916 was to the government of Miyagi prefecture, in northeast 
Japan, where he was charged with promoting local industry. Many of his colleagues in the 
prefectural government had not attended university and remembered Ōdachi as distant.511 After a 
stint in the police department in Sendai, Ōdachi married and returned to Tokyo. He was next 
dispatched to Kyūshū, where he worked in the Ōita prefectural government. While there he 
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became embroiled in a conflict between different factions of the local government, at one time 
siding against his superior with another bureaucrat he felt was in the right. Ikeda Hiroshi (Żƫ
Ò), a powerful figure in the ministry sent to investigate the conflict, eventually found that both 
sides shared in the blame—a common tactic for conflict resolution in the bureaucracy—but he 
admired Ōdachi commitment to “cleaning up” the prefectural government and began speaking 
about him at the cafeteria for senior civil servants (kōtōkan ɯǔÕ) at the Home Ministry 
headquarters in Tokyo.512 This was a critical moment for Ōdachi. From outside, military figures 
like Watanabe Wataru were frustrated by what they saw as the uncritical devotion to the 
bureaucratic process of Japanese civil servants. In fact, the civil service exercised power through 
the bureaucratic process, speeding it up or slowing it down to suit its purposes. Watanabe could 
not know that it was in social spaces like the Home Ministry cafeteria that the ministry leaders 
would speak openly, think creatively, and come up with policy decisions that they would then 
run through the formal bureaucratic process.513 Telling his colleagues over lunch about a capable 
young bureaucrat named Ōdachi posted in the prefectures, Ikeda was paving the way for his 
return to Tokyo and advancement within the ministry. Ōdachi spent another two years in Niigata 
prefecture until 1921, when he was invited back to the capital to work for the ministry’s Hygiene 
Bureau (Eiseikyoku Ȗƪé). 
 After five years of “touring the countryside” (inaka mawari ƫȃć), Ōdachi came 
into his own in Tokyo.514 By 1926 he was running both the Medical Section of the Hygiene 
Bureau (Eiseikyoku imuka Ȗƪéȥ) and the Administrative Section of the Provincial 
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Bureau (Chihōkyoku gyōseika ¶ľéȔĶȥ).515 Two years earlier he had been brought on to 
the Legislative Inspection Committee (Hōrei shinsa iinkai ƀRášÊ£V), a select group that 
secretly vetted draft laws and ordinances before they were circulated in the cabinet’s Legislation 
Bureau (Hōseikyoku ƀ}é). Ōdachi was one of the most forceful personalities on the 
committee, along with Karasawa Toshiki (¤Ž_ů) and Tsuchiya Shōzō (³êŵ=). In the 
bureaucratic tussles of the 1920s, which often played out in Japan’s administrative courts, 
Ōdachi’s biographer refers to these three men as the “champions of the Home Ministry.”516 In 
1932, when Ōdachi was appointed governor of Fukui prefecture, he was one of the most 
prominent junior civil servants in the most elite agency within the Japanese state. 
 Ōdachi assumed governorship of Fukui at a critical moment in Japanese history. The 
Great Depression had compounded the economic malaise of the 1920s, which had hit rural 
prefectures like Fukui particularly hard. The Guandong Army had provoked the Manchurian 
Incident half a year earlier, and six weeks before Ōdachi’s appointment in March 1932 bloody 
fighting broke out between Japanese and Chinese troops in Shanghai. Two months later, Prime 
Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi (ƛɫŸ) was assassinated by a group of young naval officers. His 
death marked the end of party cabinets in prewar Japan; he was succeeded by retired Admiral 
Saitō Makoto (Ļȑ×), who called for national unity and an end to political factionalism. 
Ōdachi set out to remove the influence of political parties and factions (seitō seiha ĶsĶƅ), 
for which he had already developed a distaste in Ōita, from the Fukui government as well. For 
instance, he gave control over transfers in the police department to young bureau chiefs—civil 
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servants like him—over the objections of politically entrenched precinct heads and their allies in 
the prefectural assembly.517 It was an early indication of Ōdachi’s commitment to the primacy of 
the elite civil service, and his hostility to anyone who might threaten it. 
 Ōdachi cared deeply about alleviating the economic crisis in Fukui. He searched for new 
domestic markets for Fukui’s agricultural products, used his contacts at Home Ministry 
headquarters to secure funding for development projects in the prefecture, and tried to improve 
the standards of agricultural education in local schools.518 But his hostility toward outside 
interference in the prerogatives of the civil service soon precipitated a political crisis that would 
help define Ōdachi’s career. The crisis had mundane origins: in the summer of 1933, the Fukui 
Middle School had burned down and, to reduce the economic burdens on the prefecture, Ōdachi 
and his staff chose not to rebuild the school and instead move it into the building of the Fukui 
Normal School, reducing the size of the Normal School and relocating it to another part of the 
prefecture.519 His team drafted this plan without consulting local leaders or politicians and 
missed or ignored the fact that the historic Normal School, which had been renovated through 
public donations only one year earlier, was a source of great pride to the people of Fukui city. 
They soon mounted a protest campaign against Ōdachi’s plan, enlisting the support of members 
of the Diet and central bureaucracy from Fukui.520 Ōdachi signaled that he was willing to find a 
compromise solution, but only if it presented no economic burden (which, to Ōdachi, included 
public donations) to the people of Fukui.521 In the end the Home Ministry headquarters 
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intervened to force a settlement between Ōdachi and his opponents: the normal school would 
stay where it was and a new middle school would be built, but within a reasonable budget.522 
Ōdachi acquiesced to the plan but, to the surprise of his superiors at the ministry and the people 
of Fukui, resigned on April 6, 1934, immediately after its implementation. A report on Ōdachi’s 
career in the late 1930s celebrated his resignation as a sign of moral backbone.523 This 
conclusion is only possible if one views Ōdachi’s opponents as he did, as selfish political or 
parochial actors who either could not or would not recognize that career civil servants knew what 
was best for the people of the prefecture. At the age of 42, Ōdachi entered early retirement as a 
hero of the technocratic elite and an enemy of those who would challenge its right to rule. 
 Ōdachi’s dramatic departure from Fukui caught the attention of Endō Ryūsaku (ɇȑŠ
[), a former governor on the lookout for talented young bureaucrats to help build Japan’s new 
puppet-state, Manchukuo.524 Through the mediation of fellow Shimane native and Vice Minister 
of Home Affairs, Ushio Shigenosuke (ƏĞDȹ), Ōdachi accepted a job as head of the 
Manchukuo Legislative Bureau (Hōseikyoku ƀ}é) on May 2, 1934, less than a month after 
leaving Fukui. Within two weeks he was appointed vice chief of the General Affairs Agency 
(Sōmuchō ǩý), whose Japanese head acted as the shadow prime minister of Manchukuo.525 
Arriving in the summer, Ōdachi was charmed by the open landscape around the Manchukuo 
capital of Shinkyō (ĽL, present-day Changchun). He was less charmed by the inconveniences 
of working for a puppet-state where administrative documents had to be translated into Chinese 
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and many of his staff were not Japanese and, as Japanese civil servants who worked with Ōdachi 
claimed, had a “different conception of time,” which impeded the work of the bureaucracy.526 
Ōdachi was committed to improving the efficiency of the Manchukuo administration, and this 
required the cooperation of his non-Japanese staff. And so, according to the glowing account of 
his biographer, Takamiya Taihei, Ōdachi worked to overcome the cultural divisions in his office 
by listening closely to his subordinates and issuing explicit instructions that could not be 
mistranslated. This earned him the respect of his subordinates regardless of race, at least in the 
eyes of the Japanese staffers whom Takamiya interviewed for Ōdachi’s biography, which was 
produced by a group of his friends as a memorial after his death in the 1950s.527 It is doubtful, 
given the condescension that permeates their accounts and the realities of military occupation, 
that these civil servants were privy to the sentiments of their non-Japanese counterparts. What is 
certain is that even in his first year abroad Ōdachi’s Japanese subordinates were impressed by his 
accommodating if paternalistic approach to an occupied people. 
 It appears that Ōdachi’s office worked smoothly, and his apparent ability to bridge the 
gaps between Japanese and non-Japanese staff impressed the leadership of the Guandong Army, 
which held ultimate authority over the puppet-state. On April 9, 1936, the Guandong Army 
command asked Ōdachi to lead the General Affairs Agency, making him the de facto chief 
executive of the Manchukuo state, behind the de jure Chinese Prime Minister Zhang Jinghui (ċ
ňĠ). Ōdachi immediately set about bolstering the autonomy of the puppet state. He worked to 
repeal extraterritoriality, reclaim the land leased to the South Manchuria Railway thirty years 
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earlier, bolster Manchukuo’s five-year economic 
plans, welcome groups of settlers from Japan, and 
implement a system of regional government 
beholden to the puppet-state in the capital of 
Shinkyō.528 He impressed on the army the 
importance of Manchukuo’s “independence,” a 
diplomatic sleight of hand used to justify Japan’s 
seizure of the Chinese region but also, in Ōdachi’s 
usage, the legal basis for the authority of Japanese 
civil servants like him who controlled the 
bureaucracy of the puppet state.  
 Not everyone in the Guandong Army 
approved of the growing power of Japanese civil 
servants in the Manchukuo government. Indeed, it was precisely the role that civil servants came 
to play in Manchuria that Watanabe railed against in his lecture to the Army War College in 
1941. By 1936, the China Section officers who had helped orchestrate the Manchurian Incident 
began to work to undercut the power of these civilian bureaucrats. In March that year, Itagaki 
Seishirō was appointed the Chief of Staff of the Guandong Army, and he charged a young officer 
named Tsuji Masanobu (ȽĶa) with devising a plan to undercut the power of the Manchukuo 
government and reassert the army’s direct control through the Concordia Association (Kyōwakai 
¢V).529 The Concordia Association had been created in July 1942, and its branches across 
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Manchuria were meant to help the Guandong Army extend its control deeper into local society 
than the nascent puppet-state allowed, while also gathering intelligence and disseminating 
propaganda on the army’s behalf.530 Beyond its practical utility to the Guandong Army, idealistic 
Japanese soldiers and civilians alike hoped that this organization would operate at all levels of 
Manchurian society to “promote harmony among the five races” and represent the will of the 
people to the state, promoting what Prasenjit Duara calls “fascist corporatism” as an alternative 
to both unrestrained capitalism and communism.531 But the Concordia Association did nothing to 
change existing social power structures. Instead, it recruited the same social elites to represent 
the will of the masses—such as landowners and businessmen—that Japanese administrators 
would approach in Southeast Asia a decade later.532 By 1934, the Concordia Association had 
become more bureaucratized and many of the idealists who had helped found it, such as 
Tachibana Shiraki (ŰŮ) and Yamaguchi Jūji (ìɓŲ), felt that it had lost its “revolutionary 
potential.”533 However, Guandong Army officers like Col. Ishiwara Kanji (ƾȊƖ), one of the 
instigators of the Manchurian incident and an early supporter of the Concordia Association, still 
saw the body as the premier agent of propaganda and mass mobilization in Manchuria, if only 
the Guandong Army would make use of it.534 In the eyes of Itagaki, an admirer of Ishiwara, and 
Tsuji, one of his protégés, the Concordia Association could also revitalize the great Manchurian 
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experiment by helping the military wrest control away from the conservative civil servants who 
had attached themselves like barnacles to the puppet-state. 
During the summer of 1936, Tsuji drafted a plan to transform the Concordia Association 
into the primary decision-making body in Manchukuo, through which military officers would 
enjoy direct access to all levels of Manchurian society.535 Under Tsuji’s plan, the Manchukuo 
administration and its civilian bureaucrats would rubber stamp decisions made by the Concordia 
Association, removing the thin veneer of Manchurian independence that the civil service had 
worked so hard to create. More conservatively minded officers in the Guandong Army, such as 
Vice Chief of Staff Imamura Hitoshi (Oŗ·) and staff officer Mutō Akira (ŶȑǑ), grew wary 
when they heard the broader contours of Tsuji’s plan. But Itagaki ensured that they were 
excluded from the process of drafting it and kept in dark about its details.536 This level of secrecy 
was unusual for the small group of Japanese leaders who oversaw Manchurian policy. Normally 
Imamura, Itagaki, Ōdachi, and a handful of others would discuss policy over weekly dinners at 
one another’s residences.537 Ōdachi was shocked and infuriated when someone leaked a copy of 
Tsuji’s plan to him: he rightly saw it as the threat to the Manchukuo government’s authority.538 
In response he lobbed a bombshell into the center of the Guandong Army command by 
resigning. 
 Ōdachi’s resignation was as much a surprise to the leadership of the Guandong Army as 
had been the case in the Home Ministry when he resigned from the governorship of Fukui two 
years earlier. The army enjoyed a great deal of independence in Manchuria, but the resignation 
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of the de facto prime minister was bound to bring unwanted attention from Tokyo. Itagaki tried 
to badger Ōdachi into staying, even threatening that the army could not “guarantee his safety” if 
he resigned.539 Ōdachi refused to budge. Others in the Guandong Army leadership, who were 
less sympathetic to radicals like Itagaki and Tsuji and had been left in the dark about Tsuji’s 
plan, made only perfunctory efforts to prevent Ōdachi’s resignation. This was true for Mutō and 
Imamura, and also for the head of the Guandong Army Kempeitai: Tōjō Hideki (ŚŘȈű).540 , 
Ōdachi and the future Prime Minister became close friends only a few months earlier, on 
February 26, 1936, when another group of army radicals had occupied parts of central Tokyo in 
an attempt to overthrow the Japanese government and enact a “Shōwa Restoration.” After three 
days the revolt was crushed, but during that time Tōjō, as the head of the military police in 
Manchuria, needed to decide on his own response to the coup. He was reportedly relieved when, 
in a private meeting with Ōdachi, the bureaucrat suggested that he ruthlessly suppress coup 
sympathizers in Manchuria.541 Tōjō did, and from this point on the two men were allies in 
maintaining ‘proper order’ at home and abroad. 
 Tōjō, Imamura, Mutō, and others who shared their views admired Ōdachi and had little 
interest in helping men like Itagaki and Tsuji revolutionize affairs in Manchuria. With their 
support, or at least their feigned indifference, Ōdachi left Manchuria on December 16, 1936. 
Together with his resignation, Ōdachi submitted a letter to the Guandong Army commander, 
Ueda Kenkichi (ŧƫȨ), forcefully arguing for the independence of the Manchukuo state, 
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claiming that this best represented the imperial will of Emperor Hirohito.542 In his recollections 
of the incident, Ōtsubo Yasuo (Ãº`ɤ), a fellow Home Ministry bureaucrat working for the 
General Affairs Agency, hinted at a deeper problem that the Tsuji’s plan represented to Japanese 
civil servants in Manchuria. The preeminence of the Concordia Association would cut off the 
direct connection between them and the imperial will—it would “darken the heavenly sun” 
(tenjitsu o kuraku saseru Äłŉ	).543 Ōtsubo framed this policy not only as a threat 
to the role of civil servants in Manchuria, but also to their very identity as servants of the 
Emperor. Tsuji saw the conflict in a similar light. For him it was part of a larger battle over who 
would control Manchuria, the idealistic young soldiers who had fought and died for it or venal 
civil servants who had no real investment in its future. Looking at the Manchukuo government, 
he saw Manchurian ministers who acted as “robots,” while civilian Japanese vice-ministers held 
administrative authority.544 Tsuji’s didactic tone aside, his was a fair assessment of the 
Manchukuo administration. By fighting for the independence of the puppet-state, Ōdachi was 
fighting for the Japanese bureaucrats who controlled it. From the perspective of his allies in 
Manchuria his gambit worked. Even though Ōdachi was forced to resign and his replacement as 
chief of the General Affairs Agency, Hoshino Naoki (ńɔƹů), was much more 
accommodating to the Guandong Army, Tōjō replaced Itagaki as Chief of Staff in March 1937 
and quietly shelved the more radical aspects of Tsuji’s plan for the Concordia Association.545 
The association would become critically important to Japanese efforts at mass mobilization in 
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Manchuria during the Second World War, but as an administrative organ it would complement, 
rather than supplant, the Manchukuo government. 
Ōdachi’s actions in Fukui and Manchuria made him a hero in the civil service. Despite 
his habit of resigning from positions of authority, he blended arguments for bureaucratic 
predominance in imperial governance with appeals to the greater good and the Emperor’s 
benevolent will. After a year in Tokyo, Ōdachi was again asked to serve the empire in China. On 
December 24, 1937, he was invited to join the North China Area Army in Beijing as a legislative 
and administrative advisor (hōsei komon ƀ}ɪ¦).546 His primary task was to advise Wang 
Kemin’s provisional government, which the NCAA had set up on December 14. In contrast to 
the Manchukuo government, however, the NCAA allowed the Wang regime symbolic authority 
only over the occupied territories in northern China. This left Ōdachi no baseline from which he 
could argue for increased civilian control over administration, and as a result he had little formal 
work to do in Beijing. Over the next two years Ōdachi had to resign himself to serving the 
empire in less direct ways. As the China Incident of 1937 metastasized into total war against 
China, he joined in efforts to justify the continued fighting to the Japanese at home. In an 
editorial published in the Osaka Asahi Shinbun on November 22, 1938, Ōdachi argued that 
efforts to construct a new order on the continent would benefit Chinese and Japanese alike.547 
This earned Ōdachi some attention back home, one publication referring to him as a leader of an 
emerging “continental faction” (tairikuha Ãɠƅ) of civil servants, working out the art of 
governance in the “yellow soil of northern China.”548 
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 Ōdachi also found time to ingratiate himself with the most powerful military officers in 
northern China. He grew closer to Imamura Hitoshi, who was by 1938 the commanding officer 
of the 5th Division in Qingdao.549 Mutō Akira, who was promoted to Vice Chief of Staff for the 
NCAA that same year, remembered Ōdachi fondly and introduced him to both Chief of Staff 
Yamashita and the commander of the NCAA, Terauchi Hisaichi.550 Despite his dramatic 
departure from Manchuria, Ōdachi recognized the importance of having friends at the top of the 
army hierarchy. After he returned to Japan, as Vice Minister of Home Affairs in the Abe and 
Yonai cabinets (September 1939–July 1940), Ōdachi met frequently with Mutō, who was by 
then head of the Army Ministry’s prestigious Military Affairs Bureau, to gauge the opinions of 
the various factions in the military. As Takamiya put it: 
Ōdachi’s belief was that regional administrators must not be controlled by the 
political forces of the time, and that they must faithfully execute their duties as strict 
and impartial shepherds of the people (bokuminkan ƗŹÕ). Moreover, Ōdachi 
personally never forgot to strictly monitor the attitudes of the military.551 
 
Ōdachi was committed to insulating the civil service from outside influences. But with the 
increasing dominance of the military over Japanese political life in the years before the war 
Ōdachi felt that he could not defend the prerogatives of the civil service without taking 
advantage of his connections in the army. 
 Ōdachi’s career had turned him into an effective bureaucratic fighter with a wary respect 
for the power of the army, but it also gave him a clear idea of the role of the civil servant in 
society. In Fukui, he and his allies had seen themselves as champions of popular welfare, even 
when the people themselves did not, in Ōdachi’s eyes, understand their own interests. He 
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brought this same paternalism with him to China. Although he occasionally let his personal 
prejudices toward the Chinese slip, he encouraged Japanese civil servants to work closely with 
their local counterparts.552 As Takamiya wrote about Ōdachi’s work in Manchuria: “… Ōdachi 
was not the type to force Japanese practices (Nihon/Nipponryū łŒƆ) on a Manchurian 
office.”553 He held similar attitudes about the broader public in areas occupied by the Japanese. 
But his conciliatory approach was not an end in and of itself. In 1942, when Ōdachi was already 
mayor of Shōnan, he took aside his Shōnan police chief Ogata Shin’ichi and explained to him his 
conception of “public order” (chian ſÑ) in areas occupied by the Japanese army: 
The maintenance of public order must be at the center of every measure of the 
occupation administration. Shōnan is the nerve center of the Southern Regions, so 
if by any chance a revolt were to break out here it would have a major impact on 
the entire war situation. To begin with, when we talk about public order, sometimes 
there is a tendency to focus on immediate goals like the suppression of homicides, 
robberies, and Communist and anti-Japanese movements, but the most important 
thing to pay attention to is public order in a wider sense, like the currents of public 
sentiment and the stability of people’s livelihoods. If people’s lives are stable and 
they trust us, then even if the Communists and anti-Japanese elements are active to 
a small degree, public order will be fine. In contrast, if public sentiment goes against 
us then even if we try to suppress the people with force of arms it will not work. 
Human patience has a limit and if that patience breaks then it is only natural that 
people would rise up. 
 
Despite the fact that it is vital that we ensure people’s livelihoods and gain their 
trust, the army is continuing with its stupid policy of trying to ban the use of English 
and lecturing everyone about the “Holy War”, which can only create a backlash 
among the people. Yet they are calling this policy Winning over the People. … The 
point is that we must respect the standpoint of the people and be ready to protect 
their livelihoods. The army should also do its utmost to replenish food and other 
daily necessities… and work hard to make sure that the people’s bellies are full. 
[emphasis in original]554 
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Ōdachi’s approach to Japan’s expanding wartime empire, in the end, closely mirrored that of the 
1941 guidelines of the Obata Report, to secure its strategic goals, the empire needed skilled 
administrators who, by securing the welfare of occupied peoples, could persuade them to support 
Japan’s New Order. By the time they arrived in Malaya, the approaches to occupation of both 
Watanabe and Ōdachi were focused on the everyday lives of Japan’s new subjects. But while 
Watanabe believed that Japan would only be victorious in the war by revolutionizing patterns of 
life and thought in Japan and Southeast Asia, Ōdachi believed victory could be achieved only by 
preserving them. 
 
Brands of Authoritarianism: Two Models of Leadership in Shōnan 
 Watanabe was assigned to the 25th Army staff on November 6, 1941. Manaki Takanobu, 
the 25th Army’s Vice Chief of Staff, was slated to be the head of the military administration of 
Malaya with Watanabe as his assistant. Watanabe, however, felt that Manaki “lacked the ability” 
to deal with administrative issues, and he aggressively argued that Manaki should concentrate on 
operational issues while he, Watanabe, organized the Gunseibu hierarchically under his 
direction.555 Manaki might have objected had Watanabe not enjoyed the full confidence of 
Yamashita, the 25th Army’s commander. Yamashita’s backing allowed Watanabe a free hand to 
lay the groundwork for the occupation with the help of his hand-picked civilian aide, Takase 
Tōru (ɯƑĕ). Watanabe had been introduced to Takase before the outbreak of the war by Tsuji 
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Masanobu, his close friend and now fellow member of the 25th Army’s staff.556 Like Watanabe, 
Takase had made his career in the Japanese military intelligence network in China. He was one 
of many civilians, often referred to as “continental adventurers” (tairiku rōnin ÃɠƇM), who 
helped facilitate Japanese espionage efforts on the continent. Takase had worked for the Hankou 
Special Affairs Agency in 1938 and later infiltrated British Malaya to “research the overseas 
Chinese problem.”557 Takase was the first member of Watanabe’s “brain trust,” a small clique of 
military and civilian advisors, most of whom had worked under Watanabe in China, who would 
monopolize the decision-making process in the first months of the occupation of Malaya.558 
In December 1941, Watanabe and the rest of the 25th Army headquarters followed the 
swift advance of their soldiers down the Malay peninsula. By the end of the month the Japanese 
had swept the British out of the northern Malay state of Perak and captured the city of Ipoh, a 
center of the Malayan tin-mining industry. On December 28, as Japanese troops moved on 
toward Kuala Lumpur, Watanabe and Takase met in the nearby town of Taiping (where Fujiwara 
Iwaichi was assembling the F Kikan’s Malay and Indian allies) to start laying the organizational 
groundwork for the Gunseibu. In a marathon two-week drafting session, they drew up the 
institutional framework for the occupation of Malaya, including the “Principles for Implementing 
the 25th Army Military Administration.”559 The plans addressed not only the structure of the 
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administration but also the training of personnel, the management of Malaya’s financing, the 
rehabilitation of local industries, and policy toward the overseas Chinese.560 This planning feat, 
Akashi Yōji has argued, is reason enough to consider Watanabe “the architect of the Malayan 
military administration.” It is also a prime example of how the former member of the China 
Section of the General Staff worked best—on the ground and with total control over the details 
of administration. 
In mid-January both Watanabe and Takase travelled to Tokyo to obtain formal approval 
for the guidelines they drafted. It was at this point that Watanabe made his request for the 
emergency dispatch of five hundred new staffers to help him govern Malaya and Sumatra. When 
the army leadership only granted him a tenth of that number, Watanabe sought out former 
associates from the intelligence world to bolster his team.561 After the British surrender, 
Watanabe and his subordinates began to set up their administrative headquarters in Shōnan. By 
late February he able to host the first meeting of Gunseibu branch heads from across the Malay 
Peninsula. Manaki was transferred out of Malaya to become Chief of Staff for the Borneo 
Defense Army in early April, and Watanabe, while only a colonel, took his place as the 25th 
Army’s Vice Chief of Staff and formal head of the Gunseibu. Soon Watanabe’s face could be 
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Sumatra while its Gunseisōkanbu took direct responsibility for Malaya. Ishii, 450–452. 
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seen glowering from the pages of the Syonan Times (See 
Figure 5), admonishing local residents to do their part as 
“citizens of Dai Nippon.”562 In April, with Yamashita’s 
backing and a cadre of loyal lieutenants in the Gunseibu, 
Watanabe was at the height of his power. 
Watanabe hoped to keep the military administration of 
Malaya, and soon Sumatra, under his tight, personal control. 
As Akashi has argued, his administrative philosophy was based 
on arbitrary military rule (budan gunsei ŶļȷĶ), which to 
him often translated as personal rule without regard for the 
opinions of either his superiors or inferiors within the army.563 As a veteran of the China Section, 
Watanabe came out of a particularly conspiratorial and self-righteous tradition in the Japanese 
army, and in Shōnan he was unwilling to brook challenges to his expertise and authority. While 
he admired Yamashita, his patron in the 25th Army, Watanabe’s diaries evince the same 
contempt for honors graduates of the Army War College as other members of the China Section. 
Watanabe’s dim view of Manaki is a consistent theme of his private writings, but in a diary entry 
dated from May 9, 1941, he also disparaged 25th Army Chief of Staff Suzuki Sōsaku (ɖőÔ[) 
as a member of the “military sword group” (guntōgumi ȷyǣ), after the honorary sword 
received from the emperor as an honors graduate, with little experience of the real world.564 He 
worked to keep other members of the 25th Army headquarters out of the affairs of the Gunseibu, 
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dismissing their ideas for the military administration as “desktop theories” (kijōron Ŕ>Ȧ) with 
little practical application.565 He also tried to undermine the authority of Suzuki and Manaki in 
the administration through his appointments of the governors of the different states of Malaya 
and Sumatra. While he was unable to defy orders from Tokyo to appoint civilians to these 
positions, he insisted on nominating retired generals to these posts, almost all of whom were 
senior (senpai pȺ) to Suzuki and Manaki.566 In the end, only three of these retired generals 
became governors in Malaya, while half of the governors came from the Home Ministry.567 But 
Watanabe’s prediction that Suzuki and Manaki would be uncomfortable ordering their seniors 
around came true, and his superiors were further separated from the daily operations of the 
Gunseibu.568 
While Watanabe was privately dismissive of many of his superiors and worked to keep 
them from meddling in the Gunseibu’s affairs, he was openly contemptuous towards 
subordinates in the administration who were not members of his “brain trust.” The fact that many 
were civil servants made them a liability in Watanabe’s eyes. He had been convinced that overly 
legalistic civil servants had been the downfall of the Japanese administration in China and his 
estimation of them fell even further during his time in the Total War Institute. Watanabe 
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described Japanese civil bureaucrats as “privileging law over all else (hōchi bannō), inflexible, 
uncreative, narrow-minded, phlegmatic, averse to responsibility, cliquey, territorial, self-
interested, and disingenuous.”569 He would do everything he could to prevent them from limiting 
his freedom of action in Shōnan. Watanabe’s aide Takase, meanwhile, developed an openly 
antagonistic relationship with the civilian administrators in the Gunseibu and particularly with 
the staff of the Shōnan Special Municipality.570 Takase’s abrasive and abusive behavior toward 
the administration’s civil servants mirrored his treatment of the overseas Chinese in the time of 
Watanabe’s forced donation. The elite bureaucrats found his behavior especially galling because 
he had no formal rank in either the military or the civil service. He was merely a civilian who did 
not come close to their status as formal servants of the Japanese emperor, an uppity “continental 
adventurer” with a past in China that they could only guess at. 
Watanabe and his brain trust were the driving force behind the occupation policies of the 
Gunseibu in its first months. Takase and Wee spearheaded the OCA’s $50 million donation 
drive, and Watanabe personally oversaw the drafting of policies related to the Malay community 
and their sultans, education, financing for the Gunseibu, rubber estates, and increasing food 
production.571 Watanabe even took the opportunity to subvert the conservative occupation 
guidelines he had been given, although these were more limited than his outsize personality 
might have made them seem. With the ban on enemy languages, Watanabe had tried to hasten 
the adoption of Japanese language and culture in Southeast Asia. But he failed. His successes 
came in other educational initiatives, particularly the Shōnan Kōa Kunrenjo (ȂJȡǭĪ), 
which the Syonan Times referred to as a “Government Training Centre.”572 Despite its innocuous 
                                               
569 Akashi, “Watanabe gunsei,” 52. 
570 Akashi, “Watanabe gunsei,” 52. 
571 Akashi, “Watanabe gunsei,” 45–51, 55–68. 
572 “Gunsei-bu Scheme for Malayan Young Men,” Syonan Times, May 22, 2602. 
 197 
name, the training institute, which opened in May 1942, offered an intensive course in Japanese 
language and culture, including military discipline, to a selective group of local youths working 
in the military administration.573 Watanabe was convinced that these young leaders were the key 
to the future of Malaya, if only they could internalize the martial spirit that many of his own 
countrymen had lost.574 The internal documents of the adminstration, undoubtedly under 
Watanabe’s influence, referred to the graduates of the Kōa Kunrenjo as “administrative warriors” 
(gyōsei senshi ȔĶĨÀ) who would be the nucleus of the future Malayan bureaucracy.575 
Watanabe’s interest in training the youth of Malaya extended beyond the Kōa Kunrenjo. Ibrahim 
Yaacob’s Malay Youth Federation, which the Malay nationalist leader had founded after 
Watanabe dissolved his Kesatuan Melayu Muda in June 1942, impressed the colonel and was the 
basis for his appointment of Ibrahim as his personal adviser on Malay affairs a few months 
later.576 Watanabe may have held uncompromising positions toward Japanese and Southeast 
Asians alike, but he seems to have firmly believed in they were equally capable of undergoing 
spiritual renovation and bulding a new, better East Asia. 
Akashi Yōji has argued that Watanabe’s role in drafting the 25th Army’s occupation 
guidelines and this flurry of activity early in the occupation earned Watanabe the status of 
“architect of the Malayan military occupation.”577 Postwar Japanese historians, looking back on 
the occupation of Malaya, focused on Watanabe’s tenure to contrast the Japanese administration 
on the peninsula to the supposedly lenient administration in Java.578 His draconian policies and 
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the forced donation of the Oversea Chinese Association helped to cement the negative 
impression of the new Japanese administration that the Sook Ching massacre, which Watanabe 
was not involved in, had made on local residents and particularly on the Chinese. The resentment 
engendered by the massacre and Watanabe’s policies plagued the administration through the 
remainder of the occupation. The Kōa Kunrenjo, while it was only able to train a few hundred 
Malayan officials in the art of Japanese administration before the surrender, counted some of 
most important political and economic leaders of postwar Malaysia among its alumni.579 Yet in 
the summer of 1942 Watanabe’s star had already begun to wane.  
The most profound blow to Watanabe’s influence was Yamashita’s departure from 
Malaya in early July.580 Later that month, as a result of the discussions that the Southern 
Expeditionary Army and decisionmakers in Tokyo began after Allied resistance in Southeast 
Asia had been crushed in May, the different Gunseibu (Military Administration Departments ȷ
Ķɏ) in the region were reformed into regional Gunseikanbu (Military Administration 
Directorates ȷĶƶɏ) that answered directly to the Southern Expeditionary Army’s 
Gunseisōkanbu (Military Administration General Directorate ȷĶǩƶɏ), which was set up in 
Shōnan in July 1942. Ishii Akiho, now a major figure within the Gunseisōkanbu, described this 
as an effort to streamline and unify Japanese occupation policy in the region. As a result 
Watanabe’s hardline policies in Malaya came under new scrutiny from his superiors.581 Also at 
issue was the fact that Watanabe was still only a colonel, and so when the 25th Army 
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Gunseikanbu was established in July its new head, or Gunseikan, was Maj. Gen. Nishiōeda 
Yutaka. Watanabe resumed the position he had held before Manaki’s departure as head of the 
General Affairs Department. Watanabe was furious at what he considered a “demotion,” and he 
began to feel the military administration slipping away from him.582 According to Akashi, 
Watanabe at this point began to perceive a growing and even more pervasive threat to himself 
and the occupation in the Japanese civil servants who were arriving by the thousands to help the 
army administer the Southeast Asia.583 
While Watanabe only began taking the power of these bureaucrats seriously after he lost 
his patron Yamashita, the civilian administrators had begun to chafe at Watanabe’s autocratic 
leadership early in the occupation. Chief among them was Ōdachi. Ironically, it was Watanabe 
who had first approached Ōdachi, through Asahi Shinbun editor and fellow Okayama native 
Midoro Masaichi (ǲ³ȵŃ;), to gauge his interest in serving in occupied Southeast Asia.584 
This was a few days before Ōdachi was scheduled to visit his old friend in the Army Ministry, 
Mutō Akira, who had also hoped to recruit the retired civil servant for work in the Southeast 
Asia. Ōdachi’s biographer Takamiya speculated that Watanabe intended Ōdachi take on a 
toothless advisory role like the one he had held in Beijing a few years earlier.585 It appears, 
however, that Mutō, along with Tōjō and Terauchi in the Southern Area Army command were 
prepared to grant Ōdachi a far more significant role in the strategic center of the region as mayor 
of Shōnan. Ōdachi, for his part, made clear that he would not accept anything less. He allegedly 
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told Midoro that “in these circumstances, I won’t be going to have a good time. I’ll consider it if 
I’m allowed to do my job without interference from the military, but if I’m treated as some wall 
ornament there’s going to be trouble.”586 While Ōdachi’s words may have been embellished in 
the retelling, his responsibilities as mayor of Shōnan were the basis on which he carved out an 
autonomous space for his staff in City Hall. 
Even at the height of Watanabe’s autocratic power in the military administration, Ōdachi 
found ways to improve the standing of the civil service in Shōnan. This began with his 
inauguration ceremony on March 12, 1942. Rather than simply beginning his work when he 
arrived in the city, Ōdachi organized an inauguration ceremony attended by a large crowd 
“representatives of practically every Asiatic country” and made sure that it received extensive 
coverage in the press.587 While it could not compare to the elaborate and ostentatious ceremonies 
that the British officials organized for themselves before the war, Ōdachi was able to arrive in a 
closed car, flanked by Japanese officials, and progressed in front of the crowd before walking up 
the steps to City Hall in what the Syonan Times described as the “first public function” in the 
city.588 From this point on, Ōdachi opened himself to reporters from the Syonan Jitpoh and 
Syonan Times and worked to find ways to present his administration as approachable to the 
public. One significant step he took toward making the municipality accessible was to allow 
employees of the Shōnan Special Municipality to wear civilian clothes at work. In Malaya, as in 
other parts of Asia occupied by the Japanese army, civilian administrators were required to wear 
uniforms (rikugun gunzoku jūgun fuku ɠȷȷëđȷŎ) that denoted their ranks within the civil 
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service.589 This sartorial technology enabled Japanese soldiers to identify civilians within their 
ranks while still presenting the appearance of the military administration as a unified body to the 
people it ruled. Ōdachi scoffed at these regulations. He felt that the civilian uniforms were too 
heavy for the tropical heat of Shōnan and encouraged his staff to wear loose, white clothing. 
While the army complained about the “slovenly” look of the municipal bureaucrats, this practice 
had the benefit of making local employees and residents with business at City Hall feel more at 
ease around Ōdachi and his staff.590 As time went on, Ōdachi encouraged his subordinates to 
stop shaving their heads like Japanese soldiers and allowed them to wear shorts and short-
sleeved shirts except when formal occasions demanded otherwise.591 And in stark contrast to the 
severe countenance that Watanabe adopted in the Shōnan press, Ōdachi often appeared in their 
pages with a gentle expression or an open smile (See Figure 6). There were limits to what Ōdachi 
could do—outside City Hall his employees still had to wear their formal uniforms—but his 
defiance of military discipline encouraged a sense of pride and 
independence among his subordinates and his friendly public 
persona stood in stark contrast to Watanabe’s. 
Ōdachi adopted a more decentralized approach to 
decision-making in City Hall than Watanabe did in the Fullerton 
Building. Watanabe took a personal role in policymaking within 
the military administration, and often went on inspection tours 
of Malaya and Sumatra to familiarize himself with conditions in 
the region. He limited decision-making to his “brain trust” and 
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often simply ignored criticism from both his superiors and subordinates. Ōdachi found ways to 
work around policy directives from his superiors (particularly Watanabe) who he didn’t agree 
with, but the mayor also cultivated close working relationships with his subordinates and gave 
them a great deal of leeway in making policy in their areas of expertise. Few of the staff of the 
Shōnan Special Municipality had worked outside Japan before and they were awed by Ōdachi’s 
years of experience in China, but they also appreciated the freedom he allowed them to pursue 
new ideas for governing Shōnan.592 Policy discussions that included the mayor tended to happen 
in the same informal social space that they had in the Home Ministry in Tokyo—in the Shōnan 
municipal cafeteria. Former employees of the municipality remembered that Ōdachi ate lunch 
with them as often as possible and helped to foster a sense of camaraderie that was critical to the 
formation of the distinctive bureaucratic culture of City Hall. They remember that municipal 
employees, no matter their status, could participate in the discussions that took place at the 
cafeteria, where Ōdachi made announcements and the staff of the different municipal 
departments kept him abreast of developments in their work and proposed policy solutions to 
some of the knottier problems that came with governing an occupied city. In their words, 
“lunchtime at the cafeteria deserves special mention as a site where city governance was unified 
and the task of submitting opinions up and down the chain of command was achieved.”593 Both 
inside and outside the cafeteria, Ōdachi would refrain from taking a direct role in the policy-
making process and instead provided his staff with general guidelines to frame their work.594 As 
a result, some of the most important social policies to come out of City Hall were formulated by 
mid-level bureaucrats, in stark contrast to the top-down approach Watanabe took during his time 
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in Shōnan. Ōdachi’s worldliness and history of championing the civil service endeared him to 
municipal bureaucrats, but so did the sense of ownership he gave them over the policies they 
were implementing. 
Ōdachi also took care to assert his status as one of the leading figures in the 
administration. Although he was sidelined by Watanabe when it came to overseas Chinese 
policy—during the OCA’s donation drive Watanabe’s Gunseibu assumed direct responsibility 
over Chinese affairs in Shōnan—he still played a prominent role in the ceremonial life of the 
city. Ōdachi and his municipal employees participated in the public ceremonies surrounding the 
emperor’s birthday at the end of April 1942, and the mayor made public appearances at sporting 
events, poetry competitions, and school graduations.595 His attendance at these events, often 
alongside Watanabe and sometimes Yamashita, helped to reinforce the importance of the 
municipal government and its civilian leader in the daily life of the city. He would use his 
remarks as an opportunity to emphasize the importance of civilian rule and a return to normalcy 
in Shōnan. On June 2, for instance, at the reopening of civilian courts in Shōnan, including the 
former Supreme Court (now named the Shōnan Kōtōhōin Ņɯǔƀɞ) and Civil District 
Court (now the Shōnan Minji Chihōhōin ŅŹG¶ľƀɞ), Ōdachi declared that “it had been 
the desire of both civilians and the Government for some time to reopen the courts. This is a very 
important step because proper order must be established in Syonan-to.”596 While his comments 
might seem subdued, this was a time when Watanabe, who was sitting two seats away from him, 
and other military hardliners were working to maintain arbitrary military rule in Shōnan and the 
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rest of Southeast Asia. The reopening of the courts was a triumph for the rule of law and an 
important check on military authority, and Ōdachi used this public occasion to further his 
argument for the restoration of “proper order” in the administration.597 
 Watanabe hated the penchant of civil servants for the rule of law, which they used to 
claim administrative power for themselves while avoiding personal responsibility and robbing 
the occupation state of its ability to adapt to changing circumstance. A few months into the 
occupation, he became obsessed with the idea that Ōdachi was conspiring to undermine his 
personal authority in the administration.598 He may not have been correct in assuming that a 
return to proper order would lead to the downfall of the administration, but he was right that the 
civil servants would use this cause to bolster their power vis-à-vis the military and that Ōdachi 
and his followers had identified Watanabe and his policies as a threat to the success of the 
occupation. Once the Gunseibu had been reorganized as the Gunseikanbu and Watanabe’s 
superiors began to reign in his hardline initiatives during the summer of 1942, Ōdachi began to 
move aggressively to secure civilian power in Shōnan. 
Ōdachi rekindled his relationship with Terauchi when the field marshal arrived in Shōnan 
in July. He also began cultivating relationships with other powerful figures stationed in Shōnan, 
such as Iwakuro Hideo of the Iwakuro Kikan.599 He removed the last military officer, Kempeitai 
Lt. Mizuma, from the staff of the Shōnan Special Municipality on August 1, and from that point 
on the municipality was entirely civilian-run.600 Mizuma’s replacement, fellow Home Ministry 
bureaucrat Ogata Shin’ichi, was soon promoted to chief of the municipal police and, in 
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September, he began submitting daily English-language police reports to Ōdachi. These reports 
not only provided Ōdachi with some of the best intelligence in the administration about daily life 
in Shōnan and popular opinion toward the Japanese, but they also gave him ammunition for 
bureaucratic battles to come. Ōdachi summarized these reports in Japanese and distributed them, 
not only to his superiors in the Gunseikanbu, but to the Gunseisōkanbu and the chief of staffs and 
commanders of the 25th and Southern Expeditionary Armies, highlighting acts of violence 
against local residents by individual Japanese soldiers, complaints about the behavior of 
Japanese units, and unethical behavior on the part of Japanese civilians in the city.601 With these 
reports and his informal relationship with Terauchi and other senior officers, Ōdachi was able to 
reign in some of the worst abuses of the Japanese military in the city, which he imagined 
promoted a greater sense of ease among local residents, while also claiming greater authority 
inside the administration. Some members of the army, and particularly young officers whose 
units had been reprimanded for abusing local residents, stormed into local police stations, 
shouting at municipal policemen for supposedly valuing the rights of local residents over the 
success of the war effort.602 Others, often higher up the chain of command, were simply amused 
at the gall of the silver-haired mayor and his staff. Inside City Hall, Ōdachi’s defiance toward 
(select members of) the military amazed his staff, who went so far as to describe him as an “ass 
in a lion’s skin” (tora no i o karu kitsune ȓËdƝ).603 His sense of righteousness rubbed 
off on them, giving them the confidence to oppose the military that was, after all, “supposed to 
protect the eight hundred thousand residents [of Shōnan].”604 This sense of independence and 
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self-righteousness among the municipal employees lasted well after Ōdachi’s departure in 1943, 
and even new staff members who had criticized the municipality from within the military 
administration would adopt its bureaucratic culture after being transferred there. The most 
prominent example of this was Ōdachi’s successor: Naitō Kan’ichi (xȑà;). As a member of 
the Gunseisōkanbu from late 1942, Naitō had criticized Ogata for being overly indulgent toward 
local residents but, when he became mayor in July 1943, he was soon one of Ogata’s strongest 
supporters and, while the time-consuming police reports were discontinued for a time, they were 
quickly resumed and produced until the end of the occupation.605 
 All these factors help to explain how Ōdachi was able to block Watanabe’s ban on enemy 
languages in late 1942. They also made it possible for Ōdachi and the municipal staff to lobby 
for Takase’s dismissal from the administration. Takase had been given control over concessions 
to hotels and restaurants in Shōnan earlier that year and had invited over a hundred men and 
women from the Izunagaoka hot spring town to run entertainment centers for the Japanese army 
as the “Yamato Butai” (Ã¢ɏɢ). The Yamato Butai quickly expanded in the city, opening up 
new hotels and brothels for army officers, non-coms, navy officers, and civilians, but it quickly 
became clear that many of the women working for the group had been led to believe they would 
be working as typists or clerks for the military administration, only to find themselves forced to 
work as “entertainers” for drunken Japanese soldiers.606 Ultimately the Yamato Butai spread too 
rapidly and the profiteers who managed it became too conspicuous a presence in the city, and 
Terauchi ordered them back to Japan and found work for their employees in other Japanese 
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firms.607 But he and the other army leaders in Shōnan began to scrutinize Takase, the 
ostentatious civilian who had brought these people to Southeast Asia in the first place. Ōdachi 
and his followers, who, as members of the elite imperial civil service, had hated answering to 
this upstart commoner, began a campaign to expel him from the administration and, by October, 
they had succeeded.608 
According to Akashi Yōji, who conducted extensive interviews with Watanabe as well as 
reviewing his diaries and memoirs, the former “architect of the Malayan military administration” 
believed that Ōdachi and other civilian leaders had formed a conspiracy to undermine his 
authority.609 Watanabe’s distaste for civilian administrators was well established before he came 
to Shōnan and it is not surprising that he blamed his failures on them. Akashi tends to depict the 
conflict between the two men as between two factions in the military administration that 
contributed to the balkanization of the occupation state into competing interest groups centered 
around certain strong personalities, leading to complete dysfunction within the administration by 
the end of the war.610 Although Akashi admits that Watanabe lost out in this conflict, what his 
analysis leaves out is the scale of Watanabe’s defeat.611 Despite the colonel’s pretensions as an 
expert in administration and politics, when it came to bureaucratic politics, Ōdachi ran circles 
around him. And, despite Watanabe’s dark visions of Ōdachi plotting his demise, it was his own 
management style that ultimately led to his downfall. 
Watanabe was contemptuous toward almost all his subordinates in the administration and 
was unwilling to delegate beyond a tight-knit group of advisors like Takase. His hardline attitude 
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toward the people lay behind the OCA’s forced donation, a cause of derision of his superiors and 
one of the root causes, according to many in the administration, of the communist insurgency in 
Malaya.612 His hostility toward any form of “interference” from his superiors—whom he 
privately described as “closed-minded” and “ignorant of political economics” (Manaki), “ignoble 
in vision and ambition” (Maj. Gen. Nishiōeda Yutaka (șÃŘǺ), head of the Gunseikanbu 
from July 1942), and “lacking any conception of politics” (Lt. Gen. Saitō Yaheita (ĻȑĊúÅ), 
who replaced Yamashita as head of the 25th Army)—left him with few allies even in the army 
hierarchy in Southeast Asia. After Yamashita and Takase left Malaya, Watanabe wilted. He lost 
hope for the direction of the occupation and withdrew into his diaries, where he railed against his 
perceived enemies while slowly losing his grip on the administration. In November, Marquis 
Tokugawa Yoshichika (ēóǴȝ), a civilian advisor to the 25th Army who had convinced 
Watanabe to support a harebrained scheme to force the sultans of Malaya to cede their political 
powers to the emperor, complained in his diary that Watanabe had lost the intense energy that 
had made him such an active administrator in the early months of the occupation.613 Rather than 
regroup, Watanabe began to hope that he would be called back to Japan in December, less than a 
year into the occupation.614 He began openly to criticize both Gunseikan Nishiōeda and 25th 
Army commander Saitō, and by the time he was recalled in March 1943 Watanabe had 
completely isolated himself within the administration.615 
Ōdachi, meanwhile, had built a broad base of support among his staff and maintained 
close, collegial ties with the most powerful men in Shōnan. Unlike Watanabe, Ōdachi was 
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willing to put in the hard work of cultivating allies and tirelessly seeking out ways to reinforce 
the authority of the municipal government in Shōnan both in the public eye and in internal policy 
debates. While the civilian-run municipality had to press the military to take it seriously 
throughout the occupation, Ōdachi’s tenacity served as an inspiration to the municipal staff well 
after his departure. While they could not always stop the Kempeitai from abducting and torturing 
local residents, military units from seizing local property, or Japanese profiteers from defrauding 
local businessmen, Ōdachi’s commitment to securing local livelihoods and mitigating the worst 
abuses of the Japanese animated the work of municipal bureaucrats through to the Japanese 
surrender in 1945. As the front lines of the Japanese administration in Shōnan, it was these 
earnest, self-righteous civil servants that shaped daily life in the occupied city. 
The civilian bureaucrats internalized Ōdachi’s dictum that the occupation depended on 
their ability to ensure the stability of the livelihood of the people of Shōnan. The civil servants in 
the Shōnan Special Municipality were convinced that they had a better relationship with their 
local employees than their counterparts in the Gunseikanbu. They seemed to take comfort in this 
fact, especially after the war ended. The local members of the municipal staff, who made up the 
clear majority of city workers, were more ambivalent in their recollections of their Japanese 
supervisors. Ahmad Khan, who worked in the municipal police, recalled that Ogata and the other 
civilian policemen from the Home Ministry, while not as brutal as the Kempeitai, were quick to 
employ torture to force confessions from suspects with little regard for the facts of a given 
case.616 Herman Marie de Souza, who worked in the Education Section and grew close to both 
Shinozaki Mamoru and Dazai Hirokuni over the course of the occupation, remembered other 
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Japanese administrators as rude and 
domineering. Offered advancement in 
the administration through a course at 
the Kōa Kunrenjo, he refused and was 
demoted to headmaster of the Rangoon 
Road School.617 Alfred Devadasan 
Ponnambalam in the Custodian of 
Enemy Property, who did enter the 
Kōa Kunrenjo, found his Japanese 
supervisors in the city pleasant enough but hardly ever interacted with them. His immediate boss, 
Teow Seng Kung, received his orders from the Japanese and the municipal staff implemented 
them.618 This hierarchical relationship between the Japanese and their local staff characterized 
work in City Hall just as it did in the Fullerton Building across the river. As much as the 
Japanese civil servants praised Ōdachi’s egalitarian approach to managing the city, it is clear 
from their accounts that the sense of equality was limited to Japanese staffers.619 Even in the 
municipal cafeteria, it is clear from photographs that the lunchtime meetings where some of the 
most important policies of municipal administration were decided tended to exclude local 
employees (See Figure 7).  
 In the minds of the civil servants in the municipal administration, there was no 
contradiction between their concern for the livelihood of city residents and the exclusion of these 
same residents from any meaningful role in municipal policymaking. In fact, both these impulses 
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619 Shingapōru Shiseikai, 48. 
Figure 7: A scene from the municipal cafeteria. Ōdachi is in the 
center, serving himself rice. It is clear from their standard issue 
white shirts and uniform jackets that the men seated at this table 
are Japanese. From Shingapōru Shiseikai, Shōnan Tokubetsushi shi—
Senjichū no Shingapōru (Tokyo: Nihon Shingapōru Kyōkai, 1986). 
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stemmed from their subjectivity as members of the empire’s elite civil service. Like Ōdachi, they 
saw themselves as “impartial shepherds of the people.” It was enough that they cared for the 
people and attempted to view the world from their perspective when crafting policy. If the civil 
service remained committed to the people’s welfare, there was no need to allow for popular 
representation in government and the disruptive politics that inevitably came with it. This was 
the source of Hosoda Tokujū’s belief that paternalistic rule by the empire’s bureaucratic elite, 
rather than popular participation, represented “true democracy” both in Shōnan and in Japan. 
Nothing about the occupation shook this belief: its failings were due to the military’s failure to 
understand popular sentiment, while the outrageous actions of Japanese profiteers in Shōnan 
further convinced the municipal bureaucrats that no one outside the civil service, Japanese or 
otherwise, was fit to govern the city.620 Ōdachi and his followers’ administrative style differed 
sharply from Watanabe’s, but their vision of the occupation did not allow for participation by the 
people of Shōnan. Instead, they offered a paternalistic authoritarianism that was committed to 
maintaining local livelihood but also, fundamentally, to the preeminence of Japanese power in 
the city. 
 
 Watanabe was recalled to Japan in March 1943, and Ōdachi only outlasted him by a few 
months. Despite his successes against Watanabe, after a year as mayor of Shōnan, Ōdachi was 
growing frustrated with the military and the casual disregard of many of its members for the 
welfare of the people of Shōnan and the rest of Southeast Asia. Ōdachi’s friends remember that 
in early 1943 the mayor was tired. At meetings with the governors of Malaya and Sumatra he 
began openly criticizing the glorification of the military’s successes in Southeast Asia and the 
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self-congratulatory attitudes of his fellow administrators.621 The issues came to a head when, one 
hot night at Chikamatsu (ȾŜ), the most exclusive Japanese restaurant in Shōnan, the normally 
mild-mannered Ōdachi got into a drunken shouting match with Foreign Ministry bureaucrat and 
advisor to the Borneo administration Kasama Akio (ǒɜśɤ).622 The mayor’s followers began 
to mutter to each other that life in the military administration had left Ōdachi “spiritually 
exhausted.”623 On May 21, 1943, Ōdachi flew to Tokyo to report on conditions in Southeast Asia 
to his allies in the cabinet and military, including his friend, Prime Minister Tōjō. Ōdachi came 
prepared to reprimand Japan’s leaders for not reigning in the army’s worst impulses in Southeast 
Asia but was blindsided by an offer from the Home Minister, Lt. Gen. Andō Kisaburō (Ñȑǝ=
ɍ), to appoint Ōdachi as the first governor of the newly formed Tokyo Metropolis (Tōkyōto Ś
Lɑ).624 Ōdachi’s biographer and friends claim that he was reluctant to leave his work in 
Shōnan unfinished, but acquiesced after a personal meeting with Tōjō, when the prime minister 
told him that the emperor himself was excited at the prospect of Ōdachi’s accepting this difficult 
appointment.625 Ōdachi, who went on to succeed Andō as Home Minister one year later, never 
returned to Shōnan. 
 Ōdachi’s loss was keenly felt in City Hall, especially by Ogata, Dazai, Hosoda, and the 
other Home Ministry bureaucrats who had been most devoted to him.626 Naitō, his successor, 
may have come from the same ministry, but he lacked Ōdachi’s strong personality. Akashi has 
argued that Ōdachi’s departure led to a decline in group cohesiveness in the municipal 
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administration and the encroachment of the military into the daily governance of Shōnan.627 
According to the accounts of these administrators, their continued prominence in the local 
propaganda press, and the recollections of local residents, this does not seem to have been the 
case. In fact, when the 25th Army’s Gunseikanbu was transferred to Sumatra in May 1943 and 
replaced by the Southern Expeditionary Army’s Marai Gunseikanbu (ɭřȷ}ƶɏ)—which 
was subsequently transferred to the 29th Army in 1944 and then supplanted by the 7th Area Army 
Gunseisōkanbu in 1945—the municipality and its staff remained the only constant in the 
Japanese administration of Shōnan. Their defiant attitude toward the military and paternalistic 
concern for local welfare endured even after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, as they 
prevented Japanese civilians from seizing the municipal rice supply to feed themselves while 
they awaited repatriation.628 The distinctive bureaucratic culture of the Shōnan Special 
Municipality was Ōdachi’s enduring legacy. It provided Japanese administrators with a 
justification for their presence even as American bombers began striking Shōnan and the 
mainland. Decades later, they told themselves that “when all was said and done… it was the faith 
of city residents toward our continued, earnest efforts to protect their livelihood that kept public 
order from collapsing.”629 The civil servants of Shōnan give themselves too much credit for 
actually providing security to the people of Shōnan, but these had a profound effect on their 
attitude toward the work of governing Shōnan. Although the prospect of violence by the 
Kempeitai and ordinary Japanese soldiers remained a constant threat in Shōnan, it was the 
paternalistic authoritarianism of the municipality that local residents encountered as they 
received their rations, applied for work, registered births and marriages, and paid their taxes. And 
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it was the intimate condescension of municipal bureaucrats that Shōnan’s Asian colonial elite 
had to deal with daily as they worked with them to govern the occupied city. 
 Watanabe’s hardline policies left an indelible impact on local society in Shōnan and the 
rest of Malaya. In more rural parts of the peninsula they added fuel to the Communist insurgency 
that plagued the Japanese throughout the occupation. But for all the attention the colonel has 
received, his presence in the administration itself was short-lived. Within only a few months of 
the British surrender Watanabe found his position in the military administration undermined and 
by the end of the first year of the occupation he was isolated, and his hardline policies reversed. 
The radical reforms he had hoped to introduce in society had failed or, worse, had backfired. 
Historians like Nakano Satoshi depict the hardline policies of the Japanese administration in 
Malaya as an aberration in the generally more accommodating wartime empire in Southeast 
Asia.630 In reality, Watanabe’s policies were an aberration in the Malayan administration, and the 
local Gunseikanbu quickly reverted to the regional mean once he was sidelined in the summer of 
1942. 
Yet for all his faults, Watanabe believed that with proper training Malayans could 
become the leaders of their own country. For the remainder of the occupation, except for a 
handful of idealists, Japanese administrators in the Shōnan Special Municipality and the 
Gunseikanbu alike embraced the soft authoritarianism of conservatives like Ōdachi, which 
precluded popular participation in the administration. Their commitment to protecting the 
livelihood of local residents was based in a desire to win their support for an autocratic imperial 
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administration that offered them no meaningful role in determining their own destinies as it 
sought to win a total war. Ōdachi’s paternalism was bound to the assumption of Japanese 




Chapter 5 – Policy Implementation in an Occupied City 
 
The task of governing a city like Shōnan was complicated by the personal enmity that 
existed between Col. Watanabe and Mayor Ōdachi. Their feud, however, was only one of the 
many factors that contributed to the general chaos of the Japanese administration. Structural and 
jurisdictional ambiguity plagued the administration, especially during the first year of the 
occupation. The Shōnan Special Municipality was formally a branch office of the Malayan 
Military Administration—the Gunseibu (ȷĶɏ) until July 1942 and the Gunseikanbu (ȷĶƶ
ɏ) thereafter—but Ōdachi’s defiant posture toward Watanabe and disputes over the division of 
labor between the municipality and the Gunseibu divided the two parts of the administration. 
And while Ōdachi used his personal connections to Watanabe’s superiors in the army to blunt 
what he saw as wrongheaded policy proposals, the ability of Japanese civilian firms and 
businesses to use their connections in the army to evade the oversight of the municipal 
government led to the confiscation of property from local businesses and the proliferation of 
Japanese-owned restaurants and brothels around the city, much to the dismay of Ōdachi.631 And 
while the acrimonious relationship among Japanese in Shōnan fostered grudges that resurfaced in 
memoirs written decades after war, there was still an underlying logic of proper governance 
shared by Japanese bureaucrats in the administration. Although Watanabe and Ōdachi were both 
authoritarians who saw no meaningful role for local people in the policy making process, 
Japanese at all levels of the administration, and particularly in the municipal government, 
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regarded the Asian colonial elite as critical to the implementation of policy in Shōnan. Japanese 
administrators preferred to work through prewar communal leaders rather than anticolonial 
nationalists, they also attempted to establish control over as many aspects of everyday life as 
they could. This logic of using “traditional” leaders to facilitate an unprecedented penetration of 
state power into local society emerged from decades of experience in Japan and its empire and, 
while the complexity of Shōnan society and the disorganization of the administration often 
hobbled Japanese policy, it also forced local residents to reconceive their relationship with their 
racial, linguistic, and religious communities and with the state. 
One example of Japanese administrators’ use of the prewar accommodationist elite to 
implement occupation policy was the “government lottery,” which was first held in the summer 
of 1942. In May, the Gunseibu Finance Department announced a lottery with the explicit goal of 
removing one million dollars in cash from circulation.632  They hoped that by doing so they 
could curb the inflation that had grown into one of the largest economic problems the Japanese 
administration faced in occupied Malaya.633 Before the war, Malaya had exported commodities, 
notably rubber and tin, through port cities like Singapore and imported food, particularly rice 
from Thailand and Burma, and manufactured goods from a number of countries.634 The Japanese 
invasion brought international and regional trade to a standstill. By mid-1942, the Japanese 
military had driven the Allies from Southeast Asia, but aerial and submarine attacks prevented 
them from reopening the shipping lanes that had been the lifeblood of the regional economy 
before the war. In Malaya, the scarcity of daily necessities presented an immediate problem 
which worsened as the occupation wore on. The strategies used by the military administration to 
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combat the resultant inflation mirrored the attempts of civil servants in Japan to grapple with the 
growing scarcity caused by the war in China. In the home islands in September 1939, the 
government attempted to freeze prices for consumer goods, rents, and wages.635 In Malaya, the 
25th Army command announced a similar price freeze on consumer goods immediately after the 
occupation began.636 The Gunseibu/Gunseikanbu and the Shōnan Special Municipality 
introduced price controls for an ever larger variety of goods over the next few years, while the 
municipality attempted to enforce the price restrictions by distributing daily necessities and 
foodstuffs through a growing number of semi-official organizations called kumiai (ǣ), such 
as the Sundry Goods Wholesalers Kumiai, the Drugs and Chemicals Kumiai, and even the 
Laundry and Dry Cleaning Kumiai.637 Despite the efforts of the police to curb new “economic 
crimes” and the well-publicized prosecutions of people who violated price controls in Japan and 
Shōnan, the restrictions backfired both in the home islands and in the wartime empire as they 
encouraged the growth of the black market.638 As shortages worsened the residents of Shōnan 
and Tokyo alike grew more dependent on black-market goods and the price of daily necessities 
skyrocketed. 
Scarcity drove inflation in Shōnan and the rest of Malaya, but it was exacerbated by the 
fact that Japanese military units often printed military scrip when they needed to buy materials or 
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pay wages to local workers.639 The Gunseibu’s “million dollar” lottery was an attempt, not to 
offer a million-dollar reward to the winner but to remove from circulation one million dollars’ 
worth of Straits dollars and Japanese military scrip (derogatorily referred to as “banana money” 
because of the banana tree featured on ten dollar notes).640 The Gunseibu had to sell at least one 
million of its one-dollar “Shōnan Shōken” (Ņȣ~) lottery tickets to reach its goal of 
removing that much currency from circulation.641 When the lottery was first announced in May, 
these tickets were meant to be sold only at City Hall or at the newly established Shōnan branches 
of the Yokohama Specie Bank and Bank of Taiwan.642 It quickly became apparent that the 
Gunseibu could not rely on local demand alone to sell the huge number of lottery tickets. By the 
time tickets went on sale on July 1, responsibility for reaching the quota had been farmed out to 
three familiar figures: Lim Boon Keng of the Oversea Chinese Association, S.C. Goho of the 
Indian Independence League, and Ibrahim Yaacob of the now-defunct Kesatuan Melayu Muda. 
Lim, Goho, and Ibrahim were charged with selling six hundred thousand, three hundred 
thousand, and one hundred thousand tickets, respectively, to the members of their communities 
in Shōnan and elsewhere in Malaya.643 Initially, tickets were supposed to be available only in 
July but, because of a lack of sales, the period was extended to early September while Japanese 
authorities, Lim, Goho, Ibrahim, and their proxies made ever greater efforts to sell tickets, 
encouraging local businessmen to buy large batches at a time. Other communal leaders joined 
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the effort. In September, the Shōnan Arab Working Committee, led by Syed Ahmad Alsagoff, 
made its media debut in a Syonan Times article praising the fact that its members had pledged to 
buy 10,000 lottery tickets, at the suggestion of Ibrahim Yaacob.644 When the drawing finally 
took place that month, Hara Kyūichirō (C;ɍ), the Finance Ministry bureaucrat in charge of 
the Gunseikanbu Finance Department, heaped praise upon the leaders of the Chinese, Indian, and 
Malay communities for all they had done to make the lottery possible.645 In the awkward 
translation of Hara’s speech printed in the Syonan Times, he said, “I am very glad to say that this 
co-operation has been shown by the communities thereby leading towards the realization of the 
establishment of a NEW MALAYA by the people.”646 
Like the far more intrusive “donation” that the Oversea Chinese Association had been 
forced to organize for Watanabe a few months earlier, Hara and his staff depended on the 
influence and organizational capacity of Chinese, Indian, Malay, and Arab leaders to implement 
their anti-inflationary policy. Over the course of 1942, this strategy, which echoed prewar plans 
like the Obata report, became the main means of implementing occupation policy. But after July, 
the Gunseikanbu began to cede responsibility for policy implementation to the municipal 
government. This happened because of Lt. Gen. Yamashita’s departure and Watanabe’s 
demotion from head of the military administration to chief of its General Affairs Department. Lt. 
Gen. Saitō Yaheita (ĻȑĊúÅ), who replaced Yamashita as commander of the 25th Army, and 
Maj. Gen. Nishiōeda Yutaka (șÃŘǺ), who took over the Gunseikanbu, had been given strict 
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orders by their superiors to try to maintain the prewar lifestyles of the peoples under their control 
and to avoid forcing a sudden “Japanization” of local society.647 Compared to Watanabe, who 
was committed to the spiritual reformation of both Japanese and Southeast Asian society, these 
military officers played a much smaller role in the day-to-day operations of the administration.648 
Watanabe’s waning influence in the administration was not, however, the only reason for the 
growing responsibility of the civilian officials in City Hall over all aspects of daily life in 
Shōnan. 
Although Hara had worked effectively with the Asian colonial elite of Shōnan during the 
Gunseikanbu’s lottery drive, by the end of 1942 municipal bureaucrats developed much closer 
relationships with these local elites and placed them at the heads of semi-official organizations 
that included every resident of the city, in theory if not always in reality. Shinozaki Mamoru (ǘ
ðȫ), who had been instrumental in the creation of the Oversea Chinese Association before 
Watanabe took control of it, was given a post in the municipal Welfare Department where he 
worked as a liaison between the city and local “minzoku associations” (ŹŁ®Z). He proved 
himself extremely capable of working through the leaders of the OCA, the Indian Independence 
League (IIL), and new “welfare associations” (kōsei kyōkai ƪV) that he created for the 
Eurasian, Arab, and Malay communities to implement Japanese policy. Shinozaki and his office 
in the Welfare Department became closely associated with the Shōnan Shōken lottery just as 
Hara and the Finance Ministry bureaucrats in the Gunseikanbu were pushing their local allies to 
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sell the last of the tickets in August 1942. He again played a large role in promoting the 
government lottery when it resumed in early 1943 as the Kōnan Saiken (Ȃď~).649 Through 
these institutions, and his relationship with the men who led them, Shinozaki made himself 
indispensable to the military administration in Shōnan. 
Shinozaki’s work with these race-based associations was part of a larger pattern of 
municipal governance in Shōnan. Ogata Shin’ichi in the municipal police oversaw a massive 
new neighborhood association system called the Auxiliary Police Force (APF) and sought out 
“knowledgeable people with the confidence of residents and the ability to get things done” (×Ȕ
aŏōȩǵ) to run it.650 The municipal economic department supervised the 
kumiai in Shōnan, which were most often led by prewar Japanese residents but whose 
membership included the most prominent local businessmen in the city.651 As they recruited 
leaders for these organizations, municipal bureaucrats focused on the most elite members of local 
society. As a result, many Singaporeans did not know or remember how Shinozaki’s “welfare 
                                               
649 While the propaganda press did not explicitly state that Shinozaki had a role in lottery ticket sales, after he 
returned to Shōnan in August the stated goal of the lottery shifted from curbing inflation to raising funds for “the 
relief of distressed people, the improvement of sanitary conditions and other suitable social services.” “Address by 
Zaimubu-tyo,” Syonan Times, September 11, 1942. The government lottery resumed in early 1943 rebranded as 
the Kōnan Saiken (Șµĸ£) and, while the Gunseikanbu’s internal documents continued to state that the 
purpose of the lottery was the “absorption of idle capital” (yūshi kyūshū きɘË½) and “supplementation of 
funds” (zaigen hojū ɗƵȴ) while providing “amusement” (goraku úƍ) for the people, public advertisements 
claimed that the lottery proceeds would go to “relief of the poor” (represented in Chinese characters by nanmin 
kyūsai/namin jiuji はƠŝƲ) and “improving sanitary conditions” (represented in Chinese characters by eisei 
shisetsu/weisheng shishe ȲǉŦɁ [sic.]). Kurasawa Aiko, ed. Ʀŉü、ʒ, Hiroku: Senji Geppō/Gunsei Geppō 
ǬたRŏŰŷê9ɝśŷê, Vol. 3 (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha やƳųȚ, 2000), 324. “Syonan Authorities to Hold 
$3,000,000 Lottery from April,” Syonan Sinbun, February 19, 1943. Lottery tickets in personal collection of Leong 
Sak Chooi, Accession No. 160, NAS. According to the recollections of former municipal employees some of these 
funds did go to a “destitute persons relief fund” (nanmin kyūsai shikin はƠŝƲɘɸ) that Shinozaki’s Kōseika was 
in charge of distributing, partly in the form of a $50 monthly stipend to those who had lost family members during 
the Sook Ching massacre. Shingapōru Shiseikai, 153, 164. 
650 Shingapōru Shiseikai, 221. 
651 Shingapōru Shiseikai, 100. 
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associations,” the APF, and the kumiai, functioned or even that they existed at all.652 What they 
did remember were the elite figures who led them and their Japanese handlers. The reliance of 
the municipality, and of the Japanese administration of Malaya as a whole, on prewar Asian 
elites to implement their policies meant that in their communities these leaders became the face 
of the occupation and of its many failings as well. 
There was another subtler and more pervasive effect of Japanese occupation policy on 
local residents. The members of the Gunseikanbu and the Shōnan Special Municipality disagreed 
about many things, but they shared the conviction that, to maintain stability and mobilize the 
people of Shōnan to support the Japanese war effort, the administration had to monitor and 
control all aspects of life in the city. Some, like Watanabe, felt that this could only be achieved 
through radical social change, but most hoped to achieve this level of control by establishing 
strong, hierarchical control over established social elites. As the occupation wore on, Japanese 
administrators went to greater and greater lengths to eliminate the independence of social 
organizations and bring them under centralized control. During this process of consolidation, 
which was focused on the Shōnan Special Municipality, organizations that did not fit into the 
institutional frameworks that administrators were building were threatened with dissolution. The 
Federation of Christian Churches and the Muslim missionary society Jamiyah, for instance, were 
charitable religious institutions that stood at odds with Shinozaki Mamoru’s efforts to 
consolidate welfare and relief work under the minzoku associations that he controlled. These 
organizations survived only because they were able to secure patronage from the Education and 
Religion Section in the Gunseikanbu. This process drove social organizations into closer and 
more hierarchical relationships with different parts of the administration, allowing the internally 
                                               
652 Ismail bin Zain, interview by Tan Beng Luan, September 5, 1985, Accession No. 601, OHC, Reel 4. George Edwin 
Bogaars, interview by Low Lay Leng, December 8, 1983, Accession No. 379, OHC, Reel 3. 
 224 
fractious occupation to extend its influence into all aspects of everyday life in Shōnan. Local 
residents noticed the change and, as the wartime Japanese state began to play a greater role in 
their lives, they began to expect more from the state in return. 
 
The Indispensable Shinozaki Mamoru  
When the Shōnan Special Municipality was created in late February 1942, its leaders 
were chosen from among the handful of Japanese civilians in Shōnan at the time, including 
former Consul General Toyoda Kaoru (ȭƫȐ) and Malaya-born physician Andō Kōzō (Ñȑu
=).653 For the next few weeks this small group worked to reopen city offices and convince 
former municipal employees to return to their jobs, but it was Mayor Ōdachi’s arrival in mid-
March and the two months of frenzied administrative work that followed that set the tone of the 
new government.654 With the city government up and running, the 25th Army Defense 
Headquarters began to extricate itself from daily administration in Shōnan and focus instead on 
maintaining security through the Kempeitai. Shinozaki Mamoru left his position at the Defense 
Headquarters to join his former superior in the Japanese Consulate, Toyoda, in the municipal 
administration, where he was put in charge of the Education Section of Dr. Andō’s Welfare 
Department (ŹƪɏĸǸǊ). 
By the end of March, Col. Watanabe was at the height of his powers in the Gunseibu and 
had barred Shinozaki from working with the Oversea Chinese Association. The young man was 
evidently shaken by the experience of the Sook Ching massacre and the arrests of Chinese 
leaders that followed. Indeed, his concern for local residents and what the military might do to 
                                               
653 Shingapōru Shiseikai, 44–45. 
654 Shingapōru Shiseikai, 82–83. Shinozaki Mamoru ǹĜɔ, Shingapōru senryō hiroku: Sensō to sono ningenzō 2
Q-CRM·ʑǬたˀŏdmっˀ (Tokyo: Hara Shobō ºųő, 1976), 72.  
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them became one of the major motivations for his work at the municipality. Herman Marie de 
Souza, whom Shinozaki recruited to help him in the Education Section, recalled that Shinozaki 
confessed to him early in the occupation that, while he had once harbored great ambitions in the 
Foreign Ministry and had trained in Germany before his imprisonment by the British, “My 
ambition now is to do good to people. Doesn’t matter who they are.”655 Over the next few years, 
Shinozaki became one of the most prominent public advocates for the interests of the people of 
Shōnan and, as a result, was one of the few Japanese who were widely remembered by 
Singaporeans after the war. But Shinozaki’s desire to do good did not always translate into an 
ability to do so and, through circumstances both within and beyond his control, he became 
associated with the mobilization of laborers who died by the thousands on the Thailand-Burma 
border and Shōnan’s ill-fated agricultural settlements in rural Malaya.  
As the head of the Education Section, Shinozaki quickly set himself apart from other 
civilian administrators. As with the other departments of the municipal government, the day-to-
day business of Shinozaki’s office was handled by local employees.656 Shinozaki spent much of 
his time outside the office, inspecting former school buildings. In the chaotic days after the 
British surrender, school facilities had been occupied by different units (butai ɏɢ) of the 25th 
Army. While the term butai referred to any unit in the Japanese army, it was also used to 
describe units that performed specific tasks in Shōnan, such as vehicle repair or munitions 
production. The butai, often named after their commanding officer, were a ubiquitous presence 
                                               
655 Shinozaki recruited De Souza in part because he had worked as a teacher in prewar Malacca. Herman Marie de 
Souza, interview by Tan Beng Luan, August 17, 1985, Accession No. 592, OHC, Reel 3. 
656 Shinozaki, Shingapōru, 73–74. Herman Marie de Souza recounts that the Chief Inspector of Schools at the 
beginning of the occupation was a man named Mr. Davis, while Lee Chee Hwa worked as inspector for Chinese 
schools, Incik Shamsuddin as inspector for Malay Schools, a Mr. Ratnam as inspector for Tamil schools, and De 
Souza himself as inspector for English schools. Herman Marie de Souza, interview by Tan Beng Luan, August 17, 
1985, Accession No. 592, OHC, Reel 3. 
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around the island. They were often important employers for the people of Shōnan because they 
could guarantee a steady salary and even increased rations, and some who worked for them 
fondly remembered that the officers who led these units treated them with greater equity and 
confidence than any prewar white employer ever had.657 But the butai also contributed to the 
uneven geography of Japanese power—as independent units of the 25th Army they held 
themselves aloof from the Shōnan Special Municipality and even form the Gunseibu itself. 
While butai could cause turmoil, as they did when they printed their own military scrip to buy 
supplies and pay their employees while administrators were scrambling to halt runaway inflation, 
their leaders could nonetheless claim that even such disruptive actions were vital to the war 
effort. When they were led by particularly headstrong officers, butai operated as independent 
fiefdoms in Shōnan. On some occasions, Mayor Ōdachi had to draw on his personal relationships 
with the highest-ranking officers on the island to stop the butai from abusing local residents and, 
even then, there were times when Ōdachi’s personal intervention could not alter butai 
behavior.658 
Shinozaki’s main problem in his first months at the municipality was to get these army 
units to evacuate school buildings, something the local staff of the Education Section could not 
accomplish. And so, De Souza remembered, Shinozaki himself travelled the island to convince 
the butai to relocate.659 He used the personal connections he had mad in the 25th Army Command 
                                               
657 Shingapōru Shiseikai, 107. Tobias Pereira, interviewed by Nur Azlin binte Salem, May 17, 2010, Accession No. 
3516, OHC, Reel 2.  
658 Ōdachi Shigeo Denki Kankōkai, 187–188. Municipal police chief Ogata Shin’ichi recalls that one butai, a supply 
depot along South Bridge Road in one of the most heavily populated parts of Chinatown, ordered the residents in 
the nearby shophouses to board their windows shut to “prevent espionage.” Although the lack of air circulation in 
the sweltering shophouses made life unbearable for the people who lived in them, and Ōdachi himself visited the 
area to assess the situation, the city was unable to negotiate a solution and the windows remained nailed shut. 
Shingapōru Shiseikai, 92–93. 
659 Herman Marie de Souza, interview by Tan Beng Luan, August 17, 1985, Accession No. 592, OHC, Reel 3. 
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and Defense Headquarters during the first weeks of the occupation to help manage the butai, and 
while this made him more adept at wrangling the recalcitrant leaders of these military units than 
most civilian administrators, it also became a source of friction between him and some members 
of the army.660 This was compounded by the fact that Shinozaki’s Chinese acquaintances 
continued to ask him for exemptions from the OCA’s $50 million “donation” drive and for help 
reclaiming factories and residences that had been confiscated by the butai or private Japanese 
firms.661 By the end of May, Shinozaki’s advocacy for local residents earned him a warning, not 
only from Watanabe in the Gunseibu, but from the 25th Army command itself.662 To ease the 
situation, in June Ōdachi sent Shinozaki back to Japan (on a navy plane instead of an army plane, 
“just in case (nen no tame ĚƓ)”) for two months of leave, replacing him in the Education 
Section with Welfare Ministry bureaucrat Dazai Hirokuni (ÅÛɋ).663 
But by then Shinozaki had already established himself as an indispensable liaison 
between the people of Shōnan and the Japanese administration. He had played a direct role in the 
foundation of the Oversea Chinese Association and had helped the military make administrative 
sense of the local Eurasian and Jewish communities. But there was one event that spring that 
cemented his unusual role in the occupation state. April 29, 1942, was Emperor Hirohito’s forty-
first birthday and a Japanese national holiday then called Tenchōsetsu (ÄɚǗ). The 25th Army 
command decided to use the occasion to stage a grand celebration of their military success in the 
                                               
660 Shinozaki, Shingapōru, 74. 
661 Shinozaki, Shingapōru, 86. 
662 Shinozaki, Shingapōru, 86. 
663 In Japan, Shinozaki had a personal debriefing with Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori (Ɓすȟľ), to whom he 
brought two bottles of scotch captured in Shōnan. Shinozaki, Shingapōru, 86–87. Before the foundation of the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare (Kōseishō ¹ǉǙ) in 1938, Dazai had, like Ōdachi, served in the Home Ministry as 
the Chief of Police Affairs in Ibaraki Prefecture. After the war he continued to serve in the Welfare Ministry, rising 
to the rank of Vice Minister in the 1960s. Shingapōru Shiseikai, 396.  
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Malaya Campaign, and the military administration’s Propaganda Squad (Gunsendenhan ȷØW
Ƨ) informed the municipal government that General Yamashita hoped that the ceremonies 
would include a parade of local schoolchildren and an audience with representatives of local 
minzoku associations (genchi minzoku dantai ƨ¶ŹŁ®Z).664 As the head of the Education 
Section, Shinozaki was charged with teaching a group of schoolchildren to march and sing 
patriotic Japanese songs such as “Aikoku Kōshinkyoku” (Ģ°ȔɂŊ) and the national anthem 
“Kimigayo” (Q). At the same time, he was to officiate at a formal ceremony at the newly 
opened Shōnan Gekijō  (Ņ¿, the former Victoria Theater) and a celebratory luncheon for 
General Yamashita at the Adelphi Hotel attended by “many hundreds” of local minzoku 
leaders.665 Shinozaki attested that he was given only ten days to prepare for the ceremony, during 
which time his office became a hub of activity as school principals, minzoku leaders, and even a 
handful of religious figures scrambled to prepare for the celebration.666 Despite the haste, 
Shinozaki’s frenzied preparations paid off in a massive ceremony that gathered the major figures 
who had worked with the Japanese over the past two months, including Lim Boon Keng, S.Q. 
Wong, Ibrahim Yaacob, Onan Haji Siraj, Ishak Haji Muhammad, S.C. Goho, K.P.K Menon, and 
                                               
664 Shinozaki, Shingapōru, 76. Watanabe Wataru was also personally involved in coordinating Tenchōsetsu 
celebrations across Malaya. You can find his guidelines for the celebrations in Gunseibuchō Watanabe Wataru ɝ
śɴɽƴこƴ, “Tenchōsetsu hōshi gyōji jisshi ni kansuru ken òɽǷöǤȱeăŦつ#t,” in Watanabe 
Wataru shōshō gunsei (Maraya-Shingapōru) kankei shi-shiryō ƴいƴđĎɝśʡDKH92Q-CRMʢつ
Á9ɘŢ, ed. by Akashi Yōji ŬǝにȖȉ, Vol. 3 (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha やƳųȚ, 1998), 171–179.  
665 Shingapōru Shiseikai, 86–87. “Tentyo-Setu Celebrations: Presentations of Birthday Honours, Official Luncheon 
Held in Former Adelphi Hotel,” Syonan Times, April 30, 1942. 
666 “Education Dept. Notice,” Syonan Times, April 20, 1942. “Observance of Tentyo-Setu on April 29: Opportunity to 
Pay Homage to Our Brave Servicemen,” Syonan Times, April 20, 1942. As part of the celebrations, mosques, 
churches, and temples were required to facilitate a silent prayer in the direction of the imperial palace at 10:00am, 
which may explain the involvement of religious leaders in Shinozaki’s preparations. “M.A.D. Notice No. 40,” Syonan 
Times, April 20, 1942. This requirement was particularly galling to local Muslims who felt that the Japanese were 
attempting to elevate Tokyo to the same spiritual level as Mecca. Mohamed Ibrahim, interviewed by Low Lay Leng, 
October 19, 1983, Accession No. 20, OHC, Reel 5. 
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many others.667 Much like the far more humiliating “donation” ceremony that the OCA would 
participate in two months later, the Tenchōsetsu celebrations represented the symbolic 
subordination of the various peoples of Malaya, through the minzou leaders of Shōnan, to the 
Japanese Empire and to General Yamashita, who referred to them during the ceremony as soon-
to-be “subjects of the Japanese Empire (Dai Nippon Teikoku no shinmin ÃłŒ÷°Ǿ
Ź).”668 Shinozaki’s advocacy on behalf of local residents may have frustrated some army 
officials, but by and large the leaders of the administration recognized his ability to mobilize the 
people of Shōnan through their minzoku leadership. And when the thirty-four-year-old 
bureaucrat returned to Shōnan in August Ōdachi had a new office in the Welfare Department 
created specifically for him.669 The Welfare Promotion Section (Kōseika ƪǊ), although 
formally tasked with providing relief to the destitute in Shōnan, was established in fact to help 
secure the cooperation of local residents, particularly the all-important Chinese, with the 
Japanese municipal government.670 
 
From Relief Provision to Local Mobilization: The Kōseika, the OCA, and Minzoku Welfare 
Associations 
 M. Gaus bin Mahyuddin, the Japanese-trained Sumatran doctor who had worked 
as a translator for the Japanese police in the first months of the occupation, recalled how 
                                               
667 Local Catholic Bishop Adrien Devals and Swiss Consul Heinrich Rudolf Arbenz also attended the event. Pritam 
Singh, who died in a plane crash in March, was also honored at the event. “Tentyo-Setu Celebrations: 
Presentations of Birthday Honours, Official Luncheon Held in Former Adelphi Hotel,” Syonan Times, April 30, 1942. 
668 Yamashita’s comments were widely reported in Japan, much to the consternation of Tōjō and other leaders in 
Tokyo who still preferred to leave the postwar fates of the occupied territories of Southeast Asia publicly 
ambiguous. Shinozaki, Shingapōru, 87–88. “Banpō, tokoro wo eshimu: Yamashita Tomoyuki saikō shikikan kinwa 
Uɱ&ļʬėXöŠŵむŗŘāɒ「” Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), April 30, 1942, Morning ed. 
669 Shingapōru Shiseikai, 148–149. 
670 Shingapōru Shiseikai, 148–149. 
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Shinozaki appointed him and other prominent “Malays” to lead a Malay Welfare Association 
(Marē Kōsei Kyōkai 06:ƪV) in late 1943. In his memoirs, translated into Japanese by 
Gotō Ken’ichi in 2012, he wrote: 
“In the Shōnan Special Municipality, under the direction of Kōseika director 
Shinozaki Mamoru, there were welfare associations set up for every minzoku. In 
other words, the Chinese, Eurasians, Arabs, Indians, Malays, and so on 
established their own welfare associations. This brought uniformity to the various 
minzoku, religious, and cultural groups and, consequently, in the Shōnan Special 
Municipality it was thought that this would ameliorate the grievances of the 
people and ease the work of sending laborers to important infrastructural projects 
and, to a certain extent, military facilities.”671 
 
What Dr. Gaus described in this excerpt was one of the most effective means of policy 
implementation in occupied Shōnan. From the moment Shinozaki assumed his post at the 
Kōseika in August 1942 through the end of the war in August 1945, he worked to consolidate the 
different communal associations in Shōnan under his direct control. Beginning with the leaders 
of the Oversea Chinese Association, the model for the minzoku welfare associations that 
Shinozaki established over the next year, he worked closely with the same leaders he had 
recruited to organize the Tenchōsetsu celebrations to return a modicum of stability to everyday 
life in Shōnan. Shinozaki would use this work to try to fulfill his “ambition to do good” during 
the next few years of the occupation, but it would also make him one of the most important 
agents for mobilizing the human and financial resources of Shōnan in support of the Japanese 
war effort. 
Once he assumed his position in the Kōseika, Shinozaki quickly reestablished ties with 
the Oversea Chinese Association. In the aftermath of Watanabe’s forced donation drive, the 
                                               
671 Mahyuddin Gaus DAJ8(Q9-*4, M. Gaus kaisōroku: Senzenki Indoneshia ryūgakusei no Nihon taiken 
Mら-*4ÚŇたˀŏ¤Ż)Q:=2'ǏýǉŨŽ}ʙˀ, translated by Gotō Ken’ichi ĻȬcS, Kenkyū 
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Shōnan Special Municipality had assumed jurisdiction over the OCA, which moved its 
headquarters from the Goh Loo Club to the prewar Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce 
(SCCC) building. The OCA had structured itself after the China Relief Fund to raise Watanabe’s 
$50 million but, by the time Shinozaki returned to Shōnan in August, it more closely resembled a 
successor organization to the SCCC. While its more prominent leaders remained and a few new 
leaders, such as Ching Kee Sun (ŋǝÝ), came to the forefront as the head of the General 
Affairs Bureau, many of the lower-level members of the OCA who had been involved with the 
donation drive left the organization that summer.672 Lim Boon Keng remained the nominal head 
of the organization and was occasionally asked to speak on its behalf at propaganda rallies, but 
after the forced donation drive the aged doctor took a much less active role in the day-to-day 
operations of the OCA.673 Going forward, it would be prewar businessmen like Ching, S.Q. 
Wong, Yeo Chang Boon, and Lee Wee Nam who presided over the organization and worked 
closely with Shinozaki to implement municipal policies. Just as Shinozaki had established 
himself as an indispensable figure in the administration, the OCA soon became an indispensable 
group in the mobilization of laborers, auxiliary soldiers, and agricultural settlers to participate in 
the Japanese army’s wartime projects in Malaya from among the three-quarters of Shōnan’s 
population that was Chinese. Because of its effectiveness, the OCA served as the template for the 
                                               
672 Koh Soh Goh, interviewed by Tan Beng Luan, October 24, 1984, Accession No. 497, OHC, Reel 3. Ching was a 
Cantonese China Relief Fund leader who had also been a Justice of the Peace and served on the Chinese Advisory 
Board in prewar Singapore. “China Relief Fund,” Malaya Tribune, November 21, 1938. “Mr. Ching Kee Sun,” 
Morning Tribune, October 22, 1936. 
673 According the Y.S. Tan, Lim had developed a drinking problem during the donation drive when it became clear 
that he would not be able to pay his own allotted “donation.” Y.S. Tan, “History of the formation of the Oversea 
Chinese Association and the extortion by J.M.A. of $50,000,000 Military Contribution from the Chinese in Malaya,” 
in Journal of the South Seas Society 3, no. 6 (September 1946): 8. As the occupation went on Lim’s drinking 
problem appears to have worsened, though many have attested that Lim’s drinking also provided him an excuse to 
minimize his work with the Japanese. Eric C. Paglar, interview by Low Lay Leng, August 3, 1983, interview 299, Oral 
History Centre, National Archives of Singapore, Singapore. 
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Eurasian Welfare Association, Malay Welfare Association, Arab Welfare Association, and, 
eventually, an Indian Welfare Association (distinct from the Indian Independence League). 
The role of the Kōseika, the OCA, and other minzoku welfare associations in local 
governance evolved gradually. At first, Shinozaki’s office was narrowly focused on the most 
pressing humanitarian concerns of the early occupation: aiding many people who had lost their 
homes and livelihoods during the Japanese invasion. As the 25th Army advanced down the Malay 
Peninsula in December 1941 and January 1942, thousands of refugees had poured into Singapore 
in the hopes that Britain’s “impenetrable fortress” would survive the Japanese onslaught. When 
Singapore fell on February 15, the new administration had to deal with the tens, perhaps 
hundreds, of thousands of refugees in the city.674 In early March, notices from the Military 
Administration Department and Defense Headquarters appeared, first in Chinese and then in 
English, ordering refugees first to register and then to return home by foot or specially arranged 
trains or face the confiscation of their property and “severe punishment.”675 But the 25th Army 
was not able to enforce this order, and many refugees remained in Shōnan after March.676 In 
addition to refugees, many local residents had lost their homes and places of employment during 
the campaign, either to Japanese bombing or British shelling, and many Chinese families saw 
                                               
674 Japanese sources estimate that the population had swollen from approximately 500,000 before the war to 
between 800,000 and 1,000,000 on February 15. Shingapōru Shiseikai, 13. A British statistical survey from 1939, 
however, estimates that the population of Singapore was 720,200 at the end of December 1938. Statistics 
Department, S.S. & F.M.S., Malayan Year Book, 1939 (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1939), 36–37. 
675 “Bugao ” Syonan Jitpoh, March 4, 1942. “Up-Country Refugees Must Leave Syonan,” Syonan Times, March 
6, 1942.  
676 The internal reports of the Malayan Military Administration claim that there were “over 10,000” refugees in 
Shōnan after the British surrender and that 9,619 had been evacuated by March 14. Kurasawa, Vol. 1, 16–17. 
Given the much larger estimate of refugee numbers provided by the former employees of the Shōnan Special 
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remained in Shōnan despite the administration’s threats. After he was recruited to work for the municipal police in 
mid-March one of Gaus Mahyuddin’s chief duties was writing out travel passes for remaining refugees who wanted 
to return to Malaya. Gaus, 78. 
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their adult men, often the principal breadwinners, murdered during the Sook Ching massacre.677 
An eclectic collection of organizations, including the Indian Independence League and OCA but 
also prewar institutions including local churches, temples, and mosques, provided relief to 
Shōnan’s large destitute population in the months that followed. Once Shinozaki took up his 
position in the Kōseika in August he spearheaded an effort to centralize relief distribution in the 
city. 
In the same month, the OCA applied to the Military Administration Department for 
permission and funding to set up a “Home for the Aged and Poor” (nanmin shūyōjo, nanmin 
shourongsuo ɥŹÞĪ) in Jurong, at the far western end of the island.678 Their application 
was approved, and the $156,000 funding for the project came directly from Shinozaki’s 
department.679 By November, the OCA announced that it would build its home for the destitute 
on the grounds of Siong Lim Temple in Toa Payoh instead, and that it would house one thousand 
residents: five hundred Chinese, and five hundred destitute people “of all races.”680 The OCA’s 
almshouse opened with great fanfare on Sunday February 21, 1943, with Mayor Ōdachi and 
welfare department head Dr. Andō Kōzō present.681 While they could not match the OCA’s level 
                                               
677 In a particularly tragic episode on the night of February 14—the eve of General Percival’s surrender—British 
artillery shelled Kampung Melayu, an outlying Malay settlement close to the front line. Kahn, Joel S. Other Malays: 
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of funding and organization, other minzoku associations became more active in relief work after 
Shinozaki’s return. Despite the fact that the army’s Iwakuro Kikan was supposed to act as the 
sole liaison between the Japanese and the Indian Independence League, the IIL’s Shōnan branch 
announced in late August that it would also begin relief work by opening a hospital.682 Both 
Rash Behari Bose and S.C. Goho spent the next month appealing for donations to its relief fund 
from wealthy members of the Indian community.683 Around this time Syed Ahmad Alsagoff’s 
Shōnan Arab Working Committee appeared in the pages of the Syonan Times for the first time in 
an article about its contributions to relief efforts; the article mentioned that the organization was 
working closely with former Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM) president Ibrahim Yaacob.684 At 
the end of September the newspaper published an editorial criticizing not only the Federation of 
Christian Churches, one of the most important providers of relief in the preceding months, but 
also the idea of religion as an organizing principle for society. Its writer pointedly suggested that 
all institutions providing relief to the populace “be gradually merged with the Kosei-Ka,” 
Shinozaki’s office.685 
An article in the Syonan Times one week earlier hinted at the origin of this flurry of 
activity. It claimed that a “gigantic Government relief scheme” was being developed “by the 
authorities with the co-operation of the leaders of the various communities.”686 The article 
announced that the leaders of the communities were apparently preparing reports for the 
Japanese administration about the extent of their relief efforts in Shōnan, and it noted that this 
                                               
ceremony took place on Sunday. “Zhaonan cishan shiye zhankai xinye 
 ",” Syonan Jitpoh, 
February 23, 1943. “Chinese Home for Aged,” Syonan Sinbum, February 24, 1943. 
682 “IIL in Syonan to Inaugurate Relief Work,” Syonan Times, August 30, 1942. 
683 “Syonan Indians Generously Supporting IIL Relief Appeal,” Syonan Times, September 17, 1942. “Indians Urged 
to Aid Distressed in Fight for Freedom,” Syonan Times, September 18, 1942.  
684 “Syonan’s Arab Community Not Inactive,” Syonan Times, September 3, 1942. 
685 “Religions Are Many, Reason Is One: We Are Brothers,” Syonan Times September 26, 1942. 
686 “Relief Plan for Syonan’s Destitute Ready Soon,” Syonan Times, September 20, 1942. 
 235 
new relief effort would remain separate from that of the Federation of Christian Churches.687 The 
article did not mention any Japanese administrators or minzoku leaders by name and it appears 
that this grand, unified relief program never materialized. It is clear, however, from the more 
piecemeal reporting on relief efforts at the end of 1942 that Shinozaki’s Kōseika sat at the center 
of this new policy initiative and that he was creating an institutional framework that would allow 
him control over the provision of relief with the cooperation of the leaders of the minzoku 
associations. 
Shinozaki’s efforts to provide relief to the destitute in Shōnan furthered the practical 
goals of the Japanese administration. Ōdachi, Shinozaki, and the other municipal administrators 
popularly known for their concern for the people of Shōnan were convinced that the punitive 
policies pursued by military figures like Watanabe would drive local residents into the arms of 
anti-Japanese movements like the growing Communist insurgency in the Malayan countryside. 
Although Ōdachi returned to Japan in the summer of 1943, his belief that “the stability of the 
people’s livelihoods” (shimin seikatsu no anteiöŹƪƄÑÖ) must be a priority left a lasting 
impression on the bureaucrats who continued to work in Shōnan after his departure.688 To 
Ōdachi and his allies, stability would make everyday life in Shōnan more bearable while making 
the job of the Japanese occupiers far easier. The mayor’s effort to restore “proper order” in 
Shōnan w animated municipal policy throughout his tenure and afterward, inspiring not only 
Shinozaki’s work in the Welfare Department, but also his own push to remove members of the 
military from the municipal government and, according to Engineering Section chief Yūmura 
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Iwao (ǃŗò), to conduct a massive clean-up of the city starting in July 1942.689 These 
initiatives improved the material conditions of life in Shōnan and helped municipal bureaucrats 
justify Japanese rule to local people and to themselves as well. 
While the municipal administration worked to bring stability to the lives of the people of 
Shōnan, its members evinced the impulse to bring different aspects of everyday life in the city 
under strict Japanese control. As Shinozaki consolidated his control of the relief work of the 
different minzoku associations, the Syonan Times began its attack on the independent relief effort 
of the Federation of Christian Churches.690 The press continued to be hostile until the Federation 
found its own patron in the Japanese administration: Capt. Ogawa of the Education and Religion 
Section of the Gunseikanbu.691 Amid the petty rivalries and administrative shakeups that 
characterized Japanese rule in Shōnan, prewar Asian elites soon learned that if they wished to 
engage in civic life they needed to forge a direct relationship with at least one part of the 
occupation state. 
Shinozaki’s welfare work in late 1942 helped fulfill Ōdachi’s desire to return stability to 
Shōnan and the general intent of the Japanese administration to bring public life under its 
control. It also helped to further other, more limited policy goals. From its inception, Shinozaki’s 
Kōseika played a prominent role in mobilizing local labor for the administration and its various 
projects. At the time, the municipality easily justified including labor recruitment as a part of its 
humanitarian work. At the time that Shinozaki’s office was created in August 1942, the 
breakdown of regional and international trade had fueled not only rampant inflation but mass 
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unemployment as well.692 Unemployment prevented refugees and locally displaced persons from 
rebuilding their lives in Shōnan and throughout Malaya. In mid-1942, both the Gunseikanbu and 
Shōnan Special Municipality began to experiment with strategies for putting the people back to 
work. This initiative was to be, mutually beneficial to occupier and occupied: local residents 
would be earning wages again, and the Japanese could mobilize laborers for work on 
construction projects across Southeast Asia. In reality, the army sometimes seized local people 
by force to work as laborers in local butai or in notorious military projects like the Thailand-
Burma Railway (Taimen Tetsudō ƁǬɗɅ), which began construction in November 1942.693 
Japanese and local sources attest that the army would sometimes gather young men together for 
film screenings or popular radio broadcasts, then load them on to trucks and ship them off to 
labor projects in Malaya and Thailand.694 According to Japanese civil servants at the 
municipality, even the sight of army lorries in the city caused young men to flee to avoid being 
dragooned into forced labor service.695 From the standpoint of these bureaucrats, the army’s 
approach toward labor mobilization was a major disruptive force in the city. 
It is difficult to say whether the change stemmed from a desire to ease popular fears, or 
the intent to bring order to the “recruitment” process, but there seems to have been a coordinated 
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effort to systematize labor mobilization a few months into the occupation. By mid-1942, the 
Gunseikanbu had set up an office in the KPM Building to register unemployed laborers and labor 
brokers who had worked in prewar Singapore. While it began as the unassuming “Labor Squad” 
(Rōmuhan Ƨ), in mid-August this office was renamed and expanded as the Labor 
Management Association of Malaya and Sumatra (Maraya Sumatora Rōmu Kanri Kyōkai 04
2&0(4ǖƩV).696 The municipality’s Kōseika was also created that month, and 
when the Syonan Times introduced the new department to the public it declared that its first 
official task would be to register the “educated unemployed” in the city, setting itself up as an 
alternative employment agency.697 The work of the Gunseikanbu and Kōseika offices 
overlapped, but Shinozaki’s occupied an important niche. White-collar workers had difficulty 
finding work in Shōnan, since many of the Western firms they had worked for ceased operations 
during the campaign and Japanese businesses had yet to fill the void. As a result, while the Labor 
Management Association focused on assigning work to the day laborers who had been the 
lifeblood of the Singaporean economy before the war, Shinozaki’s office focused instead on the 
clerical workers who had worked in European companies and the British colonial administration. 
After the war, some former administrators claimed that Shinozaki’s office helped to keep 
local workers from being sent to the worst of the military’s construction projects. In a statement 
quoted in the History of the Shōnan Special Municipality, Shinozaki recalled that Ōdachi 
instructed him to not entertain requests for laborers from the Ishida Butai (ƾƫɏɢ), which was 
in Shōnan recruiting laborers to work on the Thailand-Burma Railroad.698 It had quickly become 
apparent from the condition of the few local residents who returned from what became known as 
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the “Death Railway” that working conditions there were abysmal and, while Ōdachi admitted 
that they could not stop laborers who actively volunteered to work on the railroad, he wanted 
Shinozaki to do only what was absolutely necessary to support the project.699 But the compilers 
of the History were perhaps eager to use this statement in order to absolve the municipality of 
responsibility for the local residents who died working on the project.700 After the war, Shinozaki 
testified that his office had been in no position to refuse the army’s requests for laborers to work 
in Thailand, and attested that they helped to dispatch around seventy thousand Shōnan residents 
to work on the railway in 1943.701 On April 1, 1943, when the Gunseikanbu got out of the labor 
recruitment business altogether, the work of the Labor Management Agency and Kōseika were 
consolidated in a new, external agency under the Shōnan Special Municipality’s Welfare 
Department called the “Labor Office” or Rōdō Jimukyoku (iGé).702 This office took 
over responsibility for the recruitment of both skilled and unskilled laborers at the moment that 
work on the Thailand-Burma Railway reached a fever pitch as the Japanese army scrambled to 
open the line in August.703 The head of the new office was Niikuni Yasuhiko (Ľ°ĄĎ), yet 
another Home Ministry bureaucrat, but municipal employees saw it as a “branch office” 
(bunshitsu zÙ) of the Kōseika set up largely through Shinozaki’s efforts. The municipality’s 
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role in sending laborers to the Death Railway is borne out in the pages of the Syonan Times, 
where notices announcing training programs for aspirant “military engineers” and other skilled 
laborers appeared next to those calling for “coolies” to work in Thailand.704 While Shinozaki and 
the other members of the municipal government might have been able to mitigate the worst 
excesses of the military’s “recruitment” practices, they were still complicit in a wartime labor 
mobilization scheme that spanned the region and led to the deaths of tens of thousands of Asian 
civilians. 
By the end of 1943 the voracious appetite of the Japanese army for Southeast Asian labor 
had ended the unemployment crisis, and Malaya began to experience an acute labor shortage.705 
By then the municipal Labor Office had streamlined its recruitment process. Although it issued 
occasional advertisements to meet specific needs, it generally solicited the help of the same labor 
brokers, locally known as mandur, who had managed and often housed and fed teams of coolies 
in prewar Singapore. As the occupation continued and the number of butai and private Japanese 
firms in Shōnan ballooned, the Labor Office became a central clearing house for the day laborers 
in the city. On a typical day, the office would receive requests for laborers in the afternoon, local 
mandur would visit in the evening and pledge their workers to these projects, and the next 
morning the office staff would coordinate their transportation to different parts of the island.706 
Before this streamlined system developed Shinozaki took a different approach in coordinating 
the municipality’s first forays into labor recruitment. Rather than work directly with local labor 
brokers he relied on the help of a familiar cast of characters. On August 22, the municipality sent 
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out a notice ordering “educated unemployed” Eurasians, Malays, and Indians to register with the 
Kōseika before the end of the month. It asked Chinese skilled workers to register with the 
Oversea Chinese Association or its leaders.707 A few days before the end of the month the 
Syonan Times published an article praising the OCA for registering over one thousand Chinese, 
although it noted with concern that only around two hundred Eurasians, Malays, and Indians had 
shown up for registration at the municipal building.708 Clearly, Shinozaki could get his work 
done far more effectively with the help of groups like the OCA. 
The next few weeks were marked by a flurry of activity in which Shinozaki established 
ties with other existing minzoku organizations and, where none existed, his own. The bodies that 
affiliated with the Kōseika became involved in relief work, but they also specifically aided 
Shinozaki’s efforts to register the educated unemployed. Shinozaki did not address these efforts 
in detail in his memoirs, but they were laid out in the pages of the Syonan Times at the time. On 
August 30, only a couple of days after its latest update on the registration of educated 
unemployed with the Kōseika, the paper ran an editorial entitled “Local Communities Need 
Revitalizing.”709 The editorial revealed that the “Administration Authorities have had to organize 
bodies for the registration of the unemployed educated sections of the local born communities,” 
although it did so in the context of chastising local leaders for not performing this organizational 
work themselves. While the article did not mention Shinozaki by name, it alludes to him and to 
the head of the Gunseikanbu’s Labor Management Association as “two officials of the Military 
Administration Department whose sympathetic handling of matters connected with the local 
communities has been a source of great gratification to the people of Syonan-to.” In a strident 
                                               
707 “Syonan Tokubetu-si Notice No. 107,” Syonan Times, August 25, 1942. “Zhaonan tebieshi gaoshi di yilingqi hao,” 
Zhaonan Ribao, August 23, 1942. Notice dated August 22.  
708 “Big Industrial Schemes Will Provide Work for Syonan Unemployed,” Syonan Times, August 27, 1942. 
709 “Local Communities Need Revitalizing,” Syonan Times, August 30, 1942. 
 242 
tone characteristic of the Syonan Times before it was taken over by the official Japanese Dōmei 
News Agency in December 1942, the author castigated Eurasian leaders, in particular, for doing 
nothing to assist the Kōseika while celebrating the active approach of the OCA to registering 
members of the Chinese community. The solution to the lack of activity outside the Chinese 
community, the editorial posited, would be for the other peoples of Shōnan to register themselves 
with their “community committees,” which were “the only means whereby the Authorities 
[could] secure contact on a comprehensive basis with the community.” The author of the 
editorial left the definition of “community committee” vague but suggested that they should not 
be divided based on “differences of stock and differences of religious belief.” It is clear from two 
other articles on the same page, however, that these committees were meant to be divided along 
minzoku lines. 
One article announced the cooperation of the IIL with Shinozaki’s relief work, while 
another stated that the heretofore underrepresented Eurasian community needed its own “live 
wire committee.”710 The article on local Eurasians, written by the pro-Japanese Eurasian 
firebrand Charles Nell Leembruggen, illustrated the importance of this moment in the 
organizational life of Japanese Shōnan. An event that seems to have prompted this flurry of 
articles in the Syonan Times was a mass meeting of Eurasians to discuss how the community 
would represent itself to the Japanese authorities.711 As Leembruggen’s article and the postwar 
accounts of local Eurasian leaders and their family members attest, this meeting had been 
preceded by months of fitful attempts to forge a relationship between Eurasian leaders and the 
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administration.712 In the months after the occupation began, A.J. Braga, local prosecutor, vice-
president of Singapore’s Eurasian Association, and president of the Eurasian community’s 
Singapore Recreation Club, led meetings of prominent Eurasian leaders at the home of W.H. 
Mosbergen, the treasurer of the Eurasian Association.713 According to wartime and prewar 
sources, these men met at the behest of a Japanese official—a man whom Mosbergen’s son Rudy 
recalled was named “Asahi”—who wanted to form a group of leaders who could pledge the “full 
support” of the Eurasian community to the administration.714 Sources conflict over when these 
meetings took place, whether in late February or in the months that followed, but they do not 
seem to have produced a lasting associational framework for the Eurasian community.715 Braga 
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does seem to have served as the nominal head of the community, to the extent that Leembruggen 
all but anointed Braga the head of the new committee to represent the Eurasians to the Japanese. 
The next issue of the Syonan Times announced with great fanfare that the mass meeting 
of the Eurasian community had been a success, and that those present had agreed to create a new 
All-Malayan Eurasian Association. But the leader of this new body would not be Braga: instead, 
Dr. C.J. Paglar had been “elected” to this position.716 In reality, Paglar had been hand-picked by 
Shinozaki to lead the Eurasian community, after some maneuvering behind the scenes. In 
testimony that Braga gave after the war, he claimed that he had taken himself out of the running 
when F.V. Woodford, who would become its first secretary of the association, warned him that 
“he was not liked” by the Japanese.717 Paglar, a practicing obstetrician, was a less prominent 
member of the Eurasian community than Braga. In the early 1930s he had been on a course 
toward a prominent role in colonial society: he was friends with Syed Ahmad Alsagoff and was a 
founding member of the Singapore Medical Practitioners Society.718 His standing in local society 
seems to have been damaged when he was temporarily barred from practicing medicine in 
Singapore for professional misconduct.719 His efforts to rehabilitate his career and reputation 
took him to the neighboring state of Johor, where he worked as the personal physician for Sultan 
Ibrahim.720 It is possible that the Sultan, who fostered a close relationship with many Japanese 
figures before and during the occupation, recommended Paglar to the military administration. 
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What is certain is that Paglar became the leader of the Eurasian community after being recruited 
directly by Shinozaki. 
During the Malayan Campaign, Paglar had served as a member of the Medical Auxiliary 
Service for the British. In the aftermath of the British surrender. In a 1983 interview, his son 
recalled that Shinozaki came to visit his father and asked that he lead a new association that 
would represent the Eurasian community to the Japanese administration, while “disseminating 
[the] Government’s ideas” to the community.721 Shinozaki said the same in testimony he gave at 
Paglar’s treason trial by the British after the war and, during the ceremony where he accepted 
leadership of the All-Malaya Eurasian Association, the doctor specifically thanked Shinozaki for 
his “help and advice.”722 Shinozaki, who had overseen the registration of Shōnan’s Eurasians in 
the first weeks of the occupation, seems to have been concerned that Japanese prejudice against 
the mixed-race community would lead to the permanent marginalization of its members unless 
they had some form of representation within the administration.723 Having one organization and 
one leader he could turn to for help in mobilizing the Eurasian community served Shinozaki’s 
interests. Not only could the new association help him register skilled workers in Shōnan—
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which he was particularly keen to do for the highly educated Eurasians—but it could also be 
used to mobilize the Eurasian community to support other occupation projects.724 And, while 
Braga, Mosbergen, Woodford, and other former community leaders served in the body under 
Shinozaki’s hand-picked leader, the association was placed even more firmly under the 
Kōseika’s jurisdiction on October 30, when the Gunseikanbu granted it formal recognition under 
a new name, the Shōnan Eurasian Welfare Association (EWA, Aōjin Kōsei Kyōkai JųMƪ
V).725 Shinozaki’s control over these social organizations grew in tandem with his reputation 
as the leading advocate for local concerns within the administration.  
For the next few months, Shinozaki’s office worked directly with the OCA and the EWA 
to distribute relief and recruit labor, while it maintained less formal relationships with the other 
minzoku organizations in Shōnan. These included the Indian Independence League and the 
Malay organizations, including the Malay advisory board in the Gunseikanbu and the Malay 
Youth Federation, which Ibrahim Yaacob and a handful of fellow nationalists used to maintain 
their positions as representatives of the Malay community. In late 1942 and early 1943, the 
nationalists in these organizations were forced to perform an uncomfortable balancing act. As 
they worked to extend their authority over their respective communities and keep their dreams of 
independence alive, they had to be careful to avoid antagonizing a Japanese administration that 
was formally opposed to nationalist movements in the occupied territories. Ibrahim and his 
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followers proved particularly adept at maintaining this balance, although they were condemned 
by other former Kesatuan Melayu Muda leaders like Mustapha Hussein for kowtowing to the 
Japanese.726 The leaders of the IIL failed to strike this balance. By early 1943, the organization 
had been thrown into disarray by Mohan Singh’s arrest for refusing to cooperate with the 
Iwakuro Kikan and the Tokyo government’s refusal to acknowledge the Bangkok Resolution. In 
his efforts to purge independently-minded leaders who might jeopardize Japanese support for the 
IIL, Rash Behari Bose forced the resignation of Shōnan branch chairman S.C. Goho in March 
1943. Goho was succeeded by a fellow lawyer named A. Yellappa, who had taken a leading role 
in disposing of the Indian community’s quota of lottery tickets a few months earlier.727 Yellappa 
was an ardent nationalist as well, but for the next few months the Shōnan branch of the IIL 
maintained a low profile.728 
Shinozaki’s office continued to rely on Yellappa, Ibrahim, and their organizations to 
implement occupation policy. In May 1943, the Gunseikanbu began recruiting young men “of 
Asiatic race” in Malaya as military auxiliaries, or Heiho (wȘ), to serve in non-combat roles 
within Japanese army units.729 In Shōnan, the Kōseika supervised the recruitment of Heiho, 
presenting them to the public in terms associated with that office. The Syonan Times declared 
that the Heiho scheme demonstrated “the paternal concern of the authorities in the welfare of 
local inhabitants” and would help “provide more opportunities for employment” to those who 
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still lacked work.730 After the announcement of the program the municipal Labor Office handled 
applications that came in to city hall, but aspiring recruits were also asked to report to the offices 
of the minzoku associations so closely associated with Shinozaki’s work—the OCA, the Shōnan 
branch of the IIL, the EWA, and an address associated with the Malay Youth Federation.731 As 
the recruitment drive continued into late May and early June, Ibrahim Yaacob personally took 
charge of the Malay community’s recruitment efforts as the head of a “small informal 
committee” that also included accommodationist prewar figures such as the Malay Union’s Daud 
bin Mohamed Shah and the aristocrats Tengku Abdul Kadir bin Ahmad and Tengku Hussein bin 
Ali.732 By mid-June, Shinozaki and his minzoku associations had delivered another success. The 
Gunseikanbu had expected the Shōnan Special Municipality to recruit 350 Heiho but the city had 
exceeded this quota, selecting 649 recruits from 833 applicants.733 Shinozaki and his local 
partners developed one of the most productive working relationships of the occupation. Although 
their most ambitious project was yet to come, in late 1943 Shinozaki was forced to adapt to 
changes in Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere before he could continue his work.  
 
Embracing Co-Prosperity 
The summer of 1943 marked a turning point for Japan’s wartime empire. The imperial 
fleet never recovered from its defeat at the Battle of Midway in June 1942, and in February 1943 
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the army was forced to withdraw from Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. Around the same 
time, Japan’s German and Italian allies met with disaster in North Africa and Russia.734 And, in 
May, imperial forces on Attu in the Aleutian Islands conducted their first gyokusai (“breaking 
the jewel,” ƣǀ): a desperate, suicidal attack on Allied positions that came to be known in 
English as a “banzai charge.” The Japanese press presented the gyokusai to the public as the 
apotheosis of the bravery and selflessness of the Japanese soldier.735 In private, however, the 
string of defeats dispelled the euphoria that Japanese leaders had felt after their stunning victories 
in early 1942. Some, particularly in the military, began to steel themselves for a long and 
grinding war of attrition, although they still hoped to lure the Allies into a “decisive battle” that 
would force them to sue for peace on Japan’s terms. Others were less optimistic. While the actual 
terms that Japan would agree to in 1945—unconditional surrender and the dissolution of the 
empire—were still unthinkable, or at least unmentionable, members of the government began to 
consider actions they could take to improve their negotiating positions should the Allied advance 
continue. 
One response of imperial policymakers, particularly in the Foreign Ministry and newly 
created Greater East Asia Ministry, was to reimagine the relationship between the empire and the 
Asian peoples under its control. Over the course of 1943 the public image of the Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was transformed from a collection of territories being developed 
under Japanese tutelage to an East Asian alternative to the Atlantic Charter—a group of 
independent nations united in their commitment to creating an “Asia for Asians.” Jeremy Yellen 
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has argued that this diplomatic initiative was intended to convince the Allies, neutral nations, 
and, most important, the occupied peoples themselves that Japan did not seek global 
domination—as Allied propagandists had it—but instead aspired to a new, more equitable 
international order than what the racist and imperialistic Anglo-Americans could offer.736 To the 
more idealistic members of the civil service and military this new policy meant that the empire 
could finally live up to its ideals, even if Japanese commanders on the ground continued to 
exercise enormous influence in occupied China and Southeast Asia. More significant, however, 
were the new opportunities that this shift opened for Japan’s partners in these areas to raise their 
political profiles. 
In China, the Japanese army began to grant Wang Jingwei’s regime greater autonomy in 
governing the areas under its control and finally allowed Wang to declare war on the Allied 
powers, a move that would give his government a seat at the negotiating table at the end of the 
war. Japan relinquished extraterritorial rights in China in January 1943, the month that British 
and American diplomats signed treaties to the same effect in Chongqing.737 In Southeast Asia, 
Japanese government had already determined to grant Burma and the Philippines “independence 
under the forceful guidance and command of the empire.”738 When Burma gained independence 
in August and the Philippines followed in October, Japanese propagandists attempted to give 
these events world-historical significance, claiming that they added “a new and glorious page… 
to the history” of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.739 To Japanese commanders in 
                                               
736 Yellen, 214–219. 
737 John Hunter Boyle, China and Japan at War, 1937–1945: The Politics of Collaboration (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1972), 308–309. 
738 Daihon’ei Rikugunbu ñŽÖなɝɴ, Nanpō senryōchi kaku chiiki betsu tōchi yōkō µŤ·ʑãÄãèȅƨȶ
ȇ, C12120138100, October 12, 1942, NIDS, 258–259. 
739 “Opinion,” Syonan Sinbun, August 2, 1943. An article in the Mainichi Shimbun used almost the exact same 
language, describing the independence of Burma “marked a new page in the construction of Greater East Asia.” 
“Biruma/Dokuritsu wo chūgai ni sengen @MD9ƠǐAÁØȠ“ Mainichi Shimbun, August 2, 1943.  
 251 
these countries and to policymakers in Tokyo, the appearance of independence mattered more 
than its substance. But to keep up appearances, the Japanese were forced to make concessions to 
their new allies. The most public expression of the new esteem in which the Japanese held the 
members of the Co-Prosperity Sphere was the summit held in Tokyo in November 1943, the 
Greater East Asia Conference attended by Prime Minister Ba Maw of Burma, President José P. 
Laurel of the Philippines, Wang Jingwei, Manchurian Prime Minister Zhang Jinghui, and Thai 
diplomat Prince Wan Waithayakon.740 But the most important participant in the conference from 
the perspective of the people of Shōnan was the new leader of the Indian nationalist movement in 
Southeast Asia, Subhas Chandra Bose. 
Subhas Chandra Bose, like Rash Behari Bose, was born in Bengal and dedicated 
achieving Indian independence. But he came from a later generation of anticolonial nationalists. 
While the elder Bose had fled to Japan after a failed attempt to assassinate the Viceroy of India 
in 1912, the younger Subhas Chandra Bose rose through the ranks of the Indian National 
Congress (INC) and was elected president of the party in 1938. As the leader of the more militant 
wing of the INC, Bose clashed with Gandhi and was ousted from his position a year later.741 In 
1940 the British placed Bose under house arrest, but he escaped and fled to Nazi Germany, 
where he had previously spent time in exile.742 Here Bose tried to drum up support for the 
liberation of India, but his appeals found little traction in the German government. During the 
June 1942 Bangkok Conference, the Indian Independence League requested that the Japanese 
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secure safe passage for Bose to Southeast Asia and, while the Japanese were initially hesitant to 
invite such a renowned nationalist to the occupied territories, in early 1943 the Germans and the 
Japanese cooperated to smuggle Bose to East Asia by submarine.743 Bose resurfaced with great 
fanfare in Tokyo, where Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki pledged Japan’s support for Indian 
independence. In early July both Bose and Tōjō travelled to Shōnan, where the former assumed 
the mantle of leadership of the Indian Independence League from an ailing Rash Behari Bose. 
Bose’s arrival electrified the Indian community in Shōnan and the rest of Southeast Asia. 
As Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper explain, “the people of Malaya had never before 
experienced a political presence in the mould of a giant of the Indian National Congress.”744 
Bose travelled the region, speaking at mass rallies, recruiting followers and raising funds for the 
cause. Enthusiasm for the Indian Independence League soared, and the organization began to 
operate with more freedom than it had earlier in the occupation. Until mid-1943, the Japanese 
government had been reluctant to accept the Bangkok Resolution that Malayan-based Indian 
nationalists N. Raghavan and K.P.K. Menon had drafted in 1942, which would recognize the IIL 
as the sole representative of the Indian community in Malaya. But the new imperial policy 
toward the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere required that Bose be recognized as the 
leader of an independent nation. As a result, in October 1943 Bose was able to establish the 
Provisional Government of Free India (Arzi Hukumat-e-Azad Hind, commonly referred to as 
Azad Hind), while the moribund Indian National Army was reconstituted as the Azad Hind Fauj, 
or Free Indian Army (though it would continue to be referred to as the INA).745 When he 
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attended the Greater East Asia Conference that next month, Bose did so as the professed leader 
of one of the most populous nations on Earth. 
The IIL, and the status of its leaders, was transformed overnight by the creation of Azad 
Hind. While S.C. Goho worked in his private legal practice for the remainder of the occupation, 
his successor at the Shōnan branch of the IIL, A. Yellappa, threw himself into the newly 
invigorated nationalist movement as an advisor to the Azad Hind government and played a 
critical role in helping Dr. Lakshmi Swaminathan found the INA’s all-female Rani of Jhansi 
Regiment.746 Not everyone was enthusiastic about Bose and the Azad Hind. K.P.K. Menon, 
former member of the IIL’s Council of Action, condemned Bose as a “fascist dictator” and was 
arrested in April 1944.747 But, whether caught up in Bose’s movement or resistant to it, for much 
of the remainder of the war the attention of the Indian community was focused on matters 
outside of Shōnan, especially once the Azad Hind moved its headquarters to Rangoon in 
December 1943 and INA troops began fighting alongside the Japanese during the Imphal 
Campaign the following March.748 As a result, while Yellappa continued working with 
Shinozaki, the Shōnan branch of the IIL could no longer assist the Kōseika as it had a few 
months earlier.749 While he was wary of infringing on the work of the Southern Expeditionary 
Army’s Iwakuro Kikan, now under new leadership as the Hikari Kikan (qűɝ), Shinozaki 
decided to form his own Shōnan Indian Welfare Association (IWA, Shōnan Indo Kōsei Kyōkai, 
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Ņ8)ƪV) in April 1944.750 The president of the new welfare association was M.V. 
Pillai, a Ceylon Tamil judge in the Supreme Court (Kōtōhōin ɯǔƀɞ), and its committee was 
made up of veterans of the early days of the IIL as well as the former president of the All-India 
Muslim Club, K.S. Anwari.751 Though Shinozaki claims that Bose demanded the dissolution of 
the IWA in early 1945, a demand that Shinozaki resisted, the organization served as liaison 
organization between local Indian residents and the municipal government (and specifically the 
Kōseika) for the remainder of the occupation. 
The Malay nationalists were also empowered by Japan’s new attitude toward the Co-
Prosperity Sphere. Japanese authorities were however, far more reluctant to discuss the 
possibility of Malayan independence and seriously broached the issue only in 1945.752 In May 
1943, it was still official Japanese policy that Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Borneo, and the Celebes—
all the territories that had not enjoyed autonomy before the war—would remain imperial 
territories (teikoku ryōdo ÷°ɩ³).753 In order to strengthen the cooperation of the peoples of 
these territories, however, policymakers in Tokyo agreed that local commanders should 
encourage greater political participation, “in accordance with the civilizational standard of the 
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natives” (genjūmin no mindo ni ōji YŹŹăĘ).754 In July 1943, Watanabe Wataru’s 
replacement as head of the General Affairs Bureau in the Malayan Gunseikanbu, Maj. Gen. 
Fujimura Masuzō (ȑŗƴȏ), relayed this policy to the governors of the Malayan states.755 This 
was the same month that Tōjō and Subhas Chandra Bose arrived in Shōnan, and it was also when 
Ibrahim Yaacob’s cautious approach toward Malaya’s occupiers paid off as he led a delegation 
of Malay aristocrats and his former acolytes from the KMM to Japan.756 Fujimura welcomed 
Ibrahim back to Shōnan in November, praising his delegation’s “confidence in victory” and 
“self-consciousness as a race in the Dai Toa Kyoeiken,” and the next month the Southern Area 
Army gave him command of the Giyūgun (Ǵȷ), a new volunteer army that, alongside the 
Giyūtai (Volunteer Corps, Ǵɢ) based in the Malay states, were to help Japan defend Malaya 
against the Allies.757 
As Ibrahim dove into his military training as commander of the Giyūgun, Shinozaki had 
to fill the power vacuum that he left in Shōnan’s Malay community. On December 3, the Syonan 
Sinbun announced the foundation of the Shōnan Malay Welfare Association (MWA, Shōnan 
Marai Kōsei Kyōkai ŅɭřƪV).758 Ibrahim, bluntly referred to as “the leader of the 
Malai community,” would advise to the new association and his close associate, Onan Haji Siraj, 
would serve as its secretary. Dr. Gaus, the Indonesian nationalist, and Ishak Haji Muhammad, 
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the former KMM member turned editor of the Berita Malai, would also join the association. But 
its president and vice-president would be Tengku Abdul Kadir bin Ahmad and Tengku Hussein 
bin Ali. Both were members of the local Malay aristocracy, who traced their ancestry to the local 
royal family and had received stipends from the prewar British in observance of the treaties that 
had established Singapore. While Onan helped to maintain the nationalists’ influence in the 
MWA, the appointment of the two aristocrats as its leaders represented the continuing preference 
of Shinozaki and other administrators to work with the prewar accommodationist elite. The local 
Arab community, meanwhile, was assigned their own Shōnan Arab Welfare Association (AWA, 
Shōnan Arabu Kōsei Kyōkai Ņ4-ƪV) under the leadership of Mohamad bin 
Ahmad Alkaff who, like the members of the Alsagoff family who had represented the Arab 
community in the previous months and would become members of the AWA, was the scion of 
one of the wealthiest families in Shōnan.759 Their bureaucratic segregation complete, the MWA 
and AWA still worked closely together to supply laborers to the Japanese and organize religious 
ceremonies.760 
With the foundation of the Malay, Arab, and Indian Welfare Associations, Shinozaki’s 
centralization of the minzoku organizations under the control of his Kōseika had reached its 
fullest extent. The Shōnan branch of the IIL, which imperial policy demanded be treated as part 
of an independent national government, was the only local communal body to remain formally 
separate from the municipality and even it now had to compete with the IWA for the attention of 
the Indian community. Religious bodies continued to operate in Shōnan under the supervision of 
the Gunseikanbu, although Shinozaki forged deeper relations with them as well, most notably 
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with the Catholic Church. As a result, the Kōseika now oversaw an institutional framework that 
allowed it to mobilize practically every resident in Shōnan. While these social organizations 
continued to facilitate the recruitment of laborers and Heiho for the administration, for much of 
1944 their primary task was to assist Shinozaki in implementing a massive scheme to set up 
agricultural settlements in rural Malaya through the minzoku organizations they controlled. 
 
Back to the Land: Agricultural Settlements at Endau and Bahau 
At the end of 1943, Shinozaki was ordered to facilitate the removal of at least three 
hundred thousand residents in Shōnan to agricultural settlements up the Malay Peninsula. The 
order landed on the desk of Naitō Kan’ichi, a former governor of Ibaraki Prefecture and head of 
the Gunseikanbu’s Industry and Trade Department before he replaced Ōdachi as mayor a few 
months earlier. Naitō was new to the job and decided to rely on Shinozaki, who had been with 
the administration from the beginning and enjoyed such a productive relationship with Shōnan’s 
minzoku associations, to implement the scheme.761 The construction of these agricultural 
settlements would call on all the resources at Shinozaki’s disposal, and particularly the 
organizational capacity of the minzoku leaders he had worked with for the past year and a half. 
Shinozaki discussed the origins of the evacuation policy and his efforts to implement it in 
his Japanese memoir.762 According to his memoir, the plan for creating these agricultural 
settlements came as a direct response to a September attack on ships in Shōnan’s harbor which 
Japanese intelligence was convinced had been organized by a local spy network (it was in fact 
carried out by commandos operating out of Australia).763 As Shinozaki tells it, in the aftermath 
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of the attack the army was eager to reduce the number of residents in the “nerve center” of Co-
Prosperity Sphere, particularly among suspect communities like the overseas Chinese and the 
Eurasians. The top-secret internal documents of the Gunseikanbu tell a different story. In 
October 1943, the Japanese had transferred the northernmost Malay states—Kedah, Kelantan, 
and Terengganu—to Thailand as a “reward” for their reluctant ally’s participation in the war.764 
This had deprived Malaya of its primary rice-producing regions at a time when rice imports from 
Thailand and Burma were still only a fraction of their prewar levels. According to the 
documents, the settlements were meant to help bring new land under cultivation and increase 
agricultural production; they were not an attempt to move the Chinese and Eurasians out of 
Shōnan.765 
There are a few potential reasons for the discrepancy between Shinozaki’s account and 
the Gunseikanbu records. The Gunseikanbu may not have been privy to the army’s justifications 
for the resettlement campaign, in the light of Shinozaki’s claim that the “operational order” 
(sakusen meirei [Ĩ¡R) to start evacuating the city came directly to the municipality from 
army command and bypassed the regional military administration.766 But it seems unlikely that 
the Gunseikanbu would have been left out of the loop. As Paul Kratoska points out, this was a 
period when the administration oversaw the relocation of urban residents to rural agricultural 
settlements across Malaya in what was evidently a coordinated regional program.767 Shinozaki 
may have mentioned his concern for the evacuation of the victimized Chinese and Europeans to 
justify the scheme after the fact, especially since the settlements were abysmal failures at 
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increasing food production. But the likeliest cause of this discrepancy were the multiple, 
overlapping agendas of different groups in the Japanese administration. Shinozaki and other 
members of the municipality may indeed have been eager to evacuate members of the more 
vulnerable communities from Shōnan. By Shinozaki’s own admission, however, he was ordered 
to send settlers to Negeri Sembilan, where Japanese officials from the Agriculture and Forestry 
Ministry had been attempting to develop the jungle and increase food production with new 
strains of rice from Taiwan.768 Rather than fit any single agenda, the settlement scheme seems to 
have generated momentum because it helped officials at different levels of the administration 
meet their particular policy goals. 
Shinozaki had been given the difficult task of convincing thousands of urban residents to 
relocate to the countryside. From the perspective of the municipality, this needed to be a 
voluntary evacuation. Once he had assigned Shinozaki the task of overseeing the settlement 
scheme, Mayor Naitō invited him to dinner at his residence. At this informal meeting, the mayor 
warned Shinozaki about news he had heard from another Japanese occupied territory. In Hong 
Kong, the army had tried to “evacuate” residents by loading large numbers of people on to ships 
and then abandoning them at sea. While in itself  this behavior was horrific, Naitō explained that 
it also posed a practical problem by adding to the “disquiet” (fuan @Ñ) of the people, which 
made it anathema to their governing style in Shōnan. Naitō ordered Shinozaki to avoid using 
force in carrying out the army’s evacuation plan and assured him that he had the mayor’s 
complete confidence.769 Shinozaki uses this anecdote to explain a major concession he was able 
                                               
768 The civil servants that Shinozaki singles out for their work on local agricultural production were Nakamura (\
ſ), head of the state’s Industry Department, Itō (vȬ), head of the Agriculture and Forestry Section, and a civilian 
technical officer (gikan Ŕā) named Hinokio (ƕē).  Shinozaki, Shingapōru, 116. 
769 Shinozaki, Shingapōru, 98–99. 
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to wrest from the Gunseikanbu. To provide an incentive for local peoples to leave the city, he 
convinced the military administration to allow self-governance in these settlements and, more 
important, to ensure that the Kempeitai and civilian police would not interfere in their internal 
affairs.770 With this inducement, he claims he was able to convince the Oversea Chinese 
Association to commit itself creating the first agricultural settlement from Shōnan 
Convincing the OCA to participate in the project was critical. The organization had long 
been a one of Shinozaki’s most important partners, but its ability to mobilize the considerable 
financial and human resources of the Chinese community made it critical to the settlement’s 
success. The OCA threw its organizational weight behind the scheme, putting together a 
supervisory committee to corral its resources and an inspection party to accompany Shinozaki to 
inspect potential settlement sites on the peninsula.771 The group decided to settle at Endau, a 
well-watered tract of land two hundred kilometers from Shōnan along the east coast, on the 
border between Johor and Pahang. The OCA sent laborers to clear the land, burn the felled trees 
and other vegetation, and set up wet- and dry-rice fields to take advantage of the nutrient-rich ash 
that remained.772 Shinozaki claims that this work began in October, but it would be another 
month before the Japanese-controlled press publicly acknowledged the scheme, evidently in 
response to rumors that the Gunseikanbu would soon forcibly relocate urban residents to 
internment camps in rural Malaya. On November 25, the Syonan Sinbun and Syonan Jitpoh both 
announced that the Gunseikanbu was setting up new “model farms” that would solve Malaya’s 
pervasive food shortages.773 It would be weeks before the OCA’s settlement, which took on the 
                                               
770 Shinozaki, Shingapōru, 99–100. 
771 Shinozaki, Shingapōru, 100. 
772 Shinozaki, Shingapōru, 101–103. 
773 In English, articles would regularly refer to these settlements as “collective farms.” That was and remained a 
misnomer: while new settlers would often live and work communally the goal of the settlements was to settle 
families on individual, privately-owned plots. The Syonan Jitpoh’s adherence to the term “model farms” (mofan 
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name New Shōnan, would be ready for settlement. This was because the supervisory committee 
refused to rush its development. By the end of December , they had sent hundreds of workers to 
the settlement to prepare for the first batch of families, building not only individual homes but 
also a temple, church, hospital, school, and numerous commercial buildings.774 By the end of 
January, the number of laborers working to prepare the settlement approached one thousand.775 
To tide the settlers over until the first crops would ripen, the OCA acquired coffee beans from 
Sumatra and bartered them for rice from the overseas Chinese community in Thailand.776 When 
the first families departed for New Shōnan shortly after Chinese New Year in 1944, they had a 
fully developed and functioning settlement ready to receive them with a stockpile of food and 
seed to begin their new lives as farmers.777 
The same could not be said for Shōnan’s other agricultural settlers. In his memoirs, 
Shinozaki suggests that the city’s other major settlement, in the heart of the peninsula in Bahau, 
Negeri Sembilan, was an afterthought.778 According to him, the OCA had initially rejected this 
site because of its poor soil and lack of fresh water. Once Endau was up and running, however, 
Shinozaki claims that its example inspired other communities to set up their own agricultural 
settlements in Malaya. This was particularly true of the Eurasians, whose mixed-European 
                                               
nongcun, ƐǸɟſ) was more accurate. “Gunsei Announces Collective Farms Plan: 2,000 Households in Malai Will 
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775 “About 1,000 Persons Hard at Work to Ensure Success of New Syonan Scheme,” Syonan Shimbun, January 20, 
2604. 
776 Shinozaki, Shingapōru, 106–107. 
777 “First Batch of Settlers Leave for New Syonan,” Syonan Shimbun, February 2, 2604. 
778 Shinozaki’s English-language memoir, which is much sparser than its Chinese- and Japanese-language 
counterparts, does not suggest that Bahau was developed based on Endau’s example. In both other versions of his 
memoir, however, Shinozaki explicitly states that the success at Endau inspired Bahau’s development. Shinozaki, 
Shingapōru, 116. Shinozaki Mamoru, Syonan—My Story: The Japanese Occupation of Singapore (Singapore: Asia 
Pacific Press, 1975), 87. Shinozaki Mamoru ǹĜɔ, Xinjiapo lun xian san nian ban ţ¦æưどWĩ³, translated 
by Chin Kah Chong と¦ū, 3rd ed. (Singapore: Fan ya tong xun she ƩjɥȾǣ, 1982), 113. 
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heritage had earned them constant surveillance and suspicion from the military authorities. 
Shinozaki worked with the local Catholic Bishop, Adrien Devals, (most Eurasians were 
Catholics) and C.J. Paglar’s Eurasian Welfare Association to put together a settlement for this 
community at Bahau. Although the first inspection party to the site left him “without hope,” 
Shinozaki claims that he was buoyed by Devals’ faith in his parishioners and the project.779 
Inconsistencies in Shinozaki’s own account and discrepancies between his memoir and the 
propaganda press call this timeline into doubt, however. For instance, Bahau was not modeled 
after Endau. Instead, both settlements were developed at the same time, in the final months of 
1943, and the first batch of settlers departed for Bahau on December 28, 1943, more than a 
month before Endau’s first settlers.780 Shinozaki also admits that the military had specifically 
ordered him to send settlers to Bahau to support the work of local officials there, and that he had 
asked the leaders of all the minzoku association to supply settlers before Devals acquiesced.781 
Rather than a secondary settlement inspired by Endau’s success, Bahau seemed to be a bullet that 
the OCA had dodged: a suboptimal tract of land that communities with fewer independent 
resources would be forced to settle. 
The problems with the land that the Bahau settlement sat on went beyond unreliable 
water and poor soil. Despite the eagerness of the Negeri Sembilan administration to push rice 
cultivation further into the interior, they had barely prepared Bahau for settlement. The jungle 
                                               
779 Shinozaki had become acquainted with the French Bishop, who oversaw all of Malaya, early in the occupation: 
his first headquarters in the Tōyō Hotel was near the Bishop’s home. While Shinozaki avoided working with 
explicitly religious bodies early in the occupation, he would forge a close working relationship with the Catholic 
hierarchy in Malaya from this point forward. Shinozaki, Shingapōru, 116–117, 122–124. 
780 Many of the laborers who arrived in Endau in the preceding months did stay on as settlers, but before February 
the inhabitants of Endau were devoted to developing the settlement and on the OCA’s payroll. “First Batch of 
Catholics Leave for Bahau,” Syonan Shimbun, December 29, 2603. “Leader Urges Chinese to Give Full Support to 
Endau Scheme,” Syonan Shimbun, January 7, 2604. 
781 Shinozaki, Shingapōru, 116–117. 
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had been cleared months before the first inspection parties from Shōnan had come through. 
Some of the debris had been burned, but the nutrient-heavy ash had mostly washed away. Large 
tree trunks lay where they had been felled, and secondary growth was already creeping back in 
between the logs. There was no reliable source of fresh water in the area, and stagnant pools that 
had collected among the debris soon became breeding grounds for mosquitos, making malaria an 
ever-present danger. The only buildings that had been prepared for the settlers by the Negeri 
Sembilan authorities were two attap barracks.782 In addition to the dismal state of the site itself, 
Shinozaki was unable to guarantee local self-government as he had been able to for the OCA in 
Endau. Instead, the Bahau settlement would be governed by Negeri Sembilan, which proved to 
be less responsive to the needs of the settlers for supplies and assistance than Shinozaki had 
promised.783 The Kempeitai may have left Bahau to its own devices, but the general neglect of 
the settlement by the Japanese authorities who had jurisdiction over it did not bode well for its 
success.  
Despite these problems and the inability of the Catholic Church and the Eurasian Welfare 
Association to prepare the area for settlement, the first settlers were rushed to Bahau a little over 
a month after the project was first publicly announced.784 They were predominantly Catholic 
Eurasians but, as time went on, Chinese Catholics and Eurasian Protestants joined them, 
although the Chinese and Eurasians kept to different parts of the settlement.785 In theory, Bahau 
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professionals. Many Chinese Catholics, however, were Teochew-speaking agriculturalists. As a result, the Chinese 
Catholic section of Bahau was much more successful at supporting itself than the Eurasian section.  Rudy William 
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was meant to be home to a much broader cross-section of Shōnan’s population. While the Arab 
Welfare Association opened a small farm on behalf of the tiny Arab community on Shōnan 
Island itself, immediately after the first Catholic settlers left for Bahau, both the Malay Welfare 
Association and the Shōnan Branch of the Indian Independence League began accepting 
applications for Malays and Indians to settle there as well.786 On January 5, 1944—a month after 
its creation—the Malay Welfare Association sent its own inspection team to Bahau. The 
delegation included the president of the association, Tengku Abdul Kadir, as well as Dr. Gaus. 
While Gaus would later attest that Bahau was a dismal place he had no interest in returning to, as 
a member of the delegation he was featured in an article in the Syonan Shimbun praising the 
settlement plan and claiming that the settlement was “not an open piece of land with jungle all 
around it”—which it most certainly was—and assuring the people of Shōnan that malaria was 
unknown in the area.787 
The article drew on Gaus’ authority both as a leader of the MWA and a medical doctor. 
Although plans to send Malay and Indian settlers to Bahau fizzled—and there were similarly ill-
fated attempts to establish farming settlements by the MWA and the IWA within Shōnan’s 
jurisdiction, on Bintan, Karimun, and Kundur Islands—Gaus’ memoir failed to address his own 
complicity in convincing local residents to relocate to this ill-suited tract in the jungle.788 But the 
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medical doctor who played the largest role in promoting Bahau to the people of Shōnan was the 
president of the Eurasian Welfare Association, Dr. C.J. Paglar.  
Starting in late 1943, Paglar was quoted in article after article in the Syonan Shimbun 
promoting the settlement and the healthy lifestyle it afforded, assuring readers that the settlers 
were healthy and happy.789 Like Gaus, Paglar claimed early on that mosquitos were not a 
problem.790 These were lies that became apparent to anyone who regularly read the paperover the 
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790 “Dr. C. J. Paglar Visits Bahau Farm Colony: Eurasian-Settlers Fit, Enthusiastic,” Syonan Shimbun, March 3, 2604. 
 266 
next few months. Life in Bahau was difficult on a scale that the Syonan Times and Syonan Jitpoh 
could not hide. The Eurasian community had been concentrated in the colonial cities of Malaya 
for centuries and had no agricultural expertise. Devals and the Catholic priests in the settlement 
tried to set an example of diligent and humble work for the settlers under their charge, but they 
also had little experience with agriculture. The settlement failed to produce enough food to feed 
its residents, and malnutrition and exhaustion began to set in. Despite the minimal support they 
had supplied, the Negri Sembilan state government, under Home Ministry bureaucrat and former 
Tottori governor Hatta Saburō (tƫ=ɍ), blamed the deteriorating situation on the settlers 
themselves, telling Shinozaki that the settlers from Shōnan were all “slackers” (namakemono Ĝ

ǵ). Shinozaki was more sympathetic to the people he had sent off to the jungle, but was not 
above blaming the victims as well, complaining that the Eurasians did not have a proper sense of 
community compared to the (far better supplied) Chinese of Endau.791 Without adequate support 
from the administration, the settlers of Bahau were vulnerable to malaria when it arrived in the 
colony a few months after the first group of settlers. Benedict de Souza describes 1944 as a 
vicious cycle of malnutrition, exhaustion, and malaria.792 By this point there were roughly two 
thousand people living in Bahau, a quarter of whom would die.793 The situation grew so dire that 
Shinozaki was forced to stop sending new settlers in April and to begin a full-scale effort to curb 
malaria.794 Young men like De Souza, who otherwise had little to do in the fields, were sent out 
with cans of oil to eradicate mosquito larvae. By August 1944 the humanitarian disaster was so 
extreme that even the propaganda papers in Shōnan were filled with appeals for donations to the 
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Bahau Settlement Fund.795 Paglar, who encouraged many of the settlers to leave Shōnan a few 
months earlier, put his children to work making emergency batches of quinine which he then 
rushed up to the settlement.796 But there were limits to what the doctor could do, and by January 
1945 even Bishop Devals had died of tetanus, which he had contracted while working in the 
fields.797 
The OCA’s settlement at Endau did not experience disaster on the same scale. Malaria 
was less pervasive on the coast and the supervisory committee’s meticulous preparations for the 
settlers had paid off. The settlement also fell under the jurisdiction of the Shōnan Special 
Municipality, and as a result Shinozaki was able to send more supplies and even had a team of 
agricultural experts who helped the settlers get on their feet.798 But the settlement faced other 
dangers. The Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), the military arm of the Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP), fought a guerrilla war against the Japanese for the entire three-and-a-
half-year occupation. A majority-Chinese organization, the MPAJA produced propaganda that 
was particularly critical of the “collaborators” who ran the OCA. Soon after the founding of the 
settlement, convoys of OCA officials and their Japanese counterparts were ambushed while 
travelling between Endau and Shōnan. First the OCA’s vice president, Lee Choon Seng (Ŗ_
Ĭ), was shot but survived after being rushed to a nearby hospital. Some assumed that guerrillas 
mistook him for top Japanese advisor, Hirose Toyosaku (þƑȭ[), who was travelling in the 
same convoy. But then Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation leader Tan Ean Teck (ɟąĔ), 
who had been intimately involved with the development of Endau, was shot to death while 
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driving through Johor.799 Then the MPAJA struck in Endau itself, killing head of security and 
veteran of warlord Li Zongren’s army, Huang Dasan (ɴɆ=).800 These killings became a fact of 
life in Endau. Gay Wan Guay (e£Á) remembered seeing a “traitor” led out to the padi fields 
and shot in the head, while nurse Lee Hock Seng recalled performing post-mortems on an OCA 
official and his assistants killed while leaving the village restaurant.801 Gay remembers that the 
killings frightened the settlers at Endau but were not unpopular. In his words:  
“[T]hey sometimes were quite … satisfied that these people were justifiably 
wicked and deserved that this kind of justice should be meted out to them for 
helping the enemy. As a matter of fact, most of the people who went to Endau 
suffered the condition of life because of the Japanese. So, if they were supporters 
of the Japanese, they were traitors to their own race. So, most of the people were 
not too unhappy about it.”802 
 
He also remembers the OCA leadership being powerless to stop the killings. In the end, it was 
Shinozaki who put an end to the violence in Endau. After setting up a line of communication 
with the guerrillas, Shinozaki was able to stop the killings in exchange for a monthly supply of 
rice.803 While the OCA had been able to set up a functioning agricultural settlement, they were 
completely incapable of meeting the political challenge of the MPAJA. 
 
Shinozaki would not have been able to coordinate relief distribution, recruit laborers and 
auxiliaries for the army, or set up his agricultural settlements without the close cooperation of the 
social organizations associated with the Kōseika and the managerial skills of the men who led 
them. Although he and other administrators in Shōnan worked with nationalists when they 
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needed to, their preferred partners were businessmen like Ching Kee Sun, landowners like the 
Alsagoffs, and professionals like C.J. Paglar. These were the types of figures who had dominated 
colonial society before the war and were made to play similar roles under the Japanese. They 
were the face of policy implementation although they had no control over what those policies 
might be. Even for more humane administrators like Ōdachi and Shinozaki, governance in 
Shōnan only went in one direction, from the Gunseikanbu or Shōnan Special Municipality’s 
leadership, down through mid-level bureaucrats, and then through minzoku leaders to the people. 
Since minzoku leaders were forced to implement policy that they clearly had no control over and 
were even made to lie about in the press, and their powerlessness was not lost on the members of 
their communities that they supposedly represented. After the war, this powerlessness would 
become the dominant narrative about Shōnan’s “traditional” leaders’ relationships with the 
wartime Japanese empire.  
At the same time, through the work of these men and the social organizations they led, 
the state extended itself into daily life in Shōnan on an unprecedented scale. The British had 
never attempted anything like Shinozaki’s relief efforts or his employment drive. They had never 
controlled access to daily commodities on the scale that the kumiai did, or distributed rations on 
a scale that the Auxiliary Police Force managed. The occupation state asked much of the people 
of Shōnan, but it also promised something in return, even though it could not always deliver. 
When the British returned in 1945, it quickly became clear to them that the people of the newly 
liberated Singapore no longer looked to their traditional leaders for support but had instead 
expanded expectations for what the state ought to do for them. When the short-lived postwar 
 270 







Chapter 6 – An End to the Politics of Accommodation 
 
The Collapse: From Shōnan back to Singapore in Three Bloody Weeks 
 In late 1944 American bombers began striking Shōnan, focusing on strategic targets like 
the Seletar Naval base on the island’s north coast. Japan’s 7th Area Army, which was 
headquartered in Shōnan and oversaw the administrations of Malaya, Sumatra, Borneo, and Java 
from early 1944, began to prepare to city for a final stand against the Allies. Local residents were 
impressed into building air raid shelters and defensive fortifications through the “voluntary” 
Labour Service Corps, while Japanese civilians in Shōnan began receiving military and first-aid 
training.804 Asahina Nobuko (ŐłÇaÍ), who worked at City Hall, remembered that she and 
her colleagues only began to appreciate the gravity of the war when they were told to write their 
full names clearly on all their clothing.805 Shinozaki Mamoru, meanwhile, accelerated his 
evacuation plans for Shōnan’s local residents after hearing about the civilian deaths during the 
Battle of Manila. Rumors about the bloodbaths in Manila and Saipan began circulating among 
the population as well.806 Shinozaki no longer coordinated settlement in Endau or Bahau, and 
instead simply loaded residents on to specially reserved trains and sent them up the peninsula to 
settle wherever they could, out of the deathtrap that Shōnan would become when the Allies 
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attempted to retake it.807 First generation Eurasians and the remaining free members of the 
Jewish community, meanwhile, were sent to the civilian internment camp along Sime Road in 
early 1945. Scion Elias remembered that the interned Jewish men and women began fearing for 
the worst when they were ordered to two large underground tunnels behind the barracks.808 As 
news trickled in of Allied bombings in Japan, the city braced itself for the bloody denouement of 
the war. 
 No one in Shōnan anticipated the Japanese government’s acceptance of the Potsdam 
Declaration and unconditional surrender on August 15. Itagaki Seishirō (ŝ»Đ­ɍ), now a 
full general and commander of the 7th Area Army, kept the news to himself before finally 
notifying the leaders of the administration on August 18 that the emperor had ordered the 
Japanese military to lay down its arms.809 Aono Toshio (ɦɔķÆ), the head of the municipal 
Food Control Department, began sobbing, suspended between feeling relief and despair at the 
fact that the long years of war had achieved nothing.810 Shinozaki announced the surrender at an 
evacuation encouragement rally (sokai gekirei taikai ưɛƐÃV) that the OCA held on the 
evening of August 18, then rushed to the train station to stop the latest group of evacuees from 
leaving the city.811 The next issue of the Syonan Times, which came out on August 20, finally 
made the news public, publishing the full translation that the army headquarters had released of 
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Emperor Hirohito’s unprecedented radio address announcing the surrender five days earlier.812 
The people of Shōnan felt a mixture of joy, relief, and fear about what might happen next. 
They were not the only ones surprised by the sudden news of Japan’s surrender. The 
Allied South East Asia Command (SEAC), led by Lord Louis Mountbatten, knew about the 
atomic bombings and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria that had prompted Japan’s surrender, but 
they too were shocked at how suddenly the war had come to an end. SEAC had anticipated 
retaking Singapore in early 1946 and using it as a staging area for the slow and bloody 
reconquest of Southeast Asia.813 The British leadership of SEAC was particularly eager to 
redeem themselves after their embarrassing rout in Malaya three-and-a-half years earlier. The 
Japanese surrender robbed them of the opportunity to reclaim their imperial prestige, and instead 
they were forced to rush troops from their headquarters in Ceylon to Malaya. Allied forces did 
not arrive in Singapore until September 5 and, during the three weeks between the Japanese 
surrender and the British return, the Japanese, their local collaborators and enemies, and the 
other city residents had to navigate in a power vacuum. 
The timing of the surrender was particularly troublesome for the Malay nationalist 
movement. Ibrahim Yaacob had spent the past year-and-a-half as commander of the native 
volunteer army, the Giyūgun (Ǵȷ), which would have had to join in the Japanese army’s last 
stand in Malaya. In mid-1945, Ibrahim was also hard at work with his former allies from the 
Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM) setting up the framework for an independent Malaya. On 
September 7, 1944, Tōjō’s successor as Japan’s prime minister, Koiso Kuniaki (èǂ°Ņ), had 
announced to the Japanese Diet that the government would soon grant independence to the East 
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Indies (Higashi Indo Śă), beginning with Java. Indonesian nationalists Sukarno, Mohammad 
Hatta, and their allies seized the opportunity to begin planning for an independent Indonesia, 
which would include all the former territories of the Dutch East Indies. The former members of 
the KMM, for their part, began advocating for an expanded conception of independent Indonesia 
that would include Malaya as well, a concept they called “Indonesia Raya.”814 This idea appealed 
to two idealistic Japanese officials in the Gunseikanbu Research Department, Profs. Akamatsu 
Kaname (ȱŜȚ) and Itagaki Yoichi (ŝ»ȁ;). In May 1945, Itagaki received permission 
from the army command to convene new meetings between Ibrahim and other Malay nationalists 
to discuss the form Malaya’s participation in Indonesia Raya might take.815 Ibrahim was able to 
use the offer of independence to convince Mustapha Hussein to come out of self-imposed 
political retirement, and by July they had founded a new movement named KRIS. This acronym 
stood for, depending on whom you asked, Kekuatan Rakyat Istimewa (Special Strength of the 
People), Kesatuan Rakyat Indonesia Semenanjung (Union of Peninsular Indonesians), or 
Kerajaan Rakyat Indonesia Semenanjung (Government of Peninsular Indonesians), but its real 
significance was that it was a homonym for the kris, a type asymmetrical dagger that had 
spiritual and historical significance across archipelagic Southeast Asia.816 Mustapha set to work 
preparing a new constitution for Malaya and, on August 8, KRIS members including Onan Haji 
Siraj met with Sukarno and Hatta as they transited through Shōnan to discuss Malaya’s inclusion 
in an independent Indonesia.817 KRIS began to organize a conference of delegates from across 
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Malaya, where Mustapha would present his new constitution, to be held in Kuala Lumpur on 
August 17. 
The Japanese surrender derailed Itagaki, Ibrahim, and Mustapha’s plans. Itagaki quickly 
informed Ibrahim that he could no longer provide them any assistance.818 In Java, meanwhile, 
militant youths (pemuda) pressed Sukarno and Hatta to declare Indonesian independence, with 
no mention of Malaya, on the morning of August 17. The leadership of KRIS, who had been 
meeting in Kuala Lumpur discussing how they should proceed, were floored by the news.819 
Deprived of the support of both the Japanese administration and their Indonesian comrades, they 
began trickling home to await the return of the British. Ibrahim subsequently claimed that he 
made a last-ditch effort to join up with the communist guerrillas to resist the return of the British, 
but he was rebuffed and forced by the Japanese command to disband the Giyūgun.820 On August 
19, Ibrahim Yaacob and a few close allies fled to Java. With the departure of the wartime leader 
of the Malay community, the radical Malay nationalist movement was thrown into disarray and 
remained so when the British returned a few weeks later. 
The Indian nationalist movement in Shōnan lost its leader that same week. Azad Hind 
and the Indian National Army had been beset by tragedy since 1944, when they participated in 
the failed Japanese Imphal Campaign, an invasion of eastern India from Burma, and were forced 
to fight both the British and their Indian compatriots in the British Indian Army during the Allied 
reconquest of Burma. Subhas Chandra Bose and his followers were forced to flee their 
headquarters in Rangoon on April 25, 1945, and relocated to Bangkok, where the Indian 
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Independence League had been founded.821 Bose spent much of the next few months in Shōnan, 
making radio broadcasts condemning the Indians who accommodated themselves to British rule, 
while INA survivors trickled back home across the border from Thailand. On July 8, Bose laid 
the foundation stone for a “Memorial to Heroes” of the INA along the waterfront in Shōnan 
within sight of City Hall, where he had stood beside Tōjō in front of ecstatic crowds of local 
Indians two years earlier.822 The ceremony over which Bose presided was somber, attended by 
Japanese military leaders, members of the INA and Azad Hind, and “members of the Indian 
public.”823 After Bose finished a speech he laid the foundation stone, and different groups placed 
wreaths around the base of the future monument. 
Despite the shortages of building supplies that plagued Japanese-occupied Southeast Asia 
in the last year of the war, the INA Memorial was completed in a little over a month: Bose 
himself unveiled the monument on July 25, 1945. At a time when their movement was in 
disarray and many of their members had been killed fighting in India and Burma, the Indian 
nationalist community in Shōnan could still take comfort in the monument that stood alongside 
the First World War Cenotaph, Victoria Fountain, the Dalhousie Obelisk, and the grand 
administrative buildings across the Padang. Still, the community that developed around the INA 
and IIL had coalesced primarily around the charisma of Subhas Chandra Bose. It was fitting that 
the INA Memorial soon became a monument to him as well. Bose died on August 18 in a 
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Taiwanese plane crash, only three days after the Japanese surrender, on his way to Japan to rally 
support for Indian independence. The news came as a terrible shock to the Indian community of 
Malaya. The INA held a service at the memorial, which was adorned with a picture of Bose and 
blanketed with flowers.824 Beginning with this service, the monument became the focus of the 
Indian community mourning not only the defeat of their movement, but also the death of the man 
who had led it. When the British landed in September the Azad Hind and INA, like KRIS, were 
in complete disarray, occasionally meeting at Bose’s memorial to mourn his loss. 
The members of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and its Malayan People’s Anti-
Japanese Army (MPAJA) had personally suffered a great deal during the occupation. Their 
guerrilla movement had grown out of a few young volunteers, hastily trained by the British in the 
last weeks before Singapore’s surrender in 1942 and sent into the interior of the peninsula. These 
young women and men, many of them teenagers, had lived in the jungles of Malaya for years, 
beset by malnutrition, wild animals, tropical diseases, and constantly hounded by the Japanese 
army and Kempeitai. Much of their leadership had been killed during the first years of the 
occupation, sold out by their Secretary General, Lai Teck (Ȍƙ), who had been a British 
informant before the war and quickly agreed to serve the Japanese when he was arrested by the 
Kempeitai in Shōnan in March 1942.825 Cheah Boon Kheng, whose Red Star Over Malaya 
remains the seminal work on the anti-Japanese resistance in Malaya during the war, drew on 
Japanese sources to determine that Lai agreed to work with the Kempeitai and used his position 
as an informant to neutralize opposition to him from within the MCP. He was able to liquidate 
the Central Executive Committee (CEC) and engineered “the breakup of the whole communist 
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network in [Shōnan] by April 1943.”826 Everyone who suspected Lai’s treachery, as people often 
did once they were in Kempeitai custody, was quickly silenced. Lai used Shōnan as his base of 
operations, and because of his presence in the city local communist activity was minimal during 
the occupation. He was less able to affect the fate of the MPAJA guerrillas in the countryside, 
although he did arrange a Kempeitai ambush of the full CEC, state leaders, and MPAJA 
commanders at Batu Caves in Selangor in September 1942, a devastating setback for the 
communist movement in Malaya.827 Those who survived these ambushes, such as Perak MCP 
leader Chin Peng (ɟú), did so by exercising caution and organizing a disciplined and ruthless 
guerrilla force. 
The most significant flaw of the MCP from well before the war was the fact that, despite 
its claimed to fight for all oppressed people in Malaya, from the 1920s the party had been 
predominantly Chinese. The party was even reprimanded by Comintern representative Ho Chi 
Minh in 1930 for not making greater efforts to recruit non-Chinese members.828 Once the 
Japanese occupation began, however, the Sook Ching massacre and Watanabe Wataru’s $50 
million forced donation drove thousands of Chinese youths to the MCP and the MPAJA. While 
this was less apparent in Shōnan, in the countryside where the MPAJA operated tensions began 
to rise between the guerrillas and rural Malays, many of whom found work with the police or as 
auxiliary soldiers during the occupation. In May 1945, these resentments exploded into one of 
the worst episodes of inter-racial violence in Malayan history. Fighting broke out in Johor, which 
bordered on Shōnan, between the MPAJA and Malay groups who would eventually coalesce into 
the Tentera Sabil Selendang Merah (which Cheah translates as the “Holy War Army of the Red 
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Bands”) under Javanese Sufi leader Kiyai Salleh.829 Although there are conflicting accounts over 
how this conflict began, much of the violence was directed at innocent Malay and Chinese 
villagers in rural Johor. This was the context of Ibrahim’s failed gambit to join his Giyūgun 
forces with the MPAJA to fight the British and, in fact, when the Giyūgun disbanded in August 
many of its members joined the fight against the MPAJA.830 When the British arrived in 
September, the violence on Singapore’s doorstep was increasing. 
Settlers at Endau like Gay Wan Guay had developed a wary respect for the MPAJA and 
their attacks on the Japanese and their Chinese collaborators. So had the British, who had sent a 
group of officers and former residents of Malaya, code-named Force 136, to liaise with the 
MPAJA in anticipation of the British invasion. They placed the MPAJA under SEAC command, 
and begun sending arms to the guerrillas in 1945, but the relationship between the British and the 
Malayan communists, old enemies from decades before the war, was based on convenience, not 
trust.831 The SEAC ordered its Force 136 officers to prevent the MPAJA from seizing power in 
the aftermath of the Japanese surrender, but on August 22 the communist army moved to do just 
that as they were ordered by their commanders to “take over all small and big towns in the 
country.”832 Force 136 officers quickly realized that they had little control over the MPAJA, and 
were relieved when the MCP announced, through an eight-point manifesto it released on August 
27, that it would not resist the British return to Malaya but instead demanded democratic and 
socialist reforms in the colony. It was Lai Teck, who soon reverted to his role as a British 
informant, who forced the Central Executive Committee to resist the calls of many rank-and-file 
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MPAJA fighters to violently resist the colonizers’ return.833 But the fact remained that MPAJA 
guerrillas controlled the cities, towns, and countryside of Malaya, and in the weeks before 
Mountbatten’s forces landed in Singapore, they began to pursue their own justice against those 
who had collaborated with the Japanese. 
The MPAJA had assassinated OCA leaders in Endau during the war, and after the 
surrender they organized a people’s court for the Eurasian Welfare Association leaders at the 
Bahau settlement as well.834 As public order disintegrated in Shōnan, MCP members began 
moving in to the city in an attempt to define the social and political life of postwar Singapore. 
Shinozaki remembered that the communists established themselves in the former Japanese club 
along Selegie Road and began, in his words, “hanjian (traitor) hunting” (kankan gari ƎÉƟ
).835 They posted signs warning that Kempeitai informers would be executed while those who 
had cooperated with the Japanese would be subjected to people’s trials, but it was clear from the 
language of the predominantly Chinese communists—hanjian literally translates as “traitor to the 
Han race”—that their primary targets in Shōnan were members of the Chinese community.836 
Overseas Chinese leaders fled to Hong Kong, or surrendered themselves to police custody, while 
reviled Japanese agents like the Taiwanese Wee Twee Kim (along with his wife) were “brutally 
killed.”837 K. Nadarajah, whose father worked for the railway during the war, remembers seeing 
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a Chinese man who had been a police detective attacked by a group of other Chinese residents; 
he took refuge in a Japanese-held police station but was killed when he left.838 Despite the fact 
that many of the targets of the MCP were Chinese collaborators rumors circulated among the 
Malay minority that the communists were targeting their community for reprisals, which were 
undoubtedly fueled by the ongoing racial violence in Johor.839 Scattered fighting between 
Chinese and Malays began to break out. All the while, as the MCP flexed its muscles in the city, 
the Japanese administration continued to atrophy. 
When he informed the administration that Japan had surrendered, Gen. Itagaki ordered 
the members of the Gunseikanbu and Shōnan Special Municipality to maintain public order until 
the British returned.840 This became increasingly difficult as the weeks dragged on, especially as 
the Japanese troops garrisoned in Shōnan secreted themselves, first to Jurong on the far western 
end of the island, and then to Kluang almost a hundred miles up the peninsula.841 Security in the 
city fell to civilians like Ogata Shin’ichi and the municipal police. The History of the Shōnan 
Special Municipality, to which Ogata contributed, heaps praise upon the police, their local 
employees, and the Auxiliary Police Force for preventing the large-scale racial violence that was 
sweeping Johor from breaking out in Shōnan.842 It is clear from the accounts of Shinozaki and 
local residents that this self-congratulatory version of events fails to capture the general 
breakdown of public order, especially in the days between the arrival of the British fleet off 
Penang on September 1 and its landing in Singapore on September 5.843 Even in the History, 
former policemen Wakayama Yukio (ȇìüƬ) painted a dire picture of the chaos and violence 
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of the days before the British arrived, as wealthy businessmen fled the city, members of different 
races organized self-protection groups, and he began to find corpses of murdered Malays in the 
street.844 Soon the police stations themselves came under attack.845 By the time the British 
returned, Ogata and his police confined themselves to their stations and were hard pressed even 
to protect their former employees. 
Immediately after the surrender the local Japanese patriotic association, the Kōnan 
Hōkōkai (ȂÈuV), rechristened itself the Japanese Association (Nihonjinkai łŒMV) and 
its civilian leadership began preparing for eventual repatriation to Japan. Over the next three 
weeks, as security deteriorated, the Japanese civilian population relocated to a new camp they 
built for themselves in Jurong.846 But, like the police, the other members of the Shōnan Special 
Municipality remained at their posts in City Hall. Their work continued to be motivated by the 
sense of paternalistic responsibility toward the residents of the city, which they had inherited 
from Ōdachi and which had given them a sense of purpose throughout the occupation. This put 
them into conflict with Japanese civilian residents when they prevented the Japanese Association 
from seizing the municipal rice supply and hording it at the Jurong camp.847 The civilians, for 
their part, resented the bureaucrats for continuing to cling to their status as servants of the 
emperor, and many blamed the elite civil servants and military equally for the ruin of Japan. As a 
result, when the British took over the municipal administration and sent the Japanese civil 
servants who remained at City Hall (the police and staff of the Food Control Department were 
arrested) to Jurong, the bureaucrats took up residence in their own barracks separated from the 
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other civilians in the camp.848 Their devotion to popular welfare in city did not prevent local 
children from throwing rocks at them as they trudged west to Jurong. 
The three weeks between the Japanese surrender and the British landing in Singapore was 
a time of crisis for Malay and Indian nationalists as well as for the Asian colonial elites who had 
collaborated with the Japanese; a time of opportunity for the communists in the MCP and the 
MPAJA; a time of mounting racial violence; and one last chance for the civil servants of the 
Japanese administration to affirm their identities as “shepherds of the people.” Despite these 
upheavals some people in the city did not know or care exactly when or how the war ended. 
Mabel de Souza, a poor Eurasian woman who spent the occupation either working in the high-
end restaurant Nanmei-Soo or caring for her ailing mother, remembers a gradual transition at the 
restaurant from Japanese soldiers to Japanese civilians to Allied servicemen.849 The largest 
impact that the Japanese surrender had on her life was the need to find better-paying work (the 
British were terrible tippers). When pressed by an interviewer from the Singapore National 
Archives, De Souza admitted that material conditions were probably better after the Japanese 
occupation ended but emphasized that she and the other Eurasian residents of Bencoolen Street 
were still poor and struggling to get by.850 De Souza’s relative indifference to the end of the war 
hints at a deeper truth about the history of wartime Japanese Shōnan. The occupation had the 
greatest effect on the social elites the Japanese compelled to cooperate with them, and on the 
young men who had been mobilized to fight with or against the occupation regime. The Japanese 
administration treated those who were not male, wealthy, or members of traditionally dominant 
racial groups as little more than cogs in the machine that was the wartime empire in Southeast 
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Asia. The poor were recruited as laborers and died by the tens of thousands along the Thailand-
Burma border. The administration made only tepid attempts to mobilize women through male-
led organizations such as the OCA, the EWA, and the Shōnan Dai Nippon Fujinkai (ŅÃłŒ
ÌMV), and even its most concerted effort at women’s mobilization, among the Malays, had 
been geared toward forcing women to join the agricultural and clerical labor force.851 The only 
serious effort to empower local women occurred outside of the purview of the Japanese 
administration, under the auspices of Subhas Chandra Bose’s revitalized Indian National Army. 
Indeed, the INA’s all-women Rani of Jhansi Regiment, led by the indomitable Capt. Lakshmi 
Swaminathan, scandalized the Japanese military in Shōnan.852 The INA itself was riven by 
divisions between its predominantly Tamil-speaking rank-and-file and its northern Indian 
officers.853 To the Japanese administration, Mabel de Souza, along with the Malays living in the 
seaside villages on Shōnan island, the Tamil laborers in the city center, and the working-class 
Chinese women who spent the occupation searching in vain for kin who had disappeared during 
the Sook Ching massacre, were simply to be mobilized and discarded as the war effort 
demanded. All these people were deeply affected by the war, but the Japanese surrender did not 
bring an end to the hunger, want, and, for women, pervasive threat of sexual violence that came 
with living alongside some of the largest concentrations of troops in Southeast Asia before, 
during, and after the war. 
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Those most directly affected by the end of the war were the older, wealthier men, 
“traditional” communal leaders, who the Japanese had identified as their ideal partners in 
governing Shōnan at the beginning of the occupation. Some were the educated, politically active 
young Chinese that the Kempeitai had targeted for slaughter in 1942 and the multiracial youths 
the administration later selected for specialized administrative training. Women, the poor, and 
members of traditionally marginalized communities, and particularly poor women from those 
communities, were all but invisible to the Japanese administrative gaze and, as a result, the 
collapse of that administration barely affected their circumstances. 
 
Politics and Disillusionment under the British Military Administration 
 The arrival of Lord Mountbatten’s forces in Singapore on September 5 was cause for 
celebration, and they were greeted by cheering crowds hoping for an end to the deprivations of 
the war. The communists, hamstrung by Lai Teck’s commitment that the MCP would operate 
within the framework of British colonial rule, did nothing to prevent the SEAC from establishing 
its authority over the island and bringing an end to the extrajudicial killings of the past few 
weeks. Mountbatten soon proclaimed the creation of the BMA, giving its Chief Civil Affairs 
Officer, Maj. Gen. Ralph Hone, administrative authority over all of British Malaya. But the 
British had redrawn the Malayan map during the war: instead of the confusing patchwork of 
colonial possessions and protectorates that had made up prewar Malaya, the entire peninsula was 
to be unified under one Malayan Union. Singapore was “the center of British political and 
military activity throughout the region” and would be administered separately as a Crown 
Colony.854 The British cabinet approved this plan in 1944, against the strenuous objections of 
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both Asian and European former residents of Malaya who characterized the idea of separating 
Singapore from Malaya as “opposed to both geography and good sense.”855 Their objections 
were ignored. The ultimate status of this cosmopolitan, trade-oriented, predominantly-Chinese 
but diverse city in a future Malaya became the center of political debate for the next two decades. 
Carl Trocki has argued that, “the British returned to Malaya and Singapore to find the 
entire population caught up in a vast social, political, and cultural uprising.”856 To C.M. 
Turnbull, this argument is misleading, since “the immediate concern of the vast majority of the 
local population was to get back to the normal pattern of everyday life. … Rice, not politics, was 
Singaporeans’ first priority in September 1945.”857 In reality, these two observations are not at 
all incompatible. After the material shortages and chronic malnutrition of the late Japanese 
occupation, the people of Singapore were desperate to return to some degree of normalcy. But 
the “pattern of everyday life” that Turnbull identified had itself changed. Mass mobilization was 
now a fact of life in the city. Former members of the Indian National Army staged remembrance 
ceremonies at their monument on the waterfront, even after the British blew it up one day after 
they landed in Singapore.858 On October 10, 1945, the Chinese community staged a rally on the 
Padang that attracted the largest crowd in Singaporean history.859 The new habit of Singaporeans 
for mass meetings helped set the stage for the massive protests, strikes, and rallies of the coming 
years. The patterns of everyday life had also been reshaped by state intervention. During the 
occupation, the Japanese administration had attempted to provide food and employment in 
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addition to security, and while it had often failed to provide these things, Singaporeans like Chu 
Shuen Choo (œǟȒ) grew to appreciate the spirit of the Japanese system of neighborhood 
surveillance and food distribution.860 The experience of mass mobilization and life under 
Japanese economic controls had given residents a new set of expectations from the state. When 
the British Military Administration (BMA) was inaugurated by Lord Mountbatten in September 
1945 was unable to alleviate the conditions that plagued the late Japanese occupation, and the 
black market, corruption, and the scarcity of daily necessities grew perceptibly worse over the 
next few months, any lingering confidence Singaporeans might have had in British colonial rule 
collapsed completely. Under the BMA, rice was the stuff of politics for Singaporeans, and those 
who sought social, political, and economic change took advantage of that fact.  
 Singapore was transformed by the Second World War, but so was the British Empire. 
The United States, and especially President Roosevelt, had insisted during the war that the 
Empire commit to at least gradual independence for its colonies.861 Other Allied powers, 
particularly the Republic of China and the Soviet Union, were even more critical of a return to 
prewar imperial practices. The British government, however weakened by the war, refused to 
abandon its commitment to maintaining and strengthening the empire even in the face of 
pressure, but it did search for more diplomatically palatable imperial practices that might allow it 
to rebuild the empire once peace finally came. At the same time, there was considerable pressure 
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for imperial reform from the British themselves. Many of the soldiers who arrived in Singapore 
in 1945 had just voted for a new Labor Party government and were ambivalent about the 
prospect of fighting to restore imperial power in Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the Japanese 
surrender.862 More significant was a shift in opinions of colonial policymakers toward territories 
like Malaya, and their embrace of a new developmentalist ethos that Timothy Harper has called 
“welfare state imperialism.”863 As Harper has argued, the British imperial tradition of indirect 
rule faltered during the Great Depression and, during the Second World War, “the demands of 
wartime mobilization substantiated a mounting critique of old institutions.” The war precipitated 
a “second colonial occupation” in the 1940s as “a new generation of technical specialists and 
anthropologists” were recruited to help create new, more robust colonial states in Britain’s 
African and remaining Asian colonies.864 The Malayan colonial officials stationed in India 
during the war committed themselves to developing a robust colonial state after the reconquest of 
Southeast Asia that could provide for the welfare of its diverse peoples and cultivate their loyalty 
toward the Empire in a way unavailable during prewar colonial rule, under which “the vast bulk 
of the population… had no organized connection to the government.”865 Under Mountbatten, the 
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BMA would encourage freedom of thought and popular political participation on an 
unprecedented scale in Malayan history. But it also sought out “a new pattern of collaboration” 
with local leaders, “through whom Britain aimed to regain her foothold in the region.”866 Social 
improvement and the welfare of the people became the justification for the continuance of 
British imperial power in Malaya.867 
 Any local resident who been associated with Ōdachi Shigeo’s City Hall would have been 
familiar with the contours of this new British imperialism. For the civil servants of the Shōnan 
Special Municipality, promoting the welfare of the people and securing their livelihood had also 
been both an end and a justification for Japanese rule. The similarity of Japanese and British 
viewpoints is not surprising, given the fact that they both emerged from the reconciliation of 
imperial rule with the conditions of total war. During the Second World War, the British and the 
Japanese were forced to find a way to justify the total mobilization of Asian societies deprived of 
the ability to control their political destinies. Ōdachi had developed his paternalistic but 
authoritarian attitude toward occupied peoples in Manchukuo, where the Japanese were 
attempting to mobilize domestic and foreign natural and human resources to develop a utopian 
imperial formation that would lead Japan out of its social, economic, and geopolitical crises. 
Securing public welfare would secure the support of colonized peoples in the imperial projects, 
they differed in their attitude toward popular participation in colonial governance. Ōdachi and his 
followers believed that true popular representation in governance could only be achieved through 
the paternalism of civil servants, not through the involvement of venal politicians. The BMA 
believed that the people of Malaya should be allowed elected representation within the colonial 
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government, although they were convinced that the people were not yet ready to take part in 
politics. 
 They were wrong. When the British arrived in Malaya, they were shocked to find a 
politically engaged population clamoring for a state, colonial or independent, that was responsive 
to their needs. The British had hoped to implement reforms to the colonial state through their 
prewar partners in Asian colonial society—the Malay sultans on the peninsula and the “natural 
leaders of the people [who] would be invited to air the concerns of their communities in colonial 
welfare councils and legislative chambers,” much as they had before the war.868 They hoped in 
particular that the sultans would rubber-stamp their idea for a new Malayan Union that would 
rationalize the different states of Malaya under one colonial government and allow citizenship 
rights to large numbers of settled Chinese and Indian residents. But while the sultans gave their 
preliminary support to the idea, other Malays, incensed that these immigrants would be granted 
equal status to them so easily, pushed aside their sultans and demanded directly of the British 
that they restore their traditional rights. Led by figures like Onn bin Jaafar, a civil servant from 
Johor who successfully negotiated an end to racial violence in his state just as Mountbatten 
arrived in Singapore, Malay outrage at the union proposal coalesced into the first mass political 
movement within the community in early 1946, culminating in the foundation of the United 
Malays National Organization (UMNO) in May, one month after the end of the BMA and 
reversion to British civil administration.869 This political party went on to dominate politics on 
the peninsula until the Malaysian general election of May 9, 2018. 
 The British, who had always considered the Malays to be politically apathetic, were 
stunned by the coalescence of the anti-Malayan Union movement and UMNO. They were also 
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taken aback by the political turmoil and energy of Singapore, particularly within the labor 
movement. By December 1945, a new political party had been founded in the city. The Malayan 
Democratic Union (MDU) was a multiracial party dominated by English-educated and middle-
class professionals. Its members supported the Malayan Union proposal, with its liberal 
citizenship laws, but began to lobby hard for the BMA to include Singapore within Malaya.870 
The real political force in Singapore at this time, however, was the Malayan Communist Party. 
While the communists had agreed to reconcile themselves to British rule for the immediate 
future, this did not stop them from attempting to extend their influence over the political culture 
of Singapore under the BMA. Radicals within the MDU gradually extended communist 
influence within the party, while the communist-controlled General Labour Union began to 
agitate for better working conditions in the city. In October 1945, only one month into the BMA 
regime, a successful strike by Singaporean longshoreman sparked an eruption of industrial 
actions across Malaya, culminating in a crippling general strike in January. Only after a rash of 
arrests and banishments of communist leaders and bloody clashes with the police on February 
15, 1946, a “day of mourning” the MCP organized to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the 
fall of Singapore, did the party begin to reign in its industrial actions in the city.871 It remained a 
force to be reckoned with in local politics as its members continued to extend their influence in 
the local labor movement. 
 Robust and aggressive organizations like UMNO and the MCP set the tone of the new 
politics of confrontation that prevailed in Singapore and Malaya after the war. Harper attributes 
this new politics to a group he calls the “generation of 1945,” a collection of young, dynamic 
leaders, many of whom received their political and administrative training either in guerrilla 
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camps in the jungles or in the Kōa Kunrenjo.872 But to understand why the politics of 
confrontation took root in postwar Malaya, one must acknowledge the fact that the Japanese 
occupation had ended end to the politics of accommodation that characterized prewar Malaya. 
By identifying the communal elites that had thrived in the prewar politics of accommodation as 
their preferred and closest partners in the local society, and by making them the face of Japanese 
occupation policy and of its failings, the Japanese had discredited the idea that by 
accommodating themselves to imperial power the elite leaders of communal bodies like the 
Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Eurasian Association, and the Singapore Malay 
Union could do anything to protect their people. They had proven helpless to prevent the 
suffering of their communities and, as a result, many had begun to condemn them for 
collaborating with the Japanese solely for what many perceived to be their personal gain. But it 
was the period after the Japanese surrender that finally sealed the fate of accommodationist 
politics in the eyes of Singaporeans. 
 Mountbatten had not come to Singapore to pursue grudges against local collaborators. As 
Paul Kratoska points out, almost everyone in Malaya who was not directly involved in the 
communist insurgency had worked for the Japanese occupiers in some capacity.873 Mountbatten 
declared that “The first guiding principle to be observed is that no person shall suffer on account 
of political opinions honestly held, whether now or in the past—even if these may have been 
anti-British—but only on account of previous crimes against the criminal law or actions 
repugnant to humanity.”874 Those crimes, however, included assisting Japanese operations, 
actively working against the Allies, or participation in propaganda. It was under these charges 
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that the BMA arrested C.J. Paglar of the Eurasian Welfare Association, Lim Chong Pang (Şę
ɋ) and G.H. Kiat of the Oversea Chinese Association, S.C. Goho of the Shōnan branch of the 
Indian Independence League, Dr. Gaus Mahyuddin of the Malay Welfare Association, Samad 
Ismail of the Berita Malai newspaper, Choo Lye Huat (œ\Ʋ) of the Auxiliary Police Force, 
and many others in September and October 1945.875 The first of these leaders to be put on trial 
was Dr. Paglar. In January 1946 he was charged with treason for his propaganda work and for 
submitting confidential reports on the Eurasian community to the Japanese police.876 As the 
prosecution scrutinized Paglar’s wartime actions, his lawyer, P.F. de Souza, quickly settled on a 
defense that would become the predominant justification for the collaboration of the 
accommodationist elites with the Japanese administration: he was helpless to do otherwise. De 
Souza constantly reiterated Paglar’s inability to shape the course of events during the 
occupation.877 The fact that Paglar had worked hard to make a positive impact on the Eurasian 
community during the occupation, such as working around the clock to manufacture quinine for 
the settlers at Bahau, were not mentioned in his defense, possibly because these facts would have 
been quickly overshadowed by Paglar’s complicity in sending settlers to Bahau in the first place. 
Instead, De Souza argued to the British military commissioner in the courtroom that Paglar had 
no choice but to read pro-Axis scripts during propaganda broadcasts, submit mundane reports to 
                                               
875 Mahyuddin Gaus DAJ8(Q9" &, M. Gaus kaisōroku: Senzenki Indoneshia ryūgakusei no Nihon taiken Mら-*4ÚŇたˀŏ¤Ż)Q:=2'ǏýǉŨŽ}ʙˀ, translated by Gotō Ken’ichi ĻȬcS, Kenkyū 
shiryō shirīzu no. 3 ǟǱɘŢ2LR5 No .れ (Tokyo: Waseda University Asia Pacific Research Center ŪǮǊñý
'3'óĨƬǟǱ6Q7R, 2012), 103. Shinozaki, 156–157. Chia Soon Ann ɑʐÿ, interview by Tan Beng Luan, 
April 14, 1986, Accession No. 657, OHC, Reel 6. Eric C. Paglar, interview by Low Lay Leng, October 17, 1983, 
Accession No. 299, OHC, Reel 11. 
876 These reports were among the reference materials of Ogata Shin’ichi’s police reports to Ōdachi. See Chapter 4. 
Denyse Tessensohn, “The British Military Administration’s Treason Trial of Dr. Charles Joseph Pemberton Paglar, 
1946,” (master’s thesis, National University of Singapore, 2006), 68. 
877 Tessensohn, 64–68. 
 294 
the municipal police, and send youths to work as Heiho.878 This argument, splashed across the 
headlines of Singapore’s resuscitated private press in early 1946, became the common defense 
for the communal leaders the Japanese had recruited to implement policy in Shōnan. And its 
most forceful proponent, during the trial and afterward, was none other than Shinozaki Mamoru. 
 By early 1946 Shinozaki was assisting the BMA in translating wartime documents. One 
year later, he served as a key witness in the trials of his former supervisors in the 25th Army’s 
Defense Headquarters, Kempeitai officers Kawamura Saburō and Ōishi Masayuki, for their 
involvement in the Sook Ching massacre.879 Shinozaki answered the prosecution’s questions 
succinctly, making clear that he had chosen Paglar to lead the EWA and had directed him to 
make propaganda statements and help implement Kōseika policy. During his cross-examination 
by De Souza, however, Shinozaki shocked the courtroom by crying out: 
“I was the one who directed Paglar. I was the one who guided him all along. I did 
this because I knew the grave position of the Eurasian community. I regret to see 
Dr. Paglar in this trouble, because all the responsibility rests on me. If anybody is 
to be punished, please punish me.”880 
 
In his memoirs from the 1970s, Shinozaki claimed that he had not intended to make this outburst 
but that he had not regretted it either.881 His assumption of responsibility for the wartime actions 
of his local partners in Shōnan became a common refrain in his recollections of the Japanese 
occupation and his role in it. There is no doubt that the leaders of the OCA, EWA, MWA, and 
other social organizations that worked with Shinozaki felt some degree of compulsion to work 
with him. In fact, given Y.S. Tan’s account of Lim Boon Keng’s recruitment as head of the 
OCA, it is likely that these leaders were subjected to far greater compulsion than Shinozaki was 
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willing to admit.882 But this does not change the fact that the main excuse for collaboration—that 
the accommodationist elite had no choice and no ability to leave—was in effect also an 
indictment of the ineffectiveness of the politics of accommodation itself. 
 S.C. Goho was released on bail in February 1946, and one month later Paglar’s trial was 
adjourned sine die. Both men were acquitted on March 23, and the British military authorities 
did not pursue any further high-profile prosecutions of Singaporean collaborators.883 
Nonetheless, the reputation of figures like Paglar and Lim Chong Pang never fully recovered, 
and their friends and families continued to defend them against charges that they were 
“quislings” or “running dogs” (zougou ȳƞ) for decades afterward.884 Still, by the end of the 
decade Paglar, Goho, and G.H. Kiat were all running for, and winning elections for new 
positions within Singapore’s Legislative Council and Municipal Commission. More than these 
individuals themselves, it was their mode of engagement with imperial power before the war that 
had been ultimately discredited by the Japanese occupation and its aftermath. By the time the 
British Military Administration closed its doors on April 1, 1946, and relinquished power to the 
civil administrations of the Singapore Crown Colony and the fraught and short-lived Malayan 
Union, a new form of political practice had taken root in the region, enabled in part by the British 
colonial administration’s tentative promise of future elections, but also by the change in political 
attitudes precipitated by the Japanese occupation. 
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Japanese ‘rule by minzoku’ in Malaya had engendered racial tensions that led to violence 
in 1945 and resentments that lasted for decades after the war. But the Japanese had also fatally 
undermined the politics of accommodation that supported prewar British colonialism in 
Singapore and Malaya. When the British attempted to introduce new colonial policies through 
the same accommodationist elites they had worked with before the war, they were angrily 
rebuked by the people of Malaya and Singapore. Both UMNO and the MCP were able to channel 
the new political energies of the population into mass actions, culminating in a Malaya-wide 
general strike, or hartal, in October 1947. This political protest, which paralyzed the colony, 
would have been inconceivable before the war. By mid-1948 the militant wing of the MCP took 
up arms and began attacking the British colonial state itself, sparking a guerrilla war that would 
come to be known as the Malayan Emergency. In response, the British introduced emergency 
regulations that drove radical politics underground in both Malaya and Singapore. But a new 
politics of confrontation was now well-established, and voters in both Malaya and Singapore 
would continue supporting politicians who would aggressively advocate for their rights, either as 






Japanese dreams for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere never became a reality. 
Even the limited goals for the occupation laid out in the Obata report were not met, as Allied 
submarine and air attacks cut Japan off from the strategic resources of Southeast Asia. The 
planned smoothly functioning, tightly knit regional administration centered on the Southern 
Expeditionary Army’s headquarters in Shōnan was never realized. Bureaucratic infighting and 
the centrifugal forces that had plagued the Japanese army during the occupation of China again 
prevailed, as the regional military administrations ignored their organizational subordination to 
the Gunseisōkanbu, and rival bureaucratic cliques like those that formed around Watanabe 
Wataru and Ōdachi Shigeo helped to stymie regional policy coordination. Watanabe had hoped 
to bring about a spiritual purification of the peoples of Southeast Asia, and his Kōa kunrenjo did 
in fact train a few figures who continued as leaders in postwar Malaya. But Watanabe was 
sidelined in the administration within months of the start of the occupation, partly because he 
was held responsible for the $50 million forced donation he demanded from the overseas 
Chinese community which permanently alienated many of them from the Japanese. The civil 
servant Ōdachi bested the military man Watanabe in the internal politics of the administration, 
but the civil servants he inspired failed in their goal of maintaining the livelihood of the local 
population. Nor could they protect local workers from being sent to their deaths as laborers on 
the Thailand-Burma border, and in fact they had actively participated in their mobilization. They 
set up a rationing system, which failed to provide adequate food to the people of Shōnan. Later 
in the war, Shinozaki sent urban residents to agricultural settlements that failed even to feed 
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themselves. And, while the employees of the Shōnan Special Municipality had dedicated 
themselves above all to maintaining public order in the center of the Southern Co-Prosperity 
Sphere, that order collapsed entirely during the interregnum between the Japanese surrender and 
the return of the British. 
 The experience of wartime occupation in Southeast Asia did, however, profoundly affect 
those who had participated in it. In many parts of the region, the rapid rise and fall of the 
Japanese empire had indeed been the catalyst for revolutionary change. The Japanese attempt to 
resuscitate the colonial status quo had in the event only hastened its destruction. By 
marginalizing anticolonial nationalists early in the occupation, the Japanese had ensured that the 
prewar accommodationist elite was seen as the public face of occupation policy. After 1943, 
when the occupation allowed nationalists more active roles in the administration, these anti-
colonial activists took on prominent roles as propagandists and commanders of volunteer armies 
while the former colonial elites remained preoccupied with assisting the Japanese in the daily 
administration of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. All the while, resistance forces and particularly 
communist guerrillas suffered terrible losses but maintained their credibility as champions 
against Japanese oppression. Both nationalists and communists could be perceived as actively 
supporting local populations while the formerly respected Asian colonial elites were transformed 
into puppets. Their helplessness was underlined after the war, when their supporters testified at 
their trials that they had no choice but to follow Japanese orders. 
In Java, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, under pressure from radicalized youths known 
as pemuda, proclaimed the independence of Indonesia on August 17, 1945, two days after 
Japan’s surrender. Clashes between British troops from the SEAC and armed pemuda in 
Surabaya touched off a protracted national revolution and war against the returning Dutch forces, 
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which culminated in the international recognition of an independent Republic of Indonesia in 
1949. Sumatrans eagerly participated in the political revolution while the northern provinces of 
the island were convulsed by social revolution as well. Radical groups sidelined early in the 
occupation took the occasion of Japan’s surrender to massacre the Malay and Simalungun 
aristocrats of East Sumatra and the ulèëbalang class of Aceh, groups of traditional elites with 
whom the Japanese administration had worked closely.885 Both Burma and the Philippines were 
‘liberated’ by their colonial British and American masters in early 1945, but remained wracked 
by civil conflict. In Burma, collaborator-turned-resistance-leader Aung San successfully pressed 
the British to grant Burmese independence in 1947, but his assassination a few months later 
helped to plunge the country into civil war. In the Philippines, the United States resumed its 
earlier plans to grant independence after a ten-year transition period, which had begun in 1935, 
and recognized the Republic of the Philippines in 1946. Here too the newly independent 
government had to contend with civil conflicts, the most prominent of which was the communist 
Hukbalahap Rebellion on Luzon. In Indochina, in early 1945 the Japanese toppled the Vichy 
administration and created the Empire of Vietnam and the Kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos. 
Vietnam had experienced some of the worst famines in wartime Southeast Asia, and the 
Japanese surrender allowed Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh to stage their August Revolution.886 
Although the Viet Minh entered into negotiations with the returning French, by the end of 1946 
the First Indochina War had begun. 
Malaya and Singapore remained outliers in the tumultuous late 1940s in Southeast Asia. 
Malaya received its independence only in 1957; and Singapore remained a British territory until 
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1963. This was partly due to chance. Ibrahim Yaacob had thrown the Malay nationalist 
movement into disarray when he fled to Java in August 1945, while Azad Hind and the Indian 
National Army, which were in any case focused on Indian independence, were devastated by the 
death in a plane crash of Subhas Chandra Bose in the same month. The Malayan Communist 
Party, in what would be considered a historic mistake by its members only a few years later, had 
elected not to resist the British return and the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army was 
disbanded in December 1945.887 Even with the nationalists in disarray and the communists 
disarmed, the years after the Japanese surrender were marked by unprecedented political foment 
in Singapore and the rest of the peninsula. With the discrediting of Asian colonial elites and the 
politics of accommodation they represented, the political life of Malaya was dominated by the 
communist-controlled labor movement, the Malayan Democratic Union, and, on the peninsula, 
the United Malays National Organization. The returning British had planned to introduce 
electoral politics in Malaya, but they were preempted by these new political forces long before 
the first organized elections in Singapore in 1948. Mass protests and general strikes, including 
deadly protests during a communist-organized “day of mourning” on the fourth anniversary of 
the British surrender on February 15, 1946, forced the British to respond directly to the political 
demands of local residents. Then, in mid-1948, the veterans of the MPAJA returned to the jungle 
and the MCP began an insurgency known as the Malayan Emergency. The British began a 
systematic crackdown on radical political organizations after the beginning of the Emergency, 
but in the following years Singapore continued to experience student protests, riots, and other 
civil disturbances, and its citizens continued to elect political parties that were willing to 
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antagonize the British colonial government, including David Marshall’s Labour Front and future 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s People’s Action Party (PAP). 
This new politics of confrontation was fueled, in part, by disappointment in the British 
for their perceived abandonment of Malaya to the Japanese and by the corruption and 
mismanagement of the British Military Administration. The disappointment was felt most 
acutely by the Anglophone Asian minority. Lim Bo Yam remembers that many members of the 
Chinese community felt the British were useless after the war, although they had never had a 
high opinion of them in the first place.888 For local residents who did not share an affinity with 
the British because of their background or English-language educations, the shift in local 
political attitudes was rooted less in a loss of faith in the British in particular than a general rise 
in expectations that the colonial state would provide for their security and welfare and then 
outrage when it did not. As a result, they shifted allegiance from their former accommodationist 
communal leaders and embraced those who would aggressively advocate for their welfare. This 
shift was so profound that even venerable prewar communal institutions like the Singapore 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce now had to get involved in electoral politics in order to maintain 
their relevance.889 
Before the war, the British in Malaya had been obsessed with maintaining their racial 
prestige, believing that their colonial rule would collapse without it. From this perspective, it was 
the fall of Singapore and the defeat of a British army by Asian soldiers that fatally undermined 
the colonial system in Southeast Asia.890 This was how British policymakers saw their defeat in 
the decades after the war and, because it allows them to ignore the abuses that the Japanese army 
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inflicted on occupied peoples after the British surrender, how the Japanese right has preferred to 
interpret the legacy of the war in Singapore for the past half-century.891 But his interpretation 
depends on the assumption that Asians living under colonial rule were as much in thrall of white 
supremacy as the British, which they were not. White supremacy was a pervasive element of the 
colonial world in Southeast Asia, but the vast majority of Asian residents in Singapore did little 
more than tolerate British pretensions of superiority.892 To assume that the colonial system fell 
because the Japanese punctured the myth of white supremacy in Southeast Asia gives too much 
credit to Western colonialists for the survival of a complex prewar regional order they did not 
pretend to fully understand. It was the delegitimization of the accommodationist politics that 
undergirded Western imperial rule that was the true catalyst for radical change in postwar 
Southeast Asia.   
Japanese rule had both discredited the politics of accommodation and also expanded 
popular expectations of the role the state should play in securing public welfare, in part because 
of the paternalistic policies of civilian administrators like Ōdachi but chiefly because of the 
mobilizational demands of total war that his policies were meant to serve.  But the occupation 
had also deepened racial divisions in Singapore and the rest of Malaya. UMNO quickly 
established its political predominance on the peninsula as an explicitly Malay political party, and 
it soon joined in a political alliance with two other race-based parties, the Malayan Indian 
Congress (MIC, founded in 1946) and the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA, founded in 
1949). Singapore was dominated by parties that presented themselves as multiracial, but they 
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Memorial,” in Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 88, 2:309 (December 2015): 25–50. 
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operated in a racially divided political environment. Many party leaders were Anglophone 
Asians who had come up together in English educational institutions but embraced their racial 
identities when they entered the political arena. Harry Lee, who decided to begin his professional 
and political career as Lee Kuan Yew when he returned from Cambridge in 1950, was only the 
most prominent example of this phenomenon. Differences between multiracial, PAP-dominated 
Singapore and the racially divided political environment of Malaya led to conflict when the two 
were united, along with British North Borneo, as Malaysia in 1963. 
Racial resentments plagued the new nation, exacerbating conflict between Singaporean 
politicians and their counterparts on the mainland. In 1964, they exploded into bloody race riots 
in the city. Meanwhile, the conflict between the multiracial PAP and the racial coalition of 
UMNO, MIC, and MCA precipitated the expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965. In the 
aftermath of the racial violence and their unwelcome independence, Lee Kuan Yew and the 
ruling PAP cast about for a narrative to unit their small, racially-divided nation. In 1967, Lee 
used the dedication of a new Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation to 
declare that the war years had united the people of Singapore in their suffering and given them a 
common desire to create an independent, self-reliant nation.893 In reality, the occupation had 
rigidified the racial divisions of Singaporean society that Lee was having to grapple with. But it 
had also resulted in a new, aggressive party politics that PAP emerged from. Twenty years 
passed between the dissolution of Shōnan in 1945 and Singaporean independence in 1965, but its 
confrontational postwar political environment was as much a product of the Japanese occupation 
as that of its revolutionary neighbors. 
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Postwar Japan was also affected by the experience in wartime occupation in Southeast 
Asia. Nakano Satoshi, in his work on memoirs of the war in Southeast Asia, claims that many 
Japanese came to reject prewar imperial practices as they began to understand the occupation 
through Southeast Asian eyes.894 But the postwar memoirs that he relies on can also be 
considered exculpatory and self-justifying as they responded to the changed political context of 
postwar, post-imperial Japan. His focus on the redemptive qualities of life in the Co-Prosperity 
Sphere has echoes in the outsized Japanese public memory of soldiers and civilians who deserted 
in Indonesia to help fight in the national revolution.895 Some did indeed do so, such as journalist 
Ichiki Tatsuo (öřɶÆ) who took the Muslim name Abdul Rahman, but they made up less than 
half of one percent of the Japanese in Java at the end of the war.896 The vast majority of Japanese 
followed Allied orders to lay down their arms and waited for repatriation to Japan. 
And the self-justification of postwar Japanese memoirs did not always entail a 
renunciation of prewar imperial practice. The History of the Shōnan Municipality (Shōnan 
tokubetsushi shi Ņƙ{ö, 1986), a major source for this dissertation, projects a self-
congratulatory image of the civil servants who worked in Shōnan as protectors of the people that 
is virtually unchanged from the wartime occupation.897 The civil servants who contributed to this 
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volume continued to admire the paternalistic example set by Ōdachi and expressed little concern 
that local residents had no voice in the administration of Shōnan. They celebrated their efforts to 
care for the people and condemned what they saw as selfish actions by Japanese civilians outside 
the civil service. Rather than challenge their self-conceptions as “shepherds of the people,” the 
occupation experience of the staff of the Shōnan Special Municipality reinforced their 
conception of the civil service and its right to rule. They would return to Japan after the war with 
the same condescending attitude toward those outside the bureaucracy that they had left with. 
Ōdachi Shigeo, who had served as Home Minister in the cabinet of Prime Minister Koiso 
Kuniaki from mid-1944 to mid-1945, was jailed as an accused Class-A war criminal but released 
without trial in 1947. After the end of the American occupation of Japan in 1952, Ōdachi entered 
into politics, running for the House of Councilors of the National Diet in his native Shimane 
prefecture as a member of Yoshida Shigeru’s Liberal Party. He won and joined Yoshida’s fifth 
cabinet as Education Minister in 1953. In this position Ōdachi continued his lifelong battle 
against forces that challenged the preeminence of the Japanese bureaucracy orchestrating the 
passage of two education laws in 1954 (the kyōiku nihō ĸǸHƀ) that crippled the political 
power of the Japanese Teachers’s Union (Nihon Kyōshokuin Kumiai łŒĸǷ£ǣ or 
Nikkyōso łĸǣ).898 Were it not for his sudden death from stomach cancer in 1955, Ōdachi 
may have become a dominant force in postwar conservative politics in Japan. Meanwhile, 
Ōdachi’s former staffers from Shōnan continued their careers in the civil service, either entering 
the Ministry of Education with him (Ogata Shin’ichi) or joining the postwar Japanese police 
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(Hosoda Tokuju, Furuyama Takeo). Nakano is correct that the occupation experience in 
Southeast Asia helped former Japanese administrators grapple with the changed circumstances of 
postwar Japan, but this could entail the reinforcement, rather than rejection, of prewar practices. 
Both Japanese and Singaporeans, brought together under the Greater East Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere, were deeply affected by the experience. Japanese attitudes toward the 
occupation helped to catalyze radical change in Southeast Asia, though not necessarily among 
the Japanese themselves. The Japanese wartime empire was meant to perpetuate older forms of 
imperialism in Southeast Asia under a new guise, but the mobilizational demands of total war led 
the Japanese to undermine the basis of imperial rule in the region. The lived experience of 
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Appendix: Structure of the Japanese Occupation of Shōnan 
 On 26 November 1941 the Navy and Army had agreed to divide Southeast Asia, which 
they referred to as the “Southern Areas” (Nanpō ), roughly in half. In the east the Navy 
would take charge of Dutch Borneo, Celebes (Sulawesi), the Moluccas and Lesser Sundas, New 
Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Guam, while the Army would govern the Philippines, 
British Borneo, Java, Sumatra, Malaya, and Burma in the west (See Map 1).1 By the summer of 
1942 almost all this territory was in Japanese hands. The Army zone in the west fell under the 
control of Marshal Terauchi’s Southern Expeditionary Army. Based in Saigon during the initial 
invasion of Southeast Asia, once the dust of the campaign had settled in June 1942 its 
                                               
1 Thailand and French Indochina were to remain nominally autonomous. In mid-1942 the Army was given tentative 
jurisdiction over Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia while the Navy was ceded the Andamans, Nicobars, and Christmas 
Island in the Indian Ocean and the Solomons, Nauru, and Ocean Island (Banaba) in the Pacific. Cited in Hata Ikuhiko 
&-, Nanpō gunsei no kikō, kanbu gunseikan ichiran ,.,	) (Tokyo: Nanpō 
Gunsei-shi Kenkyū Fōramu ,$', 1998), 1. 
Appendix Map 1: Army and Navy Occupation Zones in Late 1942. Shōnan is starred, green represents imperial claims on the 
Spratly and Paracel Islands (1939). Map made by author in Google My Maps. Map data ©2018 GBRMPA, Google, SK telecom, 
ZENRIN. 
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headquarters moved to a site at the center of the Imperial Army’s zone of control in Southeast 
Asia: Shōnan. 
 As it settled into its new headquarters the Southern Expeditionary Army set up a Military 
Administration General Directorate (Gunseisōkanbu 	) to oversee army rule in the 
western half of Southeast Asia. Its different constituent armies, such as Yamashita Tomoyuki’s 
25th Army in Malaya and Sumatra, had divided the region into their own military administrations 
(Gunseibu 	) after the initial invasion, but in July 1942 Southern Expeditionary Army 
command ordered that they be upgraded to Military Administration Directorates (Gunseikanbu 
	) under the direct control of each army’s Chief of Staff.2 From the summer of 1942 
through the end of the war this was the basic administrative framework for the Army’s zone of 
control in Southeast Asia: in which a Gunseisōkanbu based in Shōnan oversaw the work of 
different Gunseikanbu administering their respective regions (See Chart 1).  
                                               
2 At this point there were four military administrations under the Southern Expeditionary Army’s direct control: the 
15th Army Gunseikan-bu in Burma, the 16th Army Gunseikan-bu in Java, the 25th Army Gunseikan-bu in Malaya and 
Sumatra, and the North Borneo Defense Army Gunsei-bu in former British Borneo. The North Borneo Defense 
Army alone maintained its earlier administrative structure. The 14th Army in the Philippines had been put under 

















Appendix Chart 1: Organization of Japanese Army-Occupied Southeast Asia, circa August 1942 (Offices in red are based in 
Shōnan). 
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 For most of the occupation Shōnan was the headquarters for one of these Gunseikanbu, 
starting with that of Yamashita’s 25th Army. The 25th Army’s Gunseikanbu grew rapidly during 
the first year of the occupation, adding thousands of new staff as it resuscitated the prewar 
administrative institutions of the new Shōnan Special Municipality (Shōnan Tokubetsushi 
), the ten Malay States, and ten new states in Sumatra.3 In the end of March the Gunsei-
bu had a staff of 436, most of whom were based at the headquarters in Shōnan.4 By the end of 
January 1943 that number had ballooned to 2,967 staff working at the Gunseikan-bu 
headquarters, regional offices, and external agencies such as the Post Office and the Maritime 
Agency.5 Over the course of the war the number of staff would only grow as the military 
administration grew more specialized. In April 1943 the Southern Expeditionary Army sent the 
25th Army and its Gunseikanbu to 
Sumatra and created its own 
Gunseikanbu to govern Malaya directly 
(See Chart 2). This Malay Gunseikanbu 
(	) was based in Shōnan 
until February 1944, when it was 
attached to the new 29th Army and 
moved to Perak in Northern Malaya—
                                               
3 The Sumatran states () were based on the ten residencies of the prewar Dutch administration: Aceh, Tapanuli, 
the East Coast, the West Coast, Riau, Jambi, Bengkulu, Palembang, Lampung, and Bangka-Belitung. In Malaya, the 
25th Army had folded Perlis into Kedah on 20 December 1941, leaving Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, Pahang, 
Penang, Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Malacca, and Johor. Kurasawa Aiko, ed. 
!*1, Hiroku: Senji 
Geppō/Gunsei Geppō %/,, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha 2"(, 2000), 83. 
4 Kurasawa, Vol. 1, 10. 












Appendix Chart 2: Organization of Japanese Army-Occupied 
Southeast Asia, circa October 1943 (Offices in red are based in 
Shōnan). 
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closer to the site of anticipated British landings.6 The Southern Expeditionary Army likewise 
moved its headquarters to the Philippines in April 1944 in anticipation of an American invasion 
there, but it left behind a new 7th Area Army in Shōnan to oversee military operations and 
administration in Malaya, Sumatra, Java, and North Borneo (See Chart 3).7 The Shōnan 
municipality, and later the Malay state of Johor, came under the direct control of the 7th Area 
Army’s Gunseisōkan-bu in 1945.8 All through the war the borders of Southeast Asia were 
repeatedly redrawn by the Japanese Army to suit its immediate needs, but through these 
vicissitudes Shōnan stood at the center of the Army’s zone of control in the region. 
 The city of Shōnan itself was governed by the Shōnan Special Municipality. Over the 
course of the war Gunseikan-bu came and went, but the municipal administration and its staff 
remained remarkably consistent. At the same time, the municipal administration was a radical 
                                               
6 Paul Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: A Social and Economic History (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press, 1997), 54. 
7 The 7th Area Army’s military administration was called a Gunseikanbu when it was first created in April. Iwatake 
Teruhiko speculates that this was because the Southern Expeditionary Army itself continued to maintain oversight 
over administrative issues in Southeast Asia. When the Southern Expeditionary Army moved its headquarters again 
to Saigon in January 1945, the 7th Area Army’s military administration took on the name Gunseisōkan-bu. Iwatake 
Teruhiko  #, Nanpō gunsei ronshū ,+0 (Tokyo: Gannandō Shoten , 1989), 135–136. 
8 According to Hata Ikuhiko, the municipality was put under the direct control of the 7th Area Army Gunseisōkan-bu 
in March 1945, and Johor was brought in as well that July. Hata, 25. 
Appendix Chart 3: Organization of Japanese Army-Occupied Southeast Asia, circa February 1944 (Offices in red are 
















departure from the institutions that had governed Singapore before the war. Prewar Singapore 
had been the capital of the Straits Settlements, a British Crown colony that included Malacca, 
Penang, Dinding, and Labuan in North Borneo. A Municipal Commission was founded in 1887 
to oversee urban affairs in Singapore but its jurisdiction was limited to the town, while rural 
areas on Singapore Island, as well as the police force, were directly controlled by the colony. The 
25th Army did away with the distinction between municipality and colony, bringing the whole 
island under the Shōnan Special Municipality, which inherited the local staff and offices of the 
old police force and received a greatly expanded social mandate. But that was not all: the Army 
stripped Riau, in Sumatra, of the Riau, Lingga, Karimun, Tambelan, Anambas, and Natuna 
Islands and ceded them to Shōnan on 30 April 1942.9 This meant that, on paper at least, the 
municipality controlled a massive stretch of maritime territory and all traffic between the Java 
Sea, the Malacca Strait, and the South China Sea (See Map 2).  
                                               
9 Kurasawa Aiko, ed. 
!*1, Hiroku: Senji Geppō/Gunsei Geppō %/,, Vol. 1 
(Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha 2"(, 2000), 137. 
Appendix Map 2: Army and Navy Occupation Zones in late 1943. Southern Expeditionary Army 
headquarters on Shōnan Island is starred, deep red represents the extent of the Shōnan Special 
Municipality. Map made by author in Google My Maps. Map data ©2018 GBRMPA, Google, SK telecom, 
ZENRIN. 
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 This official hierarchy, the formal map, and the prescribed behavior of administrative 
staff in Shōnan all mattered: they framed the behavior of the thousands of Japanese 
administrators who worked out of Shōnan at any one time. But it was nowhere near the whole 
story of the military administration of Shōnan. For all its abstract and physical manifestations, 
Japanese soldiers in this period are famous for their willingness to disregard the formal 
hierarchies of the military. Akashi Yōji has described this phenomenon as an outgrowth of the 
principle of dokudan senkō (
), which to the Japanese military meant the “complete 
freedom in the area of operational planning and execution” of staff-officers in the field that 
“endowed them with a discretionary power to execute operational policy without obtaining 
approval or orders from superiors.” Whether you describe this behavior as gekokujō (), a 
poetic medieval term that means “the lower overcomes the higher,” or as thinly veiled 
insubordination, from the early 1930s on lower-level Japanese officers orchestrated 
assassinations, international incidents, and even full-blown coups when they disagreed with the 
direction that senior military and civilian leaders were taking the country in.10 The manifestations 
of this disregard among Japanese officers for the chain of command were not nearly as extreme 
in Shōnan as they were in Japan and Manchuria a decade earlier, but it did mean that 
Gunseikanbu leaders generally disregarded their subordination to the Gunseisōkanbu and took 
their concerns straight to informal allies in Tokyo when problems cropped up.11 Shōnan’s 
municipal administrators were willing to leapfrog the entire military hierarchy as well if it suited 
                                               
10 Akashi himself uses the term gekokujō, referring to noted Japanese intellectual Maruyama Masao’s use of the 
same to describe wartime Japan. Akashi Yōji, “Bureaucracy and the Japanese Military Administration, with Specific 
Reference to Malaya,” in William H. Newell, ed., Japan in Asia, 1942–1945 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 
1981), 49. 
11 Kurasawa Aiko 
!, “Kaidai” *1in Hiroku: Senji Geppō/Gunsei Geppō %/,, 
Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha 2"(, 2000), 3. 
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their political ends. The formal hierarchy of the Japanese military administration in Southeast 
Asia framed the experience of wartime administrators there, but it was not the sole determinant 
of an individual administrator’s influence within the regime. 
